If China hopes to calm the turmoil that has shaken financial markets at home and around the world, and to steer its economy to a soft landing, it must reform its regulatory policymaking regime.
如果中國想要平息震撼了國內(nèi)和全球金融市場的市場動蕩,引導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟走向軟著陸,就必須改革其監(jiān)管政策制定體制。
The government itself is a significant source of instability and uncertainty. China needs more professional policymaking to restore confidence, which is possible only if Beijing stops intervening in markets arbitrarily and allows regulators independent oversight.
中國政府本身就是不穩(wěn)定和不確定性的重要來源。中國需要更專業(yè)的政策制定方式來恢復(fù)人們的信心,而這只有在中國政府停止隨意干預(yù)市場并允許監(jiān)管機構(gòu)獨立監(jiān)督之后才成為可能。
By now almost everyone is familiar with two agencies: the seemingly careless China Securities Regulatory Commission and the uncommunicative People’s Bank of China . During China’s dramatic stock market crash in June and July last year, the CSRC was busy changing rules on the fly: limiting stock index futures trading, banning short selling, cutting margin ratios, locking up the holdings of large shareholders and then investigating for potential legal actions short-sellers and those selling off big blocks. These hasty rule changes, imposed for the immediate convenience, created much uncertainty for investors.
到目前為止,差不多所有人都熟悉中國的兩大機構(gòu):看上去隨意草率的中國證監(jiān)會(CSRC)和沉默寡言的中國央行(PBoC)。在去年6月和7月中國股市急劇崩盤期間,中國證監(jiān)會在忙著隨時隨刻更改規(guī)則:限制股指期貨交易、禁止做空、降低保證金比例、禁止大股東減持,還對做空者和大宗股票賣出者開展調(diào)查,以采取可能的法律行動。這些出于一時方便而對規(guī)則倉促做出的改變,給投資者帶來了許多不確定性。
On January 4, the first working day after the New Year break, the CSRC introduced the two-step circuit breakers — to pause trading when stock indices were down 5 per cent and to close for the day if the fall reached 7 per cent. Unfortunately, the circuit breakers were needed right away as the market plunged within a few hours of opening. They were triggered again on January 7, this time with trading closed just 15 minutes after opening. That very evening, just four days after introducing the mechanism, the CSRC killed it.
1月4日是元旦假期后的第一個工作日,當(dāng)天中國證監(jiān)會引入了兩級熔斷機制,即當(dāng)股指下跌5%時暫時停盤,而當(dāng)?shù)_(dá)到7%時則當(dāng)天閉市。不幸的是,由于股市在開盤幾小時內(nèi)就出現(xiàn)暴跌,兩級熔斷機制馬上就發(fā)揮了作用。而在1月7日它們再次被觸發(fā),這一次開盤僅15分鐘就閉市了。就在當(dāng)天晚上,也就是該機制引入僅僅4天后,中國證監(jiān)會暫停了這一機制。
Since the PBoC seldom communicates with the market, its actions are often misunderstood. For example, in August last year it reformed the mechanism for setting the renminbi exchange rate. Whereas the PBoC would previously give a morning fix with no link to the market rate, it now based the morning fix on the previous day’s closing rate on the onshore renminbi market.
而由于中國央行很少與市場溝通,該行的舉措經(jīng)常會被人誤解。比如,去年8月中國央行改革了人民幣匯率形成機制。過去,中國央行會在每天早晨設(shè)定一個與市場匯率沒有關(guān)系的人民幣匯率中間價。如今,該行卻會根據(jù)前一天在岸人民幣市場收盤匯率,設(shè)定每天早晨的人民幣匯率中間價。
It was a good reform, intended to signal that Beijing was still pushing market-orientated reforms despite arbitrary interventions in the stock market. However, the outside world interpreted that step as China intending to devalue the renminbi because of worse-than-expected troubles in the economy, resulting in heavy selling of the renminbi and risky assets across global markets.
這是個不錯的改革舉措,意在釋放一種信號,即盡管中國政府在隨意干涉中國股市,它卻仍在推動市場化改革。然而,外界對這一舉措的解讀,卻是中國由于經(jīng)濟困境糟于預(yù)期而有意讓人民幣貶值。這一解讀導(dǎo)致全球市場出現(xiàn)了對人民幣和高風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)的大舉拋售。
In December, the PBoC introduced a renminbi index based on a basket of currencies but left the market to guess at its intentions. After the New Year, the guessing game intensified as the PBoC seemed to allow the renminbi to depreciate for days, leading to further confusion and intensified selling pressure across markets.
