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Not everyone is an entrepreneur. Still, everyone should try─if only once─to start a business. After all, it is small and medium enterprises that are the key to job creation. There is also something uniquely educational about sitting at the desk where the buck stops, in a dreary office you've just rented, working day and night with a handful of employees just to break even.
并不是所有人都能成為企業(yè)家。然而，每個人都應(yīng)該嘗試──至少一次──創(chuàng)建一家公司。畢竟，中小型企業(yè)才是創(chuàng)造就業(yè)的主要動力。與此同時，創(chuàng)建企業(yè)能令你收獲獨(dú)一無二的體驗(yàn)，想象一下在一個剛剛租來的乏味的辦公室里，你坐在老板桌前，為了實(shí)現(xiàn)收支平衡，和為數(shù)不多的幾位雇員夜以繼日工作的場景吧。
As an academic, I'm just an amateur capitalist. Still, over the past 15 years I've started small ventures in both the U.S. and the U.K. In the process I've learned something surprising: It's much easier to do in the U.K. There seemed to be much more regulation in the U.S., not least the headache of sorting out health insurance for my few employees. And there were certainly more billable hours from lawyers.
作為學(xué)者，我只是一名業(yè)余企業(yè)家。不過，在過去15年時間里，我在美國和英國都創(chuàng)辦過小型公司。在創(chuàng)業(yè)的過程中，我發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個奇怪的現(xiàn)象：在英國，經(jīng)商要容易得多。美國似乎有多得多的規(guī)章，尤其讓我頭痛的是給我那幾名員工處理健康保險(xiǎn)的事情。此外，在美國，律師寄來的按小時計(jì)費(fèi)的賬單肯定要貴得多。
This set me thinking. We are assured by vociferous economists that economic growth would be higher in the U.S. and unemployment lower if only the government would run even bigger deficits and/or the Fed would print even more money. But what if the difficulty lies elsewhere, in problems that no amount of fiscal or monetary stimulus can overcome?
這讓我陷入了思考。口若懸河的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們信誓旦旦地告訴我們，只要政府繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大赤字，并且/或者美國聯(lián)邦儲備委員會（Fed）繼續(xù)印刷更多的鈔票，美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增速就會提高，失業(yè)率也會下降。但是，要是問題的癥結(jié)并不在這兒，而是無論多大規(guī)模的財(cái)政和貨幣刺激措施都無法克服的問題怎么辦？
Nearly all development economists agree that good institutions─legislatures, courts, administrative agencies─are crucial. When poor countries improve their institutions, economic growth soon accelerates. But what about rich countries? If poor countries can get rich by improving their institutions, is it not possible that rich countries can get poor by allowing their institutions to degenerate? I want to suggest that it is.
幾乎所有的發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都同意，優(yōu)秀的機(jī)構(gòu)──立法機(jī)構(gòu)、法院和行政機(jī)關(guān)──至關(guān)重要。當(dāng)貧窮的國家改善機(jī)構(gòu)運(yùn)作的時候，該國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長就會很快獲得提振。但對于富裕的國家來講呢？如果貧窮的國家可以通過改善機(jī)構(gòu)運(yùn)作而致富，那么富裕的國家難道不會因?yàn)槿萑瘫緡鴻C(jī)構(gòu)的退化而變窮嗎？我想要說的是，這是完全有可能的。
Consider the evidence from the annual 'Doing Business' reports from the World Bank and International Finance Corporation. Since 2006 the report has published data for most of the world's countries on the total number of days it takes to start a business, get a construction permit, register a property, pay taxes, get an export or import license and enforce a contract. If one simply adds together the total number of days it would take to carry out all seven of these procedures sequentially, it is possible to construct a simple measure of how slowly─or fast─a country's bureaucracy moves.
