Over a lifetime, all of us change to an extraordinary degree. From a physical perspective, we start off as a little bundle about 50 centimeters high.With cherubic features, and elastic soft skin.And then we may end up some ninety years later, as a stoopped, gray, liver-spotted 180 centimeter high structure.
人的一生都將會(huì)經(jīng)歷巨大的變化。就生理變化而言 我們最開始都不過是50厘米高的新生兒。天真無邪 皮膚柔軟 充滿彈性。而也許九十年后,我們就會(huì)成為彎腰駝背 頭發(fā)灰白 身患肝斑的一米八的驅(qū)殼。
In the intervening period, every single cell in our body will have been replaced often many times over, and would've gone through all kinds of experiences that perhaps leave almost no trace in memory.
期間，我們身體里幾乎每一個(gè)細(xì)胞都將一次又一次地被替換，它們也將經(jīng)歷各種各樣的幾乎不會(huì)留在我們記憶中的事。
The twenty five-year-old won't remember most of what the five-year-old felt so strongly about, the sixty seven-year-old will only dimly recall what was on their mind as they approached 30. We carry the same name throughout our lives, and consider ourselves as a relatively stable unitary entity.
25歲的你只會(huì)對你5歲時(shí)的喜怒哀樂保有模糊的記憶，67歲的你也只能依稀記得奔三時(shí)的零星往事。我們一輩子只有一個(gè)名字，并認(rèn)為自己是一個(gè)相對穩(wěn)定的個(gè)體。
But is really right to think of ourselves as the same person?Once one puts it under a philosophical microscope, the issue of personal identity emerges as far trickier than it first assumed.
但一生中，我們是否能認(rèn)為自己是"同一個(gè)人"？當(dāng)我們用哲學(xué)的眼光細(xì)細(xì)研究時(shí)，"人格"這個(gè)問題遠(yuǎn)比我們想象中的更加棘手。
So in what ways could we be said to be continuous throughout time?What does guarantee that we can plausibly think of ourselves as the same people over a lifetime?
那么，我們要怎么樣才能稱得上是延續(xù)不變的？我們到底要在什么條件下，才能一輩子都把自己看作是同一個(gè)人？
Just where is personal identity located? A standard assumption is that it's out body that guarantees our personal identity. This is the theory that a key part of what makes me me, is that I'm housed in an identical body.
"人格"到底生于何處？通常，人們會(huì)認(rèn)為我們的身體決定了人格。這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為"我"之所以為"我"，主要是因?yàn)?quot;我"附在我的軀體上。
But philosophers like to push this assumption around a little. Imagine if I lost all my hair. Would I still be me? Yes, sure. What if I lost a finger? Eh ... Yes. A leg? Definitely. Now, what if a malevolent demon appeared and told us that we have to lose every part of our bodies, but could keep just on bit. Which bit would it be? Few of us will pick our elbows or bellybuttons. Almost all of us would pick our brains, and that tells us something interesting.
而哲學(xué)家們則喜歡挑戰(zhàn)這個(gè)設(shè)想。想象一下 如果我掉光了頭發(fā) 那我還是我嗎？當(dāng)然是啦。那沒了一根手指呢？額 . ..是一條腿呢？當(dāng)然是咯。現(xiàn)在，有個(gè)惡魔要取走我們身體的所有部位，只留下一部分，你會(huì)選哪一部分？很少人會(huì)選手肘或者肚臍眼兒。幾乎所有人都會(huì)選大腦，這點(diǎn)非常有趣。
We assume implicitly that some bits of our bodies are more "meish", closer to the core of personal identity than others, and most "meish"of all the bits are our brains.
我們的潛意識認(rèn)為我們身體的某些部位更能代表"我"，比起其他部分，這些部位更接近我們?nèi)烁竦暮诵模罹呷烁裉卣鞯牟课痪褪谴竽X了。
Christianity runs a version of this thought experiment. It asks us to think what will happen after our death, and it imagines a separation of the body, ultimately not as significant, and the ongoing survival of a more modest precious bit that it calls the soul.
