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The First World War
第一次世界大戰
Look back with angst
再回首 憂心忡忡
A century on, there are uncomfortable parallels with the era that led to the outbreak of the First World War
一戰過去已有一個世紀，回望一戰卻發現與當今世界有不少相似之處，令人不安。
AS NEW YEAR approached a century ago, most people in the West looked forward to 1914 with optimism.
一個世紀前，同是新年將至，許多西方人對即將來臨的1914年充滿期待。
The hundred years since the Battle of Waterloo had not been entirely free of disaster—there had been a horrific civil war in America, some regional scraps in Asia, the Franco-Prussian war and the occasional colonial calamity.
滑鐵盧戰役百年來，世界仍未完全擺脫災難—美國爆發嚴重內戰，亞洲部分地區變成廢墟，普法戰爭爆發，殖民地災難時有發生。
But continental peace had prevailed.
不過，各大陸整體來說還是和平的。
Globalisation and new technology—the telephone, the steamship, the train—had knitted the world together.
全球化進程加深，加上電話，蒸汽船，火車等新技術應運而生，世界各國緊密相連。
John Maynard Keynes has a wonderful image of a Londoner of the time, sipping his morning tea in bed and ordering the various products of the whole earth to his door, much as he might today from Amazon—and regarding this state of affairs as normal, certain and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement.
凱恩斯精彩描繪了當時倫敦人的生活情景，躺在床上嘖吧嘖吧喝著早茶，訂購來自全世界各地的各種產品還送貨上門，就像現在從亞馬遜上購物一樣—他們認為這種狀態正常，必然且不變，要變也只會變更好。
The Londoner might well have had by his bedside table a copy of Norman Angell's The Great Illusion, which laid out the argument thatEurope's economies were so integrated that war was futile.
他們的床頭桌上可能還放著一本諾曼?安吉爾的《大幻覺》，例舉種種說明歐洲經濟高度一體化，戰爭無用。
Yet within a year, the world was embroiled in a most horrific war.
然而不到一年，整個世界卷入了一場極端可怕的戰爭。
It cost 9m lives—and many times that number if you take in the various geopolitical tragedies it left in its wake, from the creation of Soviet Russia to the too-casual redrawing of Middle Eastern borders and the rise of Hitler.
一戰中，900萬人喪生；一戰后，蘇聯建國，中東地區的國家邊界被草率劃定，希特勒迅速崛起，若把這些尾隨一戰而來的地緣政治慘劇都囊括在內的話，死亡人數可就要翻好幾番了。
From being a friend of freedom, technology became an agent of brutality, slaughtering and enslaving people on a terrifying scale.
而科技，從自由之友搖身變成暴行的代理人，無數人因此遭屠殺、被奴役。
Barriers shot up around the world, especially during the Great Depression of the 1930s.
世界各地壁壘林立，在20世紀30年代經濟大蕭條時期更是如此。
The globalisation that Keynes's Londoner enjoyed only really began again in 1945—or, some would argue, in the 1990s, when eastern Europe was set free and Deng Xiaoping's reforms began bearing fruit in China.
凱恩斯筆下倫敦人享受的全球化真正再次出現已是1945年，或是有人認為的20世紀90年代，那時西歐解放，鄧小平在中國的改革開放已初見成效。
The driving force behind the catastrophe that befell the world a century ago wasGermany, which was looking for an excuse for a war that would allow it to dominate Europe.
德國一直伺機尋找借口發動戰爭欲征服歐洲，是百年前那場大災難的助推手。
Yet complacency was also to blame.
然而他國的驕傲自滿也難辭其咎。
Too many people, inLondon,Parisand elsewhere, believed that because Britainand Germanywere each other's biggest trading partners after America and there was therefore no economic logic behind the conflict, war would not happen.
不論是在倫敦、巴黎還是其它地方，有太多人認為英德兩國互為僅次于美國的第二大貿易合作伙伴，也就不會有經濟方面的糾紛，戰爭也就不會爆發。
As Keynes put it, The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of…daily newspaper.
正如凱恩斯所言，軍國主義和帝國主義，種族和文化對抗，貿易壟斷、限制和排外等種種計劃和政策正如失樂園的撒旦化身大蛇一樣，然而在倫敦人看來，不過是日報上的娛樂新聞罷了。
Playing your role
演好角色
Humanity can learn from its mistakes, as shown by the response to the economic crisis, which was shaped by a determination to avoid the mistakes that led to the Depression.
從經濟危機的應對便可看出，人類能從錯誤中吸取教訓，尤其當人們下定決心不再重蹈經濟大蕭條的覆轍時。
The memory of the horrors unleashed a century ago makes leaders less likely to stumble into war today.
回憶起百年前這場恐怕的戰爭，各國便不太可能再度卷入戰爭。
So does the explosive power of a modern conflagration: the threat of a nuclear holocaust is a powerful brake on the reckless escalation that dispatched a generation of young men into the trenches.
同樣，想到現代沖突帶來的爆炸威力：核毀滅的威脅有力的剎住了不顧后果的沖突升級，新一代年輕男子也就無需匍匐戰壕了。
Yet the parallels remain troubling.
然而當今世界與一戰的諸多相似之處，仍令人擔憂。
The United StatesisBritain, the superpower on the wane, unable to guarantee global security.
