評論
打印
Asia
亞洲中國
Pakistan's armed forces
巴基斯坦的軍事力量
Out of the driving seat
失去駕駛權的司機
The prime minister wants to put the army in its place
巴基斯坦的總統想要把軍隊置于此地。
IT IS said that the army chief is the most powerful man in Pakistan.
據稱軍隊總司令是巴基斯坦權利最大的人。
Even so, the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, made a point of keeping the new head waiting for as long as possible.
至于說， 侯賽因總統提出想見這位總司令都要加入其等待長隊的行列。
Breaking with the convention that gives the new chief a month or two to prepare, Mr Sharif named a successor just two days before the outgoing chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a former spymaster turned double-term army chief, was due to retire.
被中斷的大會告訴新總統，給他兩個月去準備，在前任軍方總司令離職后，侯賽因總統任命了繼承人。前總司令卡亞尼曾任一位擔任兩個軍隊的司令，前任間諜領頭。他面臨退休而不得不離開崗位。
Lieutenant General Raheel Sharif will now control not only a vast army and the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, but a business empire ranging from cornflakes to luxury housing.
拉赫利·謝里夫不將會主宰多方位的軍隊，還會掌權逐漸擴張的核能軍火庫。
So why the delay?
為什么推遲了如此久才定音？
The prime minister is not always decisive, and bear in mind that the last time he picked an army chief, Pervez Musharraf in 1998, his appointee ousted him in a coup a year later.
總統也不是神，永遠能夠很快地做出有效的決定。在1988年，在經過慎重考慮之后，侯賽因總統任命佩爾韋茲·穆沙拉夫作為軍方總司令，而他的上司，那個指定他的人，在過后的幾年將他罷職。
Others, however, suspect an attempt by Mr Sharif to assert civilian authority over an army that needs to be put in its place.
有些人懷疑謝里夫想要維持文官權利高于軍隊，所以不得不做到這步。
The army sees itself as both embodiment and guarantor of the nation.
軍隊認為他們是既國家的捍衛者又是國家的化身。
Yet it has long been at the root of Pakistan's deepest problems.
盡管這長時間以來一直是巴基斯坦最根本的問題。
By meddling in elections and mounting coups, it has weakened the political classes, whose consequent ineptitude and corruption gives it cause to meddle again.
通過一系列的干預競選和愈加劇烈的政變，政治階級已經被削弱。而緊接著的便是無能和不稱職公仆和不斷的賄賂，這又導致了再一次政治干預。
It has a history of disastrous military adventures.
在歷史上記載著一次軍隊災難性的經歷。
And it has made common cause with militant Islamists who it hoped would further its interests abroad—keeping India on edge to the south and sowing confusion in Afghanistan to the north in hopes of preventing anti-Pakistan forces growing there.
而原因是同樣的—穆斯林軍人想要對外擴張，取得更多利益—把印度置于南方的邊際，在阿富汗的北面散布迷惑信息，以防止反巴基斯坦勢力上漲。
The country is now paying a terrible price for its sponsorship of foreign terror.
目前，巴基斯坦在國際反恐活動中提供了高得離譜的資助，
It has spawned dozens of local extremist groups attacking Pakistan itself.
這卻導致多數的巴基斯坦本地極端分子集團攻擊本國人。
Since 2001 nearly 50,000 Pakistanis have died in terror-related violence.
自2001年起，已經有五十萬巴基斯坦人民由于恐怖分子引發的相關犯罪事件而死亡。
For a long time the generals refused to see the Islamists for the threat they are.
很長一段時間來，高層們一直不承認穆斯林分子對他們來說是一個威脅的存在。
Officers from the army's spy wing, Inter-Services Intelligence, were probably involved in funding and planning deadly attacks in Mumbai in 2008 carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba.
2008年，一群出自情報局的軍方間諜在孟買被虔誠軍襲擊致死。
General Kayani may have been as bad as the rest.
當時的總司令卡亞尼可能已經看出其他穆斯林分子也將跟虔誠軍一樣頑劣。
While he was rising to the top, the Afghan Taliban regrouped, the Mumbai attacks were planned, and Osama bin Laden settled in a garrison town.