基督教就宣傳著對這個(gè)思維實(shí)驗(yàn)的其中一種解讀。它讓我們想象自己死后會(huì)發(fā)生什么事，基督教認(rèn)為，人死后會(huì)軀體分離，因?yàn)樗罱K是無關(guān)緊要的，而繼續(xù)存在下去的則是更加精髓的部分——靈魂。
There's another version of this thought experiment that two lovers can play. In the early throes of love, two people who've gone to bed together might ask : what do you really like about me?
這個(gè)思維實(shí)驗(yàn)還有一個(gè)版本 適合由情侶來進(jìn)行。在陷入情網(wǎng)的初期，事后的兩人也許會(huì)問對方：你究竟喜歡我什么？

The wrong answer is to say you're fabulous breasts, or your amazing muscular arms. Breast and chest don't ultimately feel meish enough to be a respectable answer. It seems we want to be loved for something closer to our real self, perhaps our soul or our brain.
以下是錯(cuò)誤答案：你那傲人的胸線，或你那充滿力量的手臂。胸部并不代表"自我"的典型部位，因此該答案零分。人們希望聽到更能代表他們真實(shí)自我的部位，例如靈魂和大腦。
Let's push the thought experiment further. What bit of the brain is actually most crucial to being me? Let's imagine that I have a bump to the head and lose my ability to play table tennis. Am I still myself? Most of us would say: yes,sure. What if I once spoke Latin and lose the ability, or forgot how to cook asparagus with a light mayonnaise sauce? Would I still be me ? Yes. In other words, technical capacities don't feel very close to the core of personal identity.
讓我們來進(jìn)一步研究這個(gè)思維實(shí)驗(yàn)。大腦中的哪個(gè)部位對于"自我"來說是最重要的呢？試想，如果我的頭被砸到了，不能再打乒乓球了。我還是我嗎？多數(shù)人會(huì)說：當(dāng)然是。如果我會(huì)說拉丁語，突然喪失了這種能力，或者忘了怎么用低脂蛋黃醬炒蘆筍？那我還是我嗎？是的。也就是說技術(shù)能力和"人格"并沒有很大的關(guān)系。
What about other kinds of memories? A big part of making me me, tends to be my store of memories. I remember that carpet in my bedroom when I was growing up, the girl I was in love with in university, or the weather over Sydney as we came into land for my first Australian book tour. But what if these memories all vanished as well? Could I still be me ?
那其他方面的記憶呢？我之所以是我，很大程度上取決于我的記憶存儲。我記得小時(shí)候房間里的掛毯，在大學(xué)追過的女孩，或者第一次為了簽書會(huì)而登上澳洲大陸時(shí)，悉尼的天氣。但如果這些記憶都消失了呢？我還能是我嗎？
One view is : possibly, so long as something else remained, and that thing we can call, my character. In other words, if my characteristic way of responding to situations, my sense of that is fun, wise, interesting or important remain the same, I can still, in some fundamental way, claimed to be the same person.
其中一個(gè)看法是：只要那種被稱為"特性"的東西被保留下來，那我就有可能還是"我"。也就是說，我對某種情形的獨(dú)特反應(yīng)，以及我對滑稽、睿智、有趣或重要等等的理解保持一致，那么歸根結(jié)底，我還能稱得上是"我"。
My memory store of feelings and behaviors might be gone, but I could be assured of continuing to feel and behave in compatible ways in the future. Those around me would need to keep reminding me of stuff that happened, but they would still recognize me as me.
雖然我的對情感和行為的記憶已經(jīng)消失，但我感知與行動(dòng)的方式還是和從前一樣。身邊的人需要不斷提醒我以前發(fā)生過的事，但他們還是會(huì)把失憶的"我"看作以前的"我"。
A fascinating idea comes into view. Personal identity seems to consist not in bodily survival, I could be put in somebody else's body or live in a jar and still be me .nor in the survival of memory, I could forget everything and still be me, bet in the survival of what we are here going to call: character.
