To their surprise, they found that growth during years of economic expansion has fallen in the recent era—from 3.88% between 1820 and 1870 to 3.06% since 1950—even though average growth across all years in those two periods increased from 1.4% to 2.55%.
他們吃驚的是,他們發現經濟擴張時期的經濟增長在最近時期已經下降——從1820年和1870年的3.88%到自1950年3.06%——即使這兩個時期中這些年份平均經濟增長從1.4%上升到2.55%.
Instead, shorter and shallower slumps led to rising long-term growth.
相反,時間更短,程度更淺的經濟衰退導致了長期的經濟增長。
Output fell in a third of years between 1820 and 1870 but in only 12% of those since 1950.
收入在1820年和1870年中三分之一的年份下降,但是自從1950年僅在12%的年份中下降。

The rate of decline per recession year has fallen too, from 3% to 1.2%.
每個經濟衰退年份下降的比率也從3%降低到了1.2%.
So why have these “growth reversals” decreased in length and depth?
那么,為什么這些“增長逆轉”在長度和深度方面下降了呢?
In another paper Messrs Broadberry and Wallis find that conventional explanations—such as demographic change or a sectoral shift from volatile agriculture to the more stable services sector—do not fully explain the shift.
在另一篇 Messrs Broadberry 和 Wallis發現,傳統的經濟擴張——如從不穩定的農業到更加穩定的服務部門中的人口變動或部門轉變——并不能完全解釋這一轉變。
More important is the rise of the rule of law, enabling disputes to be settled by impartial courts.
更為重要的是法律地位的上升,保證了糾紛由公正的法庭解決。
Before the modern era, elites would fight between themselves for the spoils of growth and send the economy back to square one through wars, corruption and the like.
在現代時期以前,精英會為經濟增長的戰利品相互爭奪,并通過戰爭,腐敗和類似這樣的方式恢復經濟以占取一部分利益。
Respect for courts to resolve disputes prevents this from happening.
尊重法庭去解決爭端阻止了這種事的發生。
With populist politicians challenging the authority of judges once again across the world, that is food for thought.
隨著民粹主義政治家再次在全世界挑戰法官的權威,這值得人們深思。