于是當他的權利處于上位時，阿富汗塔利班的軍隊被重新部署，孟買襲擊在當時也開始進行策劃。當時本拉登被安置在駐防區的小鎮里。
Yet along the way the soldier-spy grew into the pragmatist committed to getting the army out of the driving seat and nurturing Pakistan's return to democracy.
然而，偽裝成士兵的間諜務實地保證，要將軍隊攆出獨裁，主導之位，要使巴基斯坦重回民主之路。
He and Mr Sharif seem to have got on, while the Americans respected him.
此人和總司令已有交手，而美國人表現出更尊重他。
Crucially, says Asad Munir, a retired ISI brigadier, he began to understand the nature of the existential threat posed by militant Islam.
重要的是，前情報局參謀長穆尼爾說，他已經明白，目前存在的威脅本質就是穆斯林軍人。
Military force is required to take it on, particularly in North Waziristan, a tribal area which an alphabet soup of al-Qaeda affiliates have made their base.
軍方勢力要求要掌握在手，特別是部落地區北瓦齊里斯坦，是一碗基于附屬基地組織的字母湯
General Sharif's appointment was a surprise.
總司令謝里夫的任命是很令人驚訝的。
But the good news is that he shares General Kayani's thinking on domestic militancy.
但是值得一喜的是，他前前總司令卡亞尼交流了關于國內軍事力量的想法。
In charge of army training, he was closely involved in efforts to retool an army trained for set-piece battles with India for counter-insurgency in the country's wild tribal west.
他想要接近于重組一支訓練有素的軍隊，為巴基斯坦西面廣闊的部落地帶與印度的反動起義戰爭定下籌碼。
Like General Kayani, he knows first-hand the futility of peace accords that militant groups soon renege on.
前總司令卡亞尼知道，無戰爭代價的和平定將帶來無效的回應——對方軍隊一定很快就會食言。
The problem is that the prime minister has yet to produce a national counter-terrorism strategy and says peace talks must be tried first.
而問題就是，侯賽因總統已經將國內反恐怖主義戰略定案，同時宣稱，必須先保證和平。
It is a cause with minimal chance of success, but one hotly promoted by much of the political establishment.
盡管這只是一個非常難以成功的方案，但是政治大量完善與建成被激烈地推崇。
Many more innocent lives may have to be lost before the politicians find the nerve for a military solution.
在政治家發想要運用軍事能夠解決問題之前，可能很多無辜的生命都將面臨著犧牲。
Elsewhere irritation with civilian government is already flowering among junior officers. But there is no mood to take over.
公民政府的無理取鬧已經在老一輩的官員里傳開，可是沒有人有此閑情雅致去掌權。
Mr Musharraf's eight years in power were a disaster.
穆沙拉夫八年執政便是場災難軍方不可挑戰的高高權威已經引起了廣播的大肆宣傳。
The army's once-unchallenged authority has leeched away to a set of rambunctiousbroadcast media, an activist supreme court and civilian politicians who this year successfully transferred power from one elected government to another—a first for Pakistan. Good governance is the best way for civilian rulers to keep the army off their backs.
一位最高法院激進的官員第在巴基斯坦在一個政府的倒戈，另一個政權的崛起之下，成功轉移了自己的實力。 對于秩序制定者來說，一個好的政府應該把軍隊控制之下而非之上。
Still, the army can always play a spoiling game, especially when it comes to relations with India.
依然地，軍隊一直在玩掃興的游戲，特別是在與印度的關系上。
It makes no secret of despising Mr Sharif's enthusiasm for a rapid normalisation of relations, and opposes a crucial free-trade deal.
這是正大光明地鄙視謝里夫熱忱于對社會秩序的塑造，反對自由貿易的重要則曾。
And even as Mr Sharif dreams of visa-less travel across the Indo-Pakistani border, after years of relative calm the ceasefire line in contested Kashmir has become hot again.
就當謝里夫夢想穿越巴基斯坦-印度邊際不需要簽證時，緩和多年熄戰線現在又熱了起來。
The officers probably deserve some of the blame for that.
以這方面而言，責備，是政府應得的。
