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The conventional wisdom is that China doesn’t hold much direct risk for U.S. banks. Sure, if China were to have a financial crisis, and if it were to fall into recession — a long way to go, considering its recent annual growth of 7% — that would do serious damage to the global economy. American banks and the U.S. economy would feel that. But in terms of direct exposure to China, U.S. banks don’t stand to lose a lot.
傳統觀點認為，中國對美國銀行不構成太多的直接風險。沒錯，如果中國爆發金融危機或者陷入衰退（考慮到中國經濟最近的年增長率仍然保持在7%，這一幕不會很快來臨），那將對全球經濟造成嚴重傷害。美國銀行和美國經濟將會感受到這種沖擊。但從對華直接風險敞口的角度來講，美國銀行目前并不會面臨巨虧的風險。
According to a report last week from debt rating agency Fitch, U.S. banks have a collective $83 billion in direct loan exposure to China. That isn’t very much in the scope of the U.S. banking sector. JPMorgan Chase JPM 0.00% , alone, for instance, has over $700 billion in total loans. The entire U.S. banking sector has nearly $15 trillion in assets. For U.S. banks, China is still not that big of deal.
根據債務評級機構惠譽公司(Fitch)上周發布的一份報告，美國銀行對華直接貸款共計830億美元。相對于美國銀行業的規模，這并不是一個大數目。比如，僅摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)一家銀行的貸款總額就超過7,000億美元。整個美國銀行業擁有近15萬億美元的資產。對于美國銀行來說，中國的風險權重依然不算大。
That appears to be changing, though. Fearing a credit bubble, a year ago, Chinese authorities sharply raised domestic interest rates to slow lending made by local banks. That opened up a huge gap between U.S. interest rates, which are around 0.50% for short-term interbank loans, and Chinese interest rates, which are 5% for short-term banks loans.
但這種狀況似乎正在發生改變。一年前，由于擔心信貸泡沫，中國政府大幅提高了國內利率，減緩國內銀行的貸款速度。這就使得中美之間產生一個巨大的利率差：美國的短期銀行同業貸款利率大約為 0.50% ，而中國的短期銀行貸款利率則高達5%。
And so it appears there is easy money to be made borrowing money from the U.S. and Europe, and lending it in China. The trade’s been growing for a while, but it has attracted attention lately. And it’s a bit dicey, at least for the U.S. banks.
由此看來，如果一家機構從美國和歐洲借款，然后在中國放貸，它就很容易賺到錢。一段時間以來，這種交易一直在增長，但直到最近才引起關注。它有一定的危險性，至少對美國銀行系統而言。
In the last week or so, a number of large banks have been trying to figure out if they were taken in a loan fraud scheme in which a Chinese commodities trading firm in the port of Qingdao pledged the same collateral to a number of lenders. The scheme has shed light on the fact that a large portion of the overseas lending that Chinese companies are doing to capture the interest rate spread has been with loans collateralized with commodities.
過去一周左右的時間里，一些大銀行一直在追查它們是否卷入了一起融資騙貸欺詐案：中國青島港一家大宗商品交易公司向多位貸款人提供同一抵押品。這起案件已經揭示了一個事實——中國公司為獲取利差收益而從海外借入的很大一部分資金是以大宗商品作為抵押品的貸款。
Goldman Sachs estimates that commodities-based lending has resulted in an inflow of $110 billion of foreign currency into the Chinese economy in the past four years, or about a third of all new short-term debt in China in that time.
高盛公司(Goldman Sachs)估計，過去4年來，大宗商品支持貸款已經導致1,100億美元的外幣涌入中國經濟，這筆資金約占中國同期新增短期債務總額的三分之一。
Citigroup C -1.41% appears to be the only large U.S. bank that has fallen victim to the Qingdao fraud. But most large U.S. banks make commodities-based loans, and the practice has been growing recently. Last year, banks around the world lent $687 billion to commodities-based businesses, according to Bloomberg, though much of those loans were made directly to the companies and secured by raw materials. JPMorgan was the top U.S. lender worldwide, at $57 billion, followed by Wells Fargo WFC 0.37% , which gave out $47 billion.
花旗集團(Citigroup)似乎是唯一一家淪為青島港欺詐案犧牲品的美國大型銀行。但大多數美國大銀行都在從事大宗商品支持的貸款業務，而且最近越做越大。據彭博社(Bloomberg)報道，全球銀行去年向大宗商品類企業發放了共計6,870億美元貸款，盡管其中許多貸款直接發放給了公司，并且是用原材料擔保的。摩根大通是向海外發放貸款最多的美國貸款人，貸款金額為579億美元；其次是富國銀行(Wells Fargo)，貸款金額為470億美元。
Many of these loans might not be factored in the estimates that Fitch and others have put together to calculate U.S. banks’ exposure to China. For instance, sometimes commodities loans are structured as derivatives or swaps. Fitch says its China loan estimates do not factor in derivatives or guarantees.
惠譽和其他評級機構在估算美國銀行系統的對華風險敞口時或許沒有考慮這些貸款中的很大一部分。比如，大宗商品支持貸款有時候被結構化為衍生工具或掉期交易。惠譽表示，它的美國銀行系統對華貸款預測值并沒有把衍生工具和信用擔保計算在內。
What’s more, when it comes to commodities, some banks might not even realize they are taking on China risk. The Citi loan that ended up sending money to China by way of the Qingdao port was made to Swiss commodities trading firm Mercuria. The commodities that Mercuria used to finance the loan were stored in Qingdao, on loan from a Chinese commodities company named Decheng Mining.
更重要的是，涉及大宗商品時，一些銀行甚至可能沒有意識到他們正在承受中國市場的風險。花旗集團那筆最終經青島港流入中國的貸款，其實是發放給瑞士大宗商品交易商摩科瑞公司(Mercuria)的。摩科瑞公司用來辦理這筆融資貸款的大宗商品儲存在青島，而這些大宗商品則是從一家名為德誠礦業(Decheng Mining)的中國大宗商品公司借來的。
And unlike other types of lending, banks typically don’t break out just how much money they have lent out based on accounting. “I have never seen any bank balance sheet that has that information,” says Haoziang Zhu, an economics professor at MIT who has studied commodity-based lending. “It’s hard to track.”
與其他類型的貸款不同，銀行通常不會基于會計核算而詳細披露它們究竟貸出了多少錢。“我從來沒有見過包含這類信息的銀行資產負債表，”研究大宗商品支持貸款的麻省理工學院(MIT)經濟學教授朱浩翔（音譯）說。“這是很難追蹤的。”
And while the China-to-U.S. carry trade may seem like easy money, there are ways it can go bad. A drop in the yuan, which is down 3% in the past year, would cut into profits because a debtor company would need more of those to pay back the dollars they owe in the U.S. loan at the end of the transaction. Also, if you are financing a transaction with commodities, and commodities prices rise, that could erase some of your gains.
盡管在中國和美國之間從事利差交易看起來似乎很容易賺錢，但這種交易有可能玩砸。人民幣幣值下跌（在過去一年下跌了3%）將蠶食利潤，因為在交易結束時，債務人公司需要用更多的人民幣償還他們所欠的美元債務。此外，如果你正在為大宗商品交易融資，一旦大宗商品價格上漲，那就有可能抹去你的一些收益。
That said, as long as interest rates between the U.S. and China remain this wide, the China carry trade will carry on.
盡管如此，只要中美之間依然保持這樣大的利率差，中國的利差交易就將持續下去。