去年12月,中國央行引入了基于一籃子貨幣的人民幣匯率指數(shù),卻讓市場自己猜測其意圖。新年之后,中國央行似乎放任人民幣連續(xù)多日貶值,令這種猜測游戲愈演愈烈,導(dǎo)致人們的困惑進一步加深,增大了整個市場的拋售壓力。
So does the Chinese government lack competent people, as many have concluded? The answer is no. For those of us who have dealt extensively with these organisations, it is no secret that the PBoC and CSRC are among the most competent agencies in Beijing. From top to bottom, they are staffed by well educated (often western educated) highly experienced professionals.
那么,是不是中國政府像許多人斷定的那樣,缺少能干的人士?答案是否定的。對于我們當(dāng)中與這些機構(gòu)打過密切交道的人來說,中國央行和中國證監(jiān)會屬于北京最能干的機構(gòu)并不是秘密。從上到下,他們的工作人員都是受過良好教育(往往是西方教育)、擁有豐富經(jīng)驗的專業(yè)人士。
The problem lies instead in these policymaking bodies’ lack of independence. In the US, the Federal Reserve has full authority to decide on monetary and banking policies, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has autonomy on securities market matters.
實際上,問題在于這些政策制定機構(gòu)缺乏獨立性。在美國,美聯(lián)儲(Fed)擁有決定貨幣政策和銀行業(yè)政策的全部權(quán)力,美國證交會(SEC)對證券市場的事務(wù)也有自治權(quán)。
By contrast the PBoC and CSRC cannot announce major, or sometimes even minor, policy decisions without the approval of the State Council, the state’s highest administrative body.
相比之下,沒有政府最高行政機構(gòu)國務(wù)院的批準(zhǔn),中國央行和證監(jiān)會無權(quán)公布重大政策決定——有時甚至連較小的政策決定都無權(quán)公布。
Within the State Council, it is the premier and four vice-premiers who ultimately decide on all proposals submitted by the PBoC, CSRC and other agencies. While they are all exceptionally gifted and well educated, they should not be expected to be experts on every policy matter.
而在國務(wù)院內(nèi)部,對中國央行、中國證監(jiān)會和其他機構(gòu)提交的所有提案作出最終決定的,是總理和四位副總理。雖然他們?nèi)紦碛袠O高才華,也受過良好教育,但人們不能指望他們是所有政策事務(wù)上的專家。
In the past, this mattered less. China lacked even a commercial banking sector, to say nothing of sophisticated capital and currency markets. For agriculture and traditional industries, the absence of independent economic policy agencies was probably manageable.
在過去,這一點沒那么重要。當(dāng)時的中國甚至沒有商業(yè)銀行部門,更不必說復(fù)雜的資本和貨幣市場了。而對農(nóng)業(yè)和傳統(tǒng)工業(yè)來說,缺乏獨立的經(jīng)濟政策機構(gòu)也許還行得通。
In the past two decades, however, the economy has become much more complex: many banks, big and small; markets in stocks, bonds, futures, options and other derivatives, and mutual funds, hedge funds, trusts and insurance industries, all developing rapidly. It is no longer realistic to expect one or two individuals to know it all and to be able to judge every policy matter.
然而,在過去二十年里,中國經(jīng)濟的復(fù)雜程度已大大增加:大大小小的眾多銀行,股市、債市、期貨市場、期權(quán)市場及其他衍生品市場,以及共同基金、對沖基金、信托和保險行業(yè),全都處于迅猛發(fā)展之中。指望一兩個人無所不知、并能對所有政策事務(wù)做出判斷不再現(xiàn)實。
To restore confidence and minimise turmoil, China needs to reform and ensure independence for the PBoC, CSRC and other policy bodies. Let experienced professionals take charge of the financial markets.
要想恢復(fù)人們的信心并將動蕩降至最低,中國必須開展改革,確保中國央行、證監(jiān)會和其他政策機構(gòu)的獨立性。讓有經(jīng)驗的專業(yè)人士掌管金融市場吧。