讓我們看看世界銀行(World Bank)和國際金融公司(International Finance Corporation)發(fā)布的年度《全球營商環(huán)境報(bào)告》(Doing Business)顯示出的證據(jù)吧。從2006年起，《全球營商環(huán)境報(bào)告》便開始發(fā)布在全球大多數(shù)國家開辦企業(yè)、獲得建筑許可、注冊資產(chǎn)、繳納稅款、獲得進(jìn)口和出口許可證以及執(zhí)行合同分別所需花費(fèi)的天數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)。如果我們把完成上述七項(xiàng)程序分別所需的天數(shù)簡單相加，那么我們就能夠構(gòu)建出一種簡單的、衡量一國行政速度快慢的工具。
Seven years of data suggest that most of the world's countries are successfully making it easier to do business: The total number of days it takes to carry out the seven procedures has come down, in some cases very substantially. In only around 20 countries has the total duration of dealing with 'red tape' gone up. The sixth-worst case is none other than the U.S., where the total number of days has increased by 18% to 433. Other members of the bottom 10, using this metric, are Zimbabwe, Burundi and Yemen (though their absolute numbers are of course much higher).
七年以來的數(shù)據(jù)顯示出，全球大多數(shù)國家都成功地簡化了營商流程：在這些國家，完成上述七項(xiàng)程序所需的總天數(shù)有所減少，并且在其中一些國家，總天數(shù)減少的幅度相當(dāng)?shù)卮蟆Ｖ挥写蠹s20個國家處理這些繁文縟節(jié)的總時長有所增加。居于倒數(shù)第六位的國家竟然是美國，在美國完成這七項(xiàng)程序所需的總天數(shù)增加了18%，達(dá)到了433天。按照這一衡量方法，其他排在倒數(shù)10位中的國家還有津巴布韋、布隆迪和也門（不過，這些國家所需的絕對天數(shù)當(dāng)然比美國多得多）。
Why is it getting harder to do business in America? Part of the answer is excessively complex legislation. A prime example is the 848-page Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010 (otherwise known as the Dodd-Frank Act), which, among other things, required that regulators create 243 rules, conduct 67 studies and issue 22 periodic reports. Comparable in its complexity is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (906 pages), which is also in the process of spawning thousands of pages of regulation. You don't have to be opposed to tighter financial regulation or universal health care to recognize that something is wrong with laws so elaborate that almost no one affected has the time or the will to read them.
為什么在美國經(jīng)商越來越難了呢？有一部分責(zé)任要?dú)w咎于過分復(fù)雜的法律體系。最好的例證當(dāng)屬于2010年7月生效的長達(dá)848頁的《華爾街改革和消費(fèi)者保護(hù)法案》(Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 也被稱為多德??弗蘭克法案(Dodd-Frank Act))。這項(xiàng)法案要求的內(nèi)容包括，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)需要制定243條法規(guī)制度，開展67項(xiàng)研究，并發(fā)布22種周期性報(bào)告。復(fù)雜程度能與多德??弗蘭克法案媲美的是長達(dá)906頁《患者保護(hù)與平價醫(yī)療法案》(Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act)。目前，這兩項(xiàng)法案都處于制定與之配套的數(shù)千頁的監(jiān)管規(guī)則的階段。即便不反對加強(qiáng)金融監(jiān)管或全民醫(yī)療保健制度的人士也會認(rèn)同，如此繁瑣的法律規(guī)定存在一定的問題，以至于當(dāng)事人完全不具備通讀相關(guān)法案的時間和意愿。
Who benefits from the growth of complex and cumbersome regulation? The answer is: lawyers, not forgetting lobbyists and compliance departments. For complexity is not the friend of the little man. It is the friend of the deep pocket. It is the friend of cronyism.
那么誰是法規(guī)制度變得如此復(fù)雜冗長的受益者呢？答案是：律師，同時也不要忘記政壇說客和合規(guī)部門。因?yàn)椤皬?fù)雜”永遠(yuǎn)都不是小人物的朋友。“復(fù)雜”是有錢人的朋友，也是朋黨營私的朋友。
We used to have the rule of law. Now it is tempting to say we have the rule of lawyers, which is something different. For the lawyers can also make money even in the absence of complex legislation.
