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In truth, Mr Khan's government tried hard to keep its distance from the fund.
事實上，伊姆蘭·汗的政府曾力圖與IMF保持距離。
Instead of agreeing to a deal as soon as it came to power last August,
伊姆蘭·汗政府沒有在去年8月上任后立馬同意該協議，
it turned for help to friendly countries, including Saudi Arabia (which gave $3bn and deferred a similar amount of oil payments),
而是尋求友國的幫助，如沙特阿拉伯（該國提供了30億美元并推遲了類似金額的石油付款），
the United Arab Emirates ($2bn already and more to come) and China ($2.2bn).
阿拉伯聯合酋長國（提供提供了20億美元，后續還有更多）以及中國（22億美元）。
China is investing heavily in Pakistan's roads, ports and power plants:
中國正大舉投資巴基斯坦的公路、港口和發電廠:
the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Some view this lending with suspicion,
即所謂的中巴經濟走廊（CPEC）。一些人對這種貸款持懷疑態度，
seeing Pakistan as a victim of China's "debt-trap diplomacy".
認為巴基斯坦是中國債務陷阱外交的受害者。
Such an assessment seems premature. CPEC spending may have contributed to the increase in Pakistan's imports
這種評價似乎不夠成熟。CPEC的支出已經促進了巴基斯坦的出口增長
(the country's current-account deficit exceeded 6% of GDP in the year to June 2018).
（截至2018年6月，該國經常賬戶赤字超過了GDP的6%）
But because this import spending was presumably matched by an inflow of Chinese capital,
但因為這種出口支出可能與中國資本的流入相匹配，
it cannot have been responsible for the dangerous dwindling of Pakistan's foreign-currency reserves over the past year.
所以不能為過去一年巴基斯坦外幣儲備金的減少負責。
That was Pakistan's own fault. The previous government maintained an exchange rate that was too strong for exporters
這是巴基斯坦自己的錯誤。上屆政府維持的匯率對出口商來說過于堅挺
and fiscal spending that was too strong for its revenue-raising powers.
并且財政支出過于強勁，無法提高財政收入。
Restoring stability was always going to require the kind of painful policy reforms the IMF often prescribes and oversees.
恢復穩定總需要IMF經常規定和監督的那種痛苦的政策改革。
Not that the IMF will find it easy. Pakistan is a regular taker of its loans but not a diligent follower of its advice.
這對IMF來說也并非易事。巴基斯坦經常從IMF借貸，卻不愿遵守它的建議。
Many of the reforms it has just promised have been pledged repeatedly before, including widening the tax net,
其剛承諾的很多改革之前就已經重復承諾過，包括擴大稅收網絡、
rationalising utility prices and respecting the central bank's autonomy.
公共設施價格合理化以及尊重中央銀行的自主權。
Successive governments have been slow to follow through, afraid of angering powerful domestic constituencies.
由于擔心激怒強大的國內選民，歷屆政府在貫徹執行方面一直行動遲緩。
But the IMF has been similarly reluctant to cut Pakistan off, for fear of the upheaval that would ensue.
但由于擔心隨之而來的動蕩，IMF也同樣不愿切斷對巴基斯坦的援助。
"Governments have tried to 'game' the IMF, and achieved partial success each time,"
“各國政府一直試圖‘玩弄’ IMF，每次都取得了部分成功，”
write Ehtisham Ahmad and Azizali Mohammed, former IMF advisers.
前IMF顧問Ehtisham Ahmad和Azizali Mohammed寫到。
Pakistan's public might dislike the IMF less, if they knew how frequently their leaders disregard it.
如果巴基斯坦民眾知道他們的領導人輕視IMF的頻率有多頻繁，他們或許就沒那么討厭IMF了。
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