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Inspectors seldom got suspicious, however, because they liked and trusted him. He had not spent a third of his time in Washington in the late 1980s and early 1990s, cosying up to the Securities and Exchange Commission, for nothing.
事實卻是，檢查人員很少起疑，因為他們喜歡他，信任他。上世紀80年代末和90年代初，他有三分之一的時間都在華盛頓度過，在此期間，他向美國證券交易委員會(SEC)大獻殷勤。
In 1992 the SEC found out that two accountants from his father-in-law’s firm had channelled $440m to him since 1962, offering clients annual returns of up to 20%, but not registering the notes they issued with the SEC as the law required.
1992年，美國證券交易委員會發現，自1962年以來，他岳父公司的兩名會計師向他提供了4.4億美元的資金，他們向客戶提供高達20%的年回報率，但沒有按照法律要求向美國證券交易委員會繳納他們發行的票據。
He returned the money (taking it from one of his largest investor’s accounts), and the regulators left him alone.
麥道夫把(從最大的投資者之一的賬戶里拿的)錢還了回去，監管機構也就睜一只眼閉一只眼。
Sometimes they even asked his advice on market operations. So when the financial press in the early 2000s began to smell something rotten in his secret system, regulators still trusted him entirely. Five inspections brought up nothing alarming.
有時監管人員甚至向他請教市場運作方面的建議。因此，21世紀初，當金融媒體開始意識到他的“機密體系”有些“不對勁”時，監管機構仍然完全信任他。五次的檢查都沒有發現令人擔憂的問題。
It took the financial meltdown of 2008 to expose him. Suddenly he had more than $12bn to find for investors withdrawing their funds in panic, and he could not cover it.
2008年的金融危機讓他原形畢露。突然間，他需要120多億美元的資金，好讓恐慌的投資者們撤出資金，而他無法支付這筆資金。
In December he confessed to his two sons, who worked for him, that it was all just one big lie.
12月，他向為他工作的兩個兒子坦誠，這只是一場驚世騙局。
Then, while he took the staff out for a party at a Mexican restaurant, the family lawyer called the regulators in. His sons, who both died before him, were never reconciled with him.
然后，當他帶員工前往墨西哥餐廳參加派對時，家庭律師把監管機構叫了過來。先于他去世的兩個兒子終生未跟他和解。
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