曾幾何時，我們是一個“法治至上”的國家。現(xiàn)在，我們所擁有的甚至可以用“律師至上”來形容，而這兩個“至上”的概念則大相徑庭。因?yàn)榧词乖谌狈ν晟频牧⒎w系的情況下，律師也能賺到大錢。
It has long been recognized that the U.S. tort system is exceptionally expensive. Indeed, tort reform is something few people will openly argue against. Yet the plague of class-action lawsuits continues unabated. Regular customers of Southwest Airlines LUV +2.81% recently received this email: 'Did you receive a Southwest Airlines drink coupon through the purchase of a Business Select ticket prior to August 1, 2010, and never redeem it? If yes, a legal Settlement provides a Replacement Drink Voucher, entitling you to a free drink aboard a Southwest flight, for every such drink coupon you did not redeem.'
很長時間以來，美國的民事侵權(quán)法律系統(tǒng)一直被視為異常昂貴。確實(shí)，幾乎沒人會公開抵制民事侵權(quán)法律的改革。然而，集體訴訟帶來的困擾卻從未消褪。西南航空公司(Southwest Airlines)的常旅客們最近收到了一封電子郵件：“您是否曾在2010年8月1日前通過購買西南航空的‘商務(wù)精選’機(jī)票得到過飲品券，而您卻從未兌換過它？如果是的話，依據(jù)一項(xiàng)法律和解方案，本公司將為您提供一份新的飲品券，用以替換您之前未使用的飲品券。歡迎您在下次搭乘西南航空的飛機(jī)時，享用免費(fèi)飲品。”
This is not the product of the imagination of some modern-day Charles Dickens. It is a document arising from the class-action case, In re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litigation, No. 11-cv-8176, which came before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. As the circular explains: 'This Action arose out of Southwest's decision, effective August 1, 2010, to only accept drink coupons received by Business Select customers with the purchase of a Business Select ticket on the date of the ticketed travel. The Plaintiffs in this case allege Southwest, in making that decision, breached its contract with Class Members who previously received drink coupons, ' etc.
這可不是那種當(dāng)代查爾斯??狄更斯(Charles Dickens)幻想出來的情景。這份電子郵件是對一起集體訴訟案做出的回應(yīng)。這起名為“西南航空公司優(yōu)惠券訴訟”的案件是由伊利諾伊州北部行政區(qū)地方法院法官馬修??肯內(nèi)利(Matthew F. Kennelly)審理的，訴訟編號為No. 11-cv-8176。法院通告稱：“這起訴訟是由于西南航空公司做出的一項(xiàng)決定引發(fā)的，即從2010年8月1日起，該公司只接受商務(wù)精選機(jī)票客戶因購買行程當(dāng)日機(jī)票所獲得的飲品券。該案件的原告訴稱，西南航空公司的這一決定違反了其與該決定生效前就獲得了飲品券的會員的合同……”
As often happens in such cases, Southwest decided to settle out of court. Recipients of the email will have been nonplused to learn that the settlement 'will provide Replacement Drink Vouchers to Class Members who submit timely and valid Claim Forms.' One wonders how many have bothered.
與這類案件通常采取的解決方式一樣，西南航空公司決定進(jìn)行庭外和解。收到電子郵件的客戶將會得知，和解方案“將使會員在及時提交有效的索賠表格后，獲得新的飲品券”，這些客戶可能會對此感到不知所措。我想知道的是，有多少人會因此心生煩惱。
Cui bono? The answer is, of course, the lawyers representing the plaintiffs. Having initially pitched for 'up to $7 million in fees, costs and expenses, ' these ingenious jurists settled for fees of $3 million 'plus costs not to exceed $30, 000' from Southwest.
誰會因此受益呢？答案當(dāng)然是原告的代理律師們。這些天才的法律人士當(dāng)初曾叫出了“律師費(fèi)、訴訟費(fèi)和其他開銷累計(jì)700萬美元”的高價，不過他們最終同意只收取由西南航空公司支付的300萬美元的律師費(fèi)以及“不超過三萬美元的訴訟費(fèi)用”。
Canada's Fraser Institute has been compiling an 'Economic Freedom' index since 1980, one component of which is a measure of the quality of a country's legal system and property rights. In the light of a case like the one described above, there is nothing surprising about the recent decline in U.S. performance. In 2000 U.S. law scored 9.23 out of 10. The most recent score (for 2010) was 7.12.
