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Still, this uneven adjustment in the euro area could explain why both demand and inflation,
歐元區(qū)內(nèi)的這種不均勻調(diào)整還能夠解釋，為什么一旦能源和食物價格被排除在外，
once energy and food prices are excluded, have been stubbornly low.
需求和膨脹就會低迷不振。
Since crisis countries still need to reduce their stocks of external liabilities (ie, the accumulation of past current-account deficits)
危機國家仍然需要減少他們的對外負債持股（比如，以前那些經(jīng)常賬戶赤字的積累）
and public-sector debt, that looks set to continue.
以及公共部門債務，這種情況似乎還將繼續(xù)。
John Maynard Keynes recognised the risk of such asymmetry in the 1940s:
在上世紀40年代，對于這種不對稱的風險，約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯是這么認為的：
"The process of adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor.
“調(diào)整進程，對債務人而言是強制的，對債權人來說是自愿的。
If the creditor does not choose to make, or allow, his share of the adjustment, he suffers no inconvenience."
如果債權人沒有選擇或允許對他的份額做出調(diào)整，那么他不會遇到任何麻煩?！?/p>
Keynes wanted to tax countries that hoarded trade surpluses.
凱恩斯希望對儲存貿(mào)易盈余的國家征稅。
In 2011 the European Commission set up a "macroeconomic-imbalance procedure" to tackle the problem.
為了解決這個問題，2011年歐洲委員會制定了“宏觀經(jīng)濟失衡程序”。
But the process appears to place less weight on surpluses than on deficits and lacks the means to enforce its recommendations.
但是這個程序的重點似乎在于赤字而非盈余上，且缺乏強制推行的方法。
Another way of dealing with imbalances would be to encourage greater risk-sharing through fiscal and (deeper) banking union.
解決失衡問題的另一種方法將會是通過財政和銀行聯(lián)盟鼓勵更大的風險分擔。
The euro zone would become more like America, where inter-state imbalances are not even recorded.
歐元區(qū)將變得更像美國，國與國之間的失衡甚至不會被記載下來。
But that too seems politically infeasible. The euro area's long slog will carry on, and debtor countries will bear the burden.
但是這似乎在政治上是不可行的。歐元區(qū)將繼續(xù)坎坷道路，債權國將承擔責任。
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