由此可得出一個(gè)非常耐人尋味的觀點(diǎn)。"人格"并不取決于軀體的是否存在，我可以附在別的軀體上，或是在一個(gè)瓶子里生活，但我還是我。"人格"也不取決于記憶是否存在，我可以完全失憶，但我還是我，"人格"取決于我們接下來要說的"特性"之中。
This is an idea attributed to the English philosopher John Locke, who famously wrote personal identity is made up of what he called sameness of consciousness.
這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是英國哲學(xué)家約翰·洛克提出的，他有一名句：人格是由意識的同一性構(gòu)成的。
If a demon offered as a choice between remembering everything but feeling and valuing very differently, or feeling and valuing the same sorts of things but remembering nothing, most of us would, Lock suggests, chose the latter. So if we have to boil personal identity down to its essence, it seems to come down to values, inclinations and temperament.
如果一個(gè)魔鬼讓你選擇 A. 記得所有事，但對事物的感知和評價(jià)有巨大變化。B. 對事物感知和評價(jià)不變，但忘記所有事。洛克認(rèn)為，大多數(shù)人都會(huì)選擇B（價(jià)值觀不變）。所以 若將 "人格"這個(gè)概念進(jìn)行提煉，那剩下就只是價(jià)值觀、意向和性格。
Let's think of death with all these in mind. The standard view of death is that it's sad because it means the end of our identity. Now it certainly does mean the end if we identify identity with the survival of our bodies or without our memories.
明白了這些之后，讓我們來考慮一下死亡。常人認(rèn)為 死亡讓人悲傷，是因?yàn)樗馕吨烁竦南觥Ｈ绻覀冋J(rèn)為人格和軀體或記憶有關(guān)，那死亡的確就等于人格的消亡。
But if we think that who we are is to a large degree about our values and characteristic loves and hates, then we're in a sense, granted a kind of mortality.
但如果我們認(rèn)為"自我"很大程度上取決于我們的價(jià)值觀和個(gè)人獨(dú)特的愛恨情仇，那就某種意義而言，我們是永生的。
Simply through the fact that these will continue to live on in our species as a whole, lodged here and there, outside of their present home. Perhaps what we have learned to call "me " was only ever a temporary resting place, for a set of ideas and proclivities that are far older, and are destined to live on far longer than our bodies. We might attempt to be less sad about death by letting go of the idea, that we are a particular constellation of physical features.You're always in a sense far longer lasting, far more trans-generational as a bundle of inclinations and ideas.
因?yàn)樗麄儗⒁恢痹谌祟愡@個(gè)物種中存在，他們寄存在這人或那人身上，不局限于現(xiàn)在的軀體中。也許現(xiàn)在我們所說的"我"只是一個(gè)暫時(shí)的儲存空間，寄存著一堆早就存在的想法和意向，而且遠(yuǎn)在我們的肉體消亡之后，它們還能存在下去。如果我們不再把"人格"看成是由一堆生理特征組成的話，那面對死亡，我們就能更看得開了。如果把"人格"看作一系列的意向和想法的話，那你的人格將能跨越世世代代，比你的軀體更加長壽。
We will continue to crop up and live, wherever those ideas that are most characteristic of us will emerge, as they must in the generations that have to come.
在未來的千秋萬代里，哪里有著最具"我"的特性的思想，哪里就會(huì)有我們生活的蹤跡。
Focusing in on questions of identity has the paradoxical and rather cheering effect of making us both less attached to certain bits of us, and more confident that the really important things about who we have been will survive in a way long after or bodies of return to dust and our memories have been obliterated.
注重"人格"有一種非常矛盾卻鼓舞人心的效果，它讓我們不再癡迷于自己身體的某些部位，而是讓我們堅(jiān)信對"我"來說最重要的東西會(huì)在我們的軀體早已歸于塵土、記憶早已消逝無蹤時(shí)仍然長存不朽。