從1980年起，加拿大菲莎研究所(Fraser Institute)開始編纂一個名為“經(jīng)濟(jì)自由度”(Economic Freedom)的指數(shù)。這個指數(shù)是衡量一國法律體系和所有權(quán)狀況的一個要素。鑒于與上文描述的案件類似的狀況，美國經(jīng)濟(jì)自由度指數(shù)近期的下滑就不足為奇了。2000年，美國法律體系按照10分制的得分為9.23分。而美國最近的得分（2010年）僅為7.12分。
Such indexes must be used with caution, but the Fraser index is not the only piece of evidence suggesting that the rule of law in the U.S. is not what it was. The World Justice Project uses a completely separate methodology to assess countries' legal systems. The latest WJP report ranks the U.S. 17th out of 97 countries for the extent to which the law limits the power of government, 18th for the absence of corruption, 19th for regulatory enforcement, 22nd for access to civil justice and the maintenance of order and security, 25th for fundamental rights, and 26th for the effectiveness of criminal justice. Of all the former British colonies in the report, the U.S. ranks behind New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Canada, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom─though it does beat Botswana.
使用這樣的指數(shù)必須小心謹(jǐn)慎，但是菲莎研究所的這一指數(shù)并不是揭示美國“法治”今非昔比的唯一證據(jù)。世界正義工程(World Justice Project)使用了一套完全不同的方法衡量了不同國家的法律體系。世界正義工程發(fā)表的最新報(bào)告顯示，在97個國家中，美國在法律限制政府權(quán)力的程度方面排名第17位，在遠(yuǎn)離腐敗方面排名第18位，在有效執(zhí)法方面排名第19位，在有效民事司法方面和維護(hù)社會安全有序方面均排名第22位，在基本權(quán)利方面排名第25位，在有效刑事司法方面排名第26位。在報(bào)告涉及的所有前英屬殖民地中，美國的排名位列新西蘭、澳大利亞、新加坡、加拿大、中國香港以及英國本國之后──不過，美國的排名位于博茨瓦納之前。
The decline of American institutions is no secret. Yet it is one of those strange 'unknown knowns' that is well documented but largely ignored. Each year, the World Economic Forum publishes its Global Competitiveness Index. Since it introduced its current methodology in 2004, the U.S. score has declined by 6%. (In the same period China's score has improved by 12%.) An important component of the index is provided by 22 different measures of institutional quality, based on the WEF's Executive Opinion Survey. Typical questions are 'How would you characterize corporate governance by investors and boards of directors in your country?' and 'In your country, how common is diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption?' The startling thing about this exercise is how poorly the U.S. fares.
美國國家機(jī)構(gòu)的退化已經(jīng)不是秘密。然而，這卻屬于那些我們明確了解、卻在很大程度上忽視的內(nèi)容之一。每一年，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇(World Economic Forum)都會發(fā)布一份全球競爭力指數(shù)(Global Competitiveness Index)。自從2004年該機(jī)構(gòu)采用了現(xiàn)行的指數(shù)編制方法以來，美國的競爭力指數(shù)已經(jīng)下降了6%。（同期，中國的競爭力指數(shù)卻上升了12%。）全球競爭力指數(shù)的一項(xiàng)重要指標(biāo)是針對各國國家機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行22個方面的評估，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇進(jìn)行的專家意見調(diào)查(Executive Opinion Survey)構(gòu)成了這一評估的基礎(chǔ)。其中，代表性的問題有“你如何評價貴國投資者和董事會進(jìn)行公司治理的情況？”和“在貴國，由腐敗引發(fā)的公共資金流向公司、個人或某些團(tuán)體的現(xiàn)象的頻繁程度如何？”令人驚訝的是，調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示美國的表現(xiàn)非常差。
In only one category out of 22 is the U.S. ranked in the global top 20 (the strength of investor protection). In seven categories it does not even make the top 50. For example, the WEF ranks the U.S. 87th in terms of the costs imposed on business by 'organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion).' In every single category, Hong Kong does better.
