The first is by ripping up the legal framework, as the EU cancels the “passports” that let City firms operate across the continent. Activity may move in search of certainty. The second is by the remaining 27 EU members adopting an industrial policy that uses regulation to compel financial firms to move to the Euro zone. As Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris jostle for business, this fight is turning ugly. And the last is from within Britain—if a Corbyn government takes the country back decades, with nationalisation at below-market prices, a financial-transactions tax, a tough line on mergers and acquisitions and possibly even capital controls. If a Labour government also attacks private schools and second homes, London’s giant pools of capital will disappear faster than a trader’s cocktail.
第一方面是由于歐盟取消了允許金融城公司在歐洲大陸運(yùn)營的“護(hù)照”，這一做法破壞了法律框架。行動可能是為了尋找確定性。第二方面是其余27個歐盟成員國采取產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，利用監(jiān)管來迫使金融公司轉(zhuǎn)移到歐元區(qū)。隨著阿姆斯特丹、法蘭克福和巴黎爭奪業(yè)務(wù)，這場爭斗正變得越來越丑陋。最后一方面來自英國國內(nèi)——如果科爾賓政府讓英國倒退幾十年，伴隨著低于市場價格的國有化、金融交易稅、并購的強(qiáng)硬路線，甚至可能是資本控制。如果工黨政府也反對私立學(xué)校和第二套住房，倫敦巨大的資本池將會比商人的雞尾酒會消失得更快。
Given the sums at stake—London hosts $20trn of bank assets and securities—you might expect a grand bargain between the EUand its financial hub. Some chance. Britain has spurned the option of staying in the single market. A bespoke deal for financial services is not on the table because the EU is loth to grant special favours to a departing country. It is as if New York and Wall Street were divorcing America without any agreement. Thanks to temporary licences, the risk of a financial crisis on Brexit day is slim. But these arrangements will not last long—the deal over derivatives, say, expires next year.
考慮到所涉及的金額（倫敦?fù)碛?0萬億美元的銀行資產(chǎn)和證券），你可能期望歐盟與倫敦金融中心達(dá)成一筆大交易。有機(jī)會。英國拒絕了留在單一市場的選擇。為金融服務(wù)量身定制的協(xié)議不在談判之列，因為歐盟不愿向一個即將離開的國家提供特別優(yōu)惠。這就好像紐約和華爾街在沒有達(dá)成任何協(xié)議的情況下就與美國分離了。由于臨時許可，英國退歐當(dāng)天爆發(fā)金融危機(jī)的風(fēng)險很小。但這些安排不會持續(xù)太久——比方說，衍生品交易將于明年到期。
Behind the stand-off is a deep divide. The City could keep free access to the EU if it agreed to be regulated by it. But Britain rightly fears handing control of its largest industry to the bloc, particularly if the EU’s unspoken goal is to shrink London. Europe’s motives blend principle and greed. It wants to supervise its own financial system, but also to grab jobs and tax revenues from London. In the long run the most likely set-up is “equivalence”, in which firms receive recognition from Europe. The catch is that, as Switzerland is discovering, this can be withdrawn at any time, leading to a state of permanent instability. That threat will lead to a drift of activity and people into the Euro zone as EU authorities win full sovereignty over the Euro zone’s capital markets.
在這種僵局的背后，存在著巨大的分歧。如果倫敦金融城同意接受歐盟的監(jiān)管，它可以保持自由進(jìn)入歐盟的權(quán)利。但英國有理由擔(dān)心，將其最大產(chǎn)業(yè)的控制權(quán)交給歐盟，尤其是如果歐盟的不言而喻的目標(biāo)是縮小倫敦的規(guī)模的情況下。歐洲的動機(jī)混合了原則和貪婪。它想監(jiān)管自己的金融體系，但也想從倫敦攫取就業(yè)和稅收。從長遠(yuǎn)來看，最有可能的設(shè)置是“對等”，即企業(yè)獲得歐洲的認(rèn)可。但問題是，正如瑞士所發(fā)現(xiàn)的那樣，這種做法可以在任何時候撤銷，從而導(dǎo)致永久性的不穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)。隨著歐盟當(dāng)局贏得對歐元區(qū)資本市場的完全主權(quán)，這一威脅將導(dǎo)致大量活動和民眾涌入歐元區(qū)。
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