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This looks like irrationality in action, bound to end in tears.
這看上去想是行動(dòng)方面的不理性，注定要在淚水中收場。
Why, then, should the party continue?
那么，為什么這場盛宴應(yīng)當(dāng)繼續(xù)下去呢？
Manias are as old as finance, and economists have devoted plenty of time to studying them.
狂熱如金融一樣古老，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家投入了大把的時(shí)間去研究它們。
Though often blamed on easy credit, human nature alone can goad a raging bull.
盡管經(jīng)常被歸罪于寬松信貸，但是，單單是人性就能夠激發(fā)出一頭瘋牛。
As Charles Kindleberger explained in his book “Manias, Panics and Crashes”, enthusiasm for new markets or technologies frequently results in excessive optimism, which ultimately collides with reality in a spectacular crash.
正如查爾斯·金德爾伯格(Charles Kindleberger)在他的《瘋狂、恐慌與崩潰》一書中所解釋了的那樣，對于新市場或是新技術(shù)的熱情經(jīng)常在過度的樂觀中走向終點(diǎn)，最終在一場壯觀的崩潰中與現(xiàn)實(shí)相碰撞。
That seems at odds with the idea of an efficient market, in which asset prices reflect the discounted value of expected future profits, and in which easy, risk-free money is a rarity.
這似乎有違有效市場思想。有效市場思想認(rèn)為，資產(chǎn)價(jià)格反映的預(yù)期未來盈利的貼現(xiàn)價(jià)值；低息、無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的錢是一件稀世珍寶。
But economists have learned that efficiency is a somewhat loose constraint on markets.
但是，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家清楚，有效是加在市場頭上的一種多少有些寬松的緊箍咒。
The discounted value of dividends, for instance, varies by much less over time than stockmarket indices, meaning that people's views of the state of the world gyrate more than history suggests they should.
例如，相比股市指數(shù)，紅利的貼現(xiàn)價(jià)值更少地隨時(shí)間而變化。這表明，人們有關(guān)世界狀況的觀點(diǎn)，波動(dòng)地比歷史所揭示的還要大。
Markets are better at setting prices for individual stocks than in aggregate—in Paul Samuelson's words, they are “micro-efficient and macro-inefficient”.
較之總體，市場更擅長給單支股票定價(jià)——用保羅·薩繆爾森的話說就是，它們是“微觀有效，宏觀低效”。
Yet that may be because individual stocks are more likely to provide well-informed investors with opportunities for a quick no-risk profit.
然而，這可能是因?yàn)閱沃Ч善备锌赡芙o消息靈通的投資者提供快速無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)獲利的機(jī)會(huì)。
The ICO craze certainly appears to entail a departure from reasonable values.
ICO狂熱無疑會(huì)導(dǎo)致對合理價(jià)值的背離。
Such deviations can happen when taking the pessimistic side of a bet is difficult—shorting stocks, for instance (ie, selling securities the investor does not own in the hope the price will fall).
這類偏差可能在接受一項(xiàng)賭注的悲觀面是很難的時(shí)候發(fā)生——例如，賣空股票（即帶著價(jià)格將要下跌的希望賣出投資者不擁有的股票）。
In some accounts of the tech boom of the 1990s, the small float of many new tech stocks made shorting them nearly impossible; as issuance increased, however, bears could have their say, and markets tanked.
在有關(guān)上世紀(jì)90年代科技泡沫的一些報(bào)道中，許多新技術(shù)股票的微量流通股使得賣空幾乎不可能；然而，隨著發(fā)行增加，熊市可能有了發(fā)言權(quán)。結(jié)果，股市一瀉千里。
Housing, too, is famously hard to short; in the global crisis those few financiers who found vehicles to bet against mortgage-backed securities eventually made a fortune.
房產(chǎn)也是出了名地難以做空；在全球危機(jī)中，發(fā)現(xiàn)了對賭按揭證券工具的少數(shù)幾位金融大佬最終都掙了一大筆。
There are some opportunities to short cryptocurrencies, but essentially none for ICO tokens (something those intending to buy might reflect on, if reflection is their thing).
雖然存在著一些賣空加密貨幣的機(jī)會(huì)，但是，就各種ICO代幣而言，基本上是毫無機(jī)會(huì)的（那些有意買入的人）。
譯文來源考研英語時(shí)事閱讀
