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Limited-liability, privately owned joint-stock companies are the core institutions of modern capitalism. These entities are largely responsible for organising the production and distribution of goods and services across the globe. Their role is both cause and consequence of the revolution in the scale and diversity of economic activity that has taken place over the past two centuries.
有限責任、私人所有的股份公司是現代資本主義的核心機構。這些實體在很大程度上承擔起組織全球范圍內商品和服務的生產和分配職責。它們的角色既是過去兩個世紀發生的經濟活動在規模和多元性方面革命的原因，也是其結果。
Almost nothing in economics is more important than thinking through how companies should be managed and for what ends. Unfortunately, we have made a mess of this. That mess has a name: it is “shareholder value maximisation”. Operating companies in line with this belief not only leads to misbehaviour but may also militate against their true social aim, which is to generate greater prosperity.
在經濟學中，幾乎沒有比思考明白該如何、以及出于何種目的管理公司更重要的了。遺憾的是，我們搞砸了這種思考，得出了糟糕的結論，那就是“股東價值最大化”。按照這種理念經營公司不僅會導致不當行為，而且還會妨礙它們實現真正的社會目標，即創造更大的繁榮。
I am not the first person to worry about the joint-stock company. Adam Smith, founder of modern economics, argued: “Negligence and profusion . . . must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.” His concern is over what we call the “agency problem” – the difficulty of monitoring management. Others complain that companies behave like psychopaths: a company aiming at maximising shareholder value might conclude it would be profitable – and so perhaps even its duty – to pollute the air and water if allowed to do so. It might also use its resources to obstruct an appropriate regulatory response to such (mis) behaviour.
我并非是第一個對股份公司感到憂慮的。現代經濟學創始人亞當•斯密(Adam Smith)指出：“玩忽職守和揮霍浪費……或多或少總是會在這類公司的管理過程中盛行。”他擔心的是我們所稱的“代理人問題”，即監督管理層的困難。另一些人抱怨稱，公司的行為就像精神病患者：一家旨在實現股東價值最大化的公司可能認為，如果允許的話，污染空氣和水將是合算的，或許這還是它的職責。它還可能利用自己的資源來阻礙監管機構對此類（不當）行為作出適當回應。
The economic argument for shareholder value maximisation and control is that, while all other stakeholders are protected by contract, shareholders are not. They therefore bear the residual risk. This being so, they need to control the company in order to align the interests of management with their own. Only then would they be prepared to make risky investments.
股東價值最大化和股東控制的經濟理由是，其他所有利益相關者都受到合同的保護，但股東們沒有。他們因此承擔了“剩余風險”。有鑒于此，他們需要控制公司以便讓管理層利益與他們自己的利益相一致。只有這樣，他們才愿意進行高風險的投資。
Yet, while shareholders do indeed bear risks in their role as the insurers of solvency, they are not the only stakeholders to do so. A host of others are also exposed to risks against which they cannot be fully protected by contract: long-term workers; long-term suppliers; and, not least, the jurisdictions in which companies operate. Moreover, shareholders, unlike others, and particularly employees, can hedge their risks by diversifying their portfolios. A worker cannot normally work for many companies at the same time and nobody can hedge employee income by owning shares in other people, except via taxation.
然而，盡管股東的確因“償付承保人”的角色而承擔了風險，但他們并非是承擔風險的唯一利益相關者。其他許多人也暴露在無法得到合同充分保護的風險之下：長期員工，長期供應商，以及更為重要的，公司經營地所屬的司法管轄地。此外，與其他人（尤其是員工）不同，股東可以通過多元化投資組合來對沖他們的風險。員工通常無法同時為許多公司工作，也沒有人可以通過擁有其他人的股份來對沖薪資收入，除了通過稅收以外。
The doctrine of shareholder value maximisation has allowed us to believe that the existence of these long-lived, hierarchical and powerful entities has not changed the market economy fundamentally. But, as Colin Mayer of Oxford’s Saïd Business School argues in his splendid book, Firm Commitment, this approach also misses the true purpose of the company.
股東價值最大化的信條讓我們相信，這些長期存續、等級分明的強大實體的存在，沒有從根本上改變市場經濟。但正如牛津大學(Oxford)賽德商學院(Saïd Business School)的科林•邁耶(Colin Mayer)在其精彩著作《堅定承諾》(Firm Commitment)中論述的那樣，這種看法也忽視了公司的真正目的。
Companies, argues Professor Mayer, are a mechanism for sustaining long-term commitments. But such commitments will only work if it is costly for the parties to act opportunistically. Moreover, it is often in the interests of all parties to bind themselves not to behave in such a way. But, with an active market in corporate control, such commitments cannot be made. Those who make the promises may disappear before they can deliver.
