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Yet this effort to stamp norms onto a covert and chaotic arena of competition has been unsuccessful. For one thing, it is not always simple to define what is “honourable”, in Mr Hayden’s parlance, and what is not. If stealing a policy document is kosher, why not a vaccine? The line between espionage and subversion is also blurred: is Russia stealing emails to understand American policy, or to publish them later? It is not always clear until after the fact.
然而，這種將規范強加于隱蔽而混亂的競爭舞臺的努力卻沒有成功。首先，用海登的話來說，界定入侵行為是否“光榮”并不總是那么簡單。如果界定竊取政策文件為正當活動，那為什么不可以竊取疫苗文件呢？間諜活動和破壞活動之間的界限也很模糊：俄羅斯竊取電子郵件是為了了解美國政策，還是為了稍后公布它們？直到事后才清楚。
Most so-called cyber-attacks are simply espionage. But espionage conducted over computer networks has enabled intelligence gathering on a scale that was previously impossible. Though America has been as much a beneficiary of this intelligence revolution as it has been a victim, it has grown less tolerant in recent years. American views of “what’s allowed in cyberspace” have changed since the OPM breach five years ago, says Max Smeets of the Centre for Security Studies in Zurich. Such large-scale espionage “would be now at the top of the list of operations that they would deem as unacceptable,” he suggests.
大多數所謂的網絡攻擊只是間諜活動。但通過計算機網絡進行的間諜活動使情報收集達到了前所未有的規模。盡管美國既是這場情報革命的受益者，也是受害者，但近年來美國的容忍度有所下降。蘇黎世安全研究中心的馬克斯•斯梅茨稱，自從五年前人事管理局被攻破以來，美國對“網絡空間準入什么”的看法已經發生了變化。他表示，美國目前認為如此大規模的間諜活動“將是不可接受的首要行動”。
Yet forbidding something is different from stopping it. “Deterrence is mostly irrelevant in an intelligence contest,” writes Joshua Rovner of the American University in Washington, a scholar-in-residence at the NSA in 2018-19. “No combination of threats and promises will stop a rival intelligence service from collecting information.” Sturdier defences are needed.
然而，禁止與阻止是不同的。美國國家安全局2018-19年度的駐校學者、華盛頓美國大學的約書亞•羅夫納寫道：“威懾在情報競賽中大多無關緊要。”。“任何威脅和承諾的結合都不能阻止敵對情報機構收集信息。”我們需要更堅固的防御。
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