在對各國國家機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行的22個方面評估中，美國只在一個方面躋身了全球前20名之列（即在投資者保護(hù)力度方面）。在其中七個方面的評估中，美國甚至未能躋身前50名。例如，在企業(yè)為“有組織犯罪”（即黑社會背景的敲詐和勒索）承擔(dān)的成本方面，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇對美國的排名為第87名。在每個方面，中國香港的表現(xiàn)都優(yōu)于美國。
At the same time, the U.S. has seen a marked deterioration in its World Governance Indicators. In terms of 'voice and accountability, ' 'government effectiveness, ' 'regulatory quality' and especially 'control of corruption, ' the U.S. scores have all gone down since the WGI project began in the mid-1990s. It would be tempting to say that America is turning Latin, were it not for the fact that a number of Latin American countries have been improving their governance scores over the same period.
與此同時，美國的全球治理指標(biāo)(World Governance Indicators)也已經(jīng)顯著惡化。自從上世紀(jì)90年代中期全球治理指標(biāo)項(xiàng)目啟動之后，在“言論自由與政府責(zé)任”、“政府效能”、“法規(guī)執(zhí)行品質(zhì)”，特別是“反腐”方面，美國的分?jǐn)?shù)都有所下降。如果不是出于很多拉丁美洲國家在治理方面的得分逐漸提高的事實(shí)，我們倒可以說美國越來越像拉美國家了。
What is the process at work here? Perhaps this is a victory from beyond the grave for classical Western political theory. Republics, after all, were regarded by most ancient political philosophers as condemned to decadence, or to imperial corruption. This was the lesson of Rome. Democracy was always likely to give way to oligarchy or tyranny. This was the lesson of the French Revolution. The late Mancur Olson had a modern version of such cyclical models, arguing that all political systems were bound to become the captives, over time, of special interests. The advantage enjoyed by West Germany and Japan after World War II, he suggested, was that all the rent-seeking elites of the pre-1945 period had been swept away by defeat. This was why Britain won the war but lost the peace.
是什么導(dǎo)致了美國的問題？或許這是已被遺忘的經(jīng)典西方政治理論的一次勝利。別忘了，大多數(shù)古代政治哲人都認(rèn)為共和政體終將衰落或者最終淪落為君主制；古羅馬共和國就是一個例證。而民主政體總是傾向于給寡頭政治和專制暴政讓路；法國大革命就是一個例證。已故的曼瑟爾??奧爾森(Mancur Olson)對這些周而復(fù)始的循環(huán)模式提出了一個現(xiàn)代版的闡述，即：隨著時間的推移，所有政體最終都將變成為特定對象服務(wù)的工具。在他看來，二戰(zhàn)后西德和日本享有的一大優(yōu)勢是，所有在1945年前尋租的所謂精英都因戰(zhàn)爭失敗而被掃清了。這也正是為什么英國贏得了二戰(zhàn)勝利，但卻沒有得到和平。
Whatever the root causes of the deterioration of American institutions, smart people are starting to notice it. Last year Michael Porter of Harvard Business School published a report based on a large-scale survey of HBS alumni. Among the questions he asked was where the U.S. was 'falling behind' relative to other countries. The top three lagging indicators named were: the effectiveness of the political system, the K-12 education system and the complexity of the tax code. Regulation came sixth, efficiency of the legal framework eighth.
不管美國國家機(jī)構(gòu)退化的深層次原因是什么，杰出人士已經(jīng)開始注意到了這個問題。去年，哈佛商學(xué)院(Harvard Business School)的邁克爾??波特(Michael Porter)在對本校校友進(jìn)行了大規(guī)模的問卷調(diào)查后發(fā)布了一份報(bào)告。波特向校友們提出的問題包括下面這道：你認(rèn)為美國在哪一方面落到了其他國家身后？調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，美國滯后的前三大領(lǐng)域分別是：政治體系的效能、基礎(chǔ)教育體系以及復(fù)雜的會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則。此外，規(guī)章制度排名第六位，法律體系的效能排名第八位。
Asked to name 'the most problematic factors for doing business' in the U.S., respondents to the WEF's most recent Executive Opinion Survey put 'inefficient government bureaucracy' at the top, followed by tax rates and tax regulations.