邁耶表示，公司是一種維持長期承諾的機制。但此類承諾只有在相關方采取機會主義行動代價高昂的時候才會有效。此外，約束自己不采取機會主義行動通常也符合所有人的利益。但由于公司控制權市場非常活躍，相關方不可能做出此類承諾。那些做出承諾的，可能在履行承諾之前就會消失。
These commitments take the form of implicit – or not fully specified – contracts. Why do we have to rely on implicit contracts? Long-term commitments could in theory be managed instead by trying to specify every eventuality. About a second’s thought makes it clear that this is impossible. It would not just be inconceivably complex and costly. It would come up against the deeper problem of uncertainty. We have little idea of what might happen in the next few months, let alone the next few decades. If people are to make long-term commitments, trust is the only alternative. But a company whose goal is whatever seems profitable today can be trusted only to renege on implicit contracts. It is sure to act opportunistically. If its managers did not want to do so, they would be replaced. This is because, as Prof Mayer argues: “The corporation is a rent extraction vehicle for the shortest-term shareholders.” Aligning managerial rewards to shareholder returns reinforces the opportunism.
這些承諾以隱性（或不完全明確的）合同形式存在。我們為何不得不依賴隱性合同？就理論而言，我們可以通過努力明確所有可能性來管理長期承諾。但稍微想一下就知道這是不可能的。不僅其復雜性和成本會高到難以想象，而且還會遇到不確定性的更深層次問題。我們連今后幾個月將會發生什么事都不知道，更別說今后幾十年了。而如果人們要做出長期承諾，信任是唯一的選擇。但對于一家今天只以不擇手段盈利為目標的公司，人們只能相信它必將背棄隱性合同。它肯定會采取機會主義的行為。如果它的經理們不想這么做，他們就會被替換掉。正如邁耶指出的那樣，這是因為：“對最短期的股東來說，企業是一個抽租工具。”將管理層獎勵與股東回報掛鉤強化了這種機會主義。
In practice, many capitalist economies do mitigate the risks of shareholder value maximisation and the market in corporate control. This is true of continental Europe, notably German companies. But it is also, notes Prof Mayer, true in the US, where the idea that management should be protected against shareholders is widely accepted in practice, if not so much in theory. The country that has taken the idea furthest is the UK.
在實踐中，許多資本主義經濟體的確減輕了股東價值最大化和公司控制權市場的風險。歐洲大陸就是如此，尤其是德國公司。但邁耶指出，美國同樣如此——在美國，人們普遍在實踐中認可應防止管理層遭受股東侵害的觀點（理論上則接受程度較低）。最大程度接受這種觀點的國家是英國。
Prof Mayer argues rightly: “The defect of existing economic models of the corporation is in not recognising its distinguishing feature – the fact that it is a separate legal entity. The significance of this stems from the fact that it is thereby capable of sustaining arrangements that are distinct from those that its owners, its shareholders, are able to achieve.” It is, in other words, in the shareholders’ interests not to control companies completely. They need to be able to tie their hands.
邁耶正確地指出：“企業現有經濟模式的缺陷在于沒有認識到其獨特的特征，即它是一個單獨法律實體的事實。該特征之所以重要，源于公司因此能夠維持與其所有者和股東能夠實現的安排不同的安排。”換言之，不完全控制公司符合股東的利益。他們需要能夠管住自己的手。
Prof Mayer’s suggested solution is what he calls a “trust company”, one with explicit values and a board designed to oversee them. He justifies such a radical switch with his scepticism about the feasibility and effectiveness of regulation. Less radical would be to encourage companies to consider divergent structures of control. One might be to vest voting rights in shares whose ownership can be transferred only after a holding period of years, not hours. In that way, control would be married to commitment. One could also vest limited control rights in some groups of workers. Yet this is not to argue that committed long-term ownership is always preferable. Family control, for example, has both weaknesses and strengths.
邁耶提議的解決方案被他稱作“信托公司”，這種公司有明確的價值標準，以及對之進行監督的董事會。他懷疑監管的可行性和有效性，因此認為如此激進的方案是合理的。較不激進的方案是鼓勵公司考慮采用分散的控制結構。比如，授予人們帶有投票權的股份，而這些股份只有在持有幾年、而非幾小時之后才可以轉讓，通過這種方式將控制與承諾綁在一起。還可以將有限控制權授予某些員工群體。然而，這并不是說，有承諾的長期所有權總是可取的。例如，家族控制就有利也有弊。
The right way to approach governance is to recognise the big trade-offs in managing and governing these complex, vital and long-lived institutions. We should let 100 governance flowers bloom. But the canonical academic model of the past few decades will rarely be the best.
對待治理問題的正確方式是，認識到管理和治理這些復雜、重要、長期存續的機構時要面對的巨大權衡。我們應該讓治理百花齊放。但過去幾十年的正統學術模式不太可能是最佳答案。