現在的美國類似當時的英國，同是月滿正虧的超級大國，同樣無法保證全球安全。
Its main trading partner,China, plays the part of Germany, a new economic power bristling with nationalist indignation and building up its armed forces rapidly.
中國，美國最主要的貿易伙伴，則類似當時的德國，同為新興經濟力量，同樣充斥著憤懣的民族主義者，同樣在迅速地構建軍事力量。
Modern Japan is France, an ally of the retreating hegemon and a declining regional power.
日本就如當時的法國，同為衰退霸權國的同盟者，在地區的影響力同樣下降。
The parallels are not exact—China lacks the Kaiser's territorial ambitions and America's defence budget is far more impressive than imperial Britain's—but they are close enough for the world to be on its guard.
不過，并無完全相同，中國缺少德國擴張的野心，美國的國防預算也遠強于那時的英帝國。然而，這種高度相似已足以令世界提高警惕。
Which, by and large, it is not.
但總體上并未引起世界各國的重視。
The most troubling similarity between 1914 and now is complacency.
自滿才是1914年與當今世界最令人擔憂的相似點。
Business people today are like businesspeople then: too busy making money to notice the serpents flickering at the bottom of their trading screens.
商人還像那時的的商人：忙著掙錢，對電子交易屏下若隱若現的撒旦毒蛇渾然不知。
Politicians are playing with nationalism just as they did 100 years ago.
政客也還像百年前的政客那樣，耍弄老一套民族主義。
India may next year elect Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist who refuses to atone for a pogrom against Muslims in the state he runs and who would have his finger on the button of a potential nuclear conflict with his Muslim neighbours in Pakistan.
明年印度總統大選，納倫德拉?莫迪或當選，作為一名印度教民族主義者，他拒絕彌補在他管轄的州內發生的屠殺穆斯林的行為；他一旦上臺，有可能觸發與穆斯林領邦巴基斯坦潛在的核沖突。
Vladimir Putin has been content to watch Syria rip itself apart.
敘利亞四分五裂，俄羅斯已表現出漁翁旁觀之態。
And the European Union, which came together in reaction to the bloodshed of the 20th century, is looking more fractious and riven by incipient nationalism than at any point since its formation.
而歐盟，在20世紀為抵制殺戮而結成聯盟，如今民族主義抬頭，歐盟呈現出自成立以來最為分裂的狀態，內部也極易起沖突。
I have drunk and seen the spider
酒醉蛛現
Two precautions would help prevent any of these flashpoints sparking a conflagration.
為防星星之火燎原，有兩種預防措施。
One is a system for minimising the threat from potential dangers.
其一，構建安全體系，將潛在危險降到最低。
Nobody is quite clear what will happen when North Koreaimplodes, but America and Chinaneed to plan ahead if they are to safeguard its nuclear programme without antagonising each other.
一旦朝鮮內戰爆發，誰也無法預料會發生什么，但中美兩國必須未雨綢繆，屆時才能既穩住朝鮮核項目，又不致引起敵對。
Eventually, somebody is bound to crash into somebody else—and there is as yet no system for dealing with it.
最終，定有迎頭相撞的時候，而目前卻還沒有應對體系。
A code of maritime conduct for the area is needed.
因此，這個地區還需要一套海洋行為準則。
The second precaution that would make the world safer is a more active American foreign policy.
促進世界安全的第二個預防措施則需要美國采取更積極的外交政策。
Despite forging an interim nuclear agreement with Iran, Barack Obama has pulled back in the Middle East—witness his unwillingness to use force in Syria.
盡管同伊朗簽訂了臨時核協議，奧巴馬已從中東地區事務中抽手，他不愿對敘利亞動武即是例證。
He has also done little to bring the new emerging giants—India,Indonesia,Braziland, above all,China—into the global system.
此外，印度、印尼、巴西尤其是中國等新型大國加入全球體系，美國貢獻甚微。
This betrays both a lack of ambition and an ignorance of history.
這一切都透露出：奧巴馬歷史缺乏，雄心不足。
Thanks to its military, economic and soft power,Americais still indispensable, particularly in dealing with threats like climate change and terror, which cross borders.
多虧軍事、經濟和軟實力依舊強大，美國仍是必不可少的角色，尤其在應對全球氣候變化和恐怖主義上。
But unlessAmericabehaves as a leader and the guarantor of the world order, it will be inviting regional powers to test their strength by bullying neighbouring countries.
但只有當美國扮演好領導者和世界秩序維護者的角色，其他地區大國才不會為試實力欺辱鄰國。
The chances are that none of the world's present dangers will lead to anything that compares to the horrors of 1914.
也許當今世界的各種威脅還不致造成1914年那樣可怕的戰爭。
Madness, whether motivated by race, religion or tribe, usually gives ground to rational self-interest. But when it triumphs, it leads to carnage, so to assume that reason will prevail is to be culpably complacent.
無論是種族、宗教還是部落驅動的瘋狂行為，通常都會向理性的自身利益考量讓步。一旦瘋狂占據上風，屠殺就難以避免，因此假定理智永遠會戰勝瘋狂的自滿，本應受責。
That is the lesson of a century ago.
這就是我們應吸取的一戰教訓。
