They also hoover up valuable data from users through the use of tools like reCAPTCHA, which ask visitors to solve problems that are easy for humans but hard for AIs, such as deciphering text from books that machines are unable to parse.
它們還通過reCAPTCHA之類的工具的使用從用戶那里搜集有價值的數(shù)據(jù)。這類工具要求訪問者解決對人類來說很容易但對AI卻很難的問題,例如辨認(rèn)來自機器無法辨析的書籍中的文本。
That does not just screen out malicious bots, but also helps digitise books.
這不僅將惡意機器人屏蔽在外,還有助于書籍的數(shù)字化。
People “pay” for useful free services by providing firms with the data they crave.
人們通過給公司提供它們夢寐以求的數(shù)據(jù)為各種免費服務(wù)“付費”。
These data become part of the firms' capital, and, as such, a fearsome source of competitive advantage.
這些數(shù)據(jù)成為公司資本的一部分,而且就其本身而言,也是一種可怕的競爭優(yōu)勢之源頭。

Would-be startups that might challenge internet giants cannot train their AIs without access to the data only those giants possess.
可能挑戰(zhàn)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)巨頭的準(zhǔn)初創(chuàng)公司不可能在不訪問只有這些巨頭們擁有的數(shù)據(jù)的情況下訓(xùn)練它們的AI。
Their best hope is often to be acquired by those very same titans, adding to the problem of uncompetitive markets.
它們的最佳希望經(jīng)常是被這些巨頭收購,加重了非競爭市場問題。
That, for now, AI's contributions to productivity growth are small, the authors say, is partly because of the free-data model, which limits the quality of data gathered.
作者稱,AI對生產(chǎn)力增長的貢獻(xiàn)目前微乎其微,部分是因為這種免費數(shù)據(jù)的模式,它限制了收集到的數(shù)據(jù)的質(zhì)量。
Firms trying to develop useful applications for AI must hope that the data they have are sufficient, or come up with ways to coax users into providing them with better information at no cost.
試圖為AI開發(fā)有用應(yīng)用的公司必須指望自己擁有的數(shù)據(jù)足夠多。不然,就得想法不花一分錢地去誘導(dǎo)用戶給他們提供更好的信息。
For example, they must pester random people—like those blur-deciphering visitors to websites—into labelling data, and hope that in their annoyance and haste they do not make mistakes.
例如,他們必須麻煩隨機人群——如那些涂抹辨識碼的網(wǎng)站訪問者——為數(shù)據(jù)貼上標(biāo)簽,而且還要希望他們在不耐煩和匆忙之中不出錯。
Even so, as AI improves, the amount of work made vulnerable to displacement by technology grows, and ever more of the value generated in the economy accrues to profitable firms rather than workers.
即便如此,隨著AI的發(fā)展,被技術(shù)搞得對失去位置弱不禁風(fēng)的工作的數(shù)量日漸增加,在經(jīng)濟體中被生產(chǎn)出來的價值越來越多地向盈利公司而不是工人累積。
As the authors point out, the share of GDP paid out to workers in wages and salaries—once thought to be relatively stable—has already been declining over the past few decades.
正如作者所指出的那樣,以工資和薪水形式付給工人的GDP比例——曾經(jīng)被認(rèn)為是相對穩(wěn)定的——在過去的幾十年中,早已在不斷下降之中。