在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇進(jìn)行的最近一次專家意見調(diào)查中，對于在美國“經(jīng)營企業(yè)感覺最困難的因素是什么”的問題，受訪者們將“效率低下的政府官僚體制”放在了首位，緊隨其后的是稅率和稅法。
All this should not be interpreted as yet another prophecy of the imminent decline and fall of the U.S., however. There is some light in the gloom. According to the most recent United Nations projections, the share of the U.S. population that is over 65 will reach 25% only at the very end of this century. Japan has already passed that milestone; Germany will be next. By midcentury, both countries will have around a third of their population age 65 or older.
然而，所有這些都不應(yīng)解讀為預(yù)示美國將馬上陷入衰退的又一個征兆。黑暗中仍有一絲曙光。根據(jù)聯(lián)合國(United Nations)發(fā)布的最新預(yù)期，美國年齡在65歲以上的人口比例在本世紀(jì)末才會達(dá)到25%。日本已經(jīng)跨越了這一里程碑；德國將緊隨其后。至本世紀(jì)中葉，日本和德國65歲以上的人口都將達(dá)到各自國民總數(shù)的約三分之一。
More imminently, a revolution in the extraction of shale gas and tight oil, via hydraulic fracking, is transforming the U.S. from energy dependence to independence. Not only could the U.S., at least for a time, re-emerge as the world's biggest oil producer; the lower electricity costs resulting from the fossil-fuel boom are already triggering a revival of U.S. manufacturing in the Southeast and elsewhere.
近在咫尺的事情是，由水力壓裂技術(shù)帶來的頁巖氣和致密油開采革命正在把美國從能源進(jìn)口國變?yōu)槟茉醋越o國。美國不僅能夠再度成為──至少在一段時間內(nèi)──全球最大的產(chǎn)油國；由化石燃料產(chǎn)量激增帶來的電力成本下降也已經(jīng)令美國東南部及其他地區(qū)的制造業(yè)開始復(fù)蘇。
In a functioning federal system, the pace of institutional degeneration is not uniform. America's four 'growth corridors'─the Great Plains, the Gulf Coast, the Intermountain West and the Southeast─are growing not just because they have natural resources but also because state governments in those regions are significantly more friendly to business. There are already heartening signs of a great regeneration in states like Texas and North Dakota.
在美國的聯(lián)邦運(yùn)作體系內(nèi)，各地的政府機(jī)構(gòu)退化程度不盡相同。美國四大“經(jīng)濟(jì)增長走廊”──北美大平原、墨西哥灣沿岸地區(qū)、山間西部以及東南部地區(qū)──獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的原因不僅在于這些地區(qū)擁有自然資源，還在于這些地區(qū)的州政府對待企業(yè)要友善得多。在得克薩斯州和北達(dá)科他州等地，已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了政府機(jī)構(gòu)顯著革新的喜人跡象。
'In America you have a right to be stupid─if you want to be.' Secretary of State John Kerry made that remark off the cuff in February, speaking to a group of students in Berlin. It is not a right the founding fathers felt they needed explicitly to enshrine. But it has always been there, and America's leaders have frequently been willing to exercise it.
美國國務(wù)卿約翰??克里(John Kerry)今年2月在柏林對學(xué)生發(fā)表演講的時候即興說道：“在美國，只要你愿意，你就有權(quán)利裝傻。”這可不是美國的開國元勛們覺得有必要明確奉為神圣的權(quán)利。但是這個傳統(tǒng)由來已久，而且美國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人總是愿意親身實(shí)踐這句話。
Yes, we Americans have the right to be stupid if we want to be. We can carry on pretending that our economic problems can be solved with the help of yet more fiscal stimulus or quantitative easing. Or we can face up to the institutional impediments to growth I have described here.
是的，只要我們愿意，我們美國人有權(quán)利裝傻。我們可以繼續(xù)假裝，借助于更多的財(cái)政刺激或量化寬松，我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)問題能夠得以解決。或者，我們也可以坦然面對我在文中描述的這種阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的機(jī)構(gòu)問題。
Not many economists talk about them, it's true. But that's because not many economists run businesses.
的確，討論這個問題的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家并不多。但那是因?yàn)榻?jīng)商的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家微乎其微。
Adapted from Mr. Ferguson's new book, 'The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die, ' to be published by Penguin Press on Thursday.
（本文選自Niall Ferguson的新書《西方文明的四個黑盒子》(The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die)。該書已由企鵝出版社(Penguin Press)出版。
