評論
打印
Turkey's election
土耳其大選
How big will the protest vote be?
反對票會占多大比例？
Why the ruling AK party may not do as well on June 7th as in the past
土耳其執政黨正義與發展黨在6月7日大選的表現為何會不如以往
THE Justice and Development (AK) party has won three general elections in a row, most recently in 2011. Yet although it seems certain to win over 40% of the vote and remain the largest party after the election on June 7th, it is losing ground. Many things that helped AK are being reversed. The economy, its strongest suit, has run out of steam. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, AK's charismatic former prime minister, who became Turkey's first directly elected president in August, has become increasingly despotic and out of touch. And some opposition parties now look more appealing.
土耳其正義與發展黨已連續贏得三次大選，最近的一次是在2011年。盡管正發黨對于6月7日的普選似乎勝券在握，認為自己能夠贏得超過40%的選票并且其最大執政黨的位置依然屹立不倒，然而，正發黨的執政地位正日益失勢。益于正發黨之事也漸漸與其對立起來。其強項經濟方面也已經疲軟。正發黨前首相埃爾多安魅力超凡，曾是首位于八月被直接推選而出的土耳其總統，如今的他卻越來越專制與脫節。當下，不少反對黨看起來更具有吸引力。
The main centre-left Republican People's Party (CHP) has changed tack. Its leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has ditched his shrilly anti-Erdogan rhetoric of old and is hitting AK hard on the economy. His pledges to double the minimum wage and to improve the lot of some 11m pensioners may sound populist, yet they have resonance. Two-thirds of CHP candidates were elected in primaries. And Mr Kilicdaroglu has managed to bring in female candidates such as Selina Dogan, an ethnic Armenian lawyer, and Selin Sayek Boke, a respected Arab Christian economist. Ultra-secular dinosaurs have gone.
最大的左翼共和人民黨改變了策略。其領導人齊力·克達洛格魯也摒棄了他過去關于反埃爾多安的尖銳說辭，在經濟方面對正發黨發起重擊。他承諾會將最低工資翻上一番，并提高約一千一百萬養老金領取人群的數量，聽起來民粹主義，然而反響不錯。左翼共和人民黨中三分之二的候選人都是經過初選選拔而來。克達洛格魯想法設法引入了一些女性候選人，例如少數民族亞美尼亞律師賽琳娜·多根，受人景仰的阿拉伯經濟學家與基督教徒賽琳·薩耶克·博克。超世俗的守舊時代已遠去。
Alas, the newly colourful CHP is still not expected to add much to the 26% it got in 2011. But that is partly because some supporters are defecting to another opposition party, the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP). The HDP is a challenge to Mr Erdogan because his dream of an executive presidency depends on its share of the vote. Previously the Kurds fielded independent candidates to get around the minimum 10% threshold for seats in the parliament. But the HDP is now running nationally. Should it get over 10% of the vote, it will pick up 50-60 seats, leaving AK well short of the minimum 330 deputies required to propose constitutional changes, including an executive presidency.
可惜的是，新晉共和人民黨仍沒有太大希望超過2011年，得到多于26%選票。一部分原因是某些追隨者叛變投向諸如親庫爾德人民民主黨的其他反對黨。親庫爾德人民民主黨對于埃爾多安而言是項挑戰，因為他的執行主席之夢需要依靠選票來實現。此前，庫爾德人派出的獨立候選人在議會中所占席位最低大約10%。然而，如今共和人民黨的勢力正在土耳其全國范圍內推行蔓延。如果共和人民黨能夠贏得超過10%的選票，它將在議會獲得50-60的席位，那么正發黨則無法湊齊包括執行主席在內的至少330位議會代表的提議來完成憲法修改。
Some pollsters think AK might even fall short of the 276 seats it needs for a simple majority. It would then have to form a coalition with the third main opposition party, the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), since both the CHP and the HDP say they will not go into government with AK. If, however, the HDP does not clear the 10% hurdle, AK will inherit all its seats, clearing the way not just for a renewed single-party government but perhaps for Mr Erdogan's executive presidency.
一些民意調查機構認為正發黨達不到一般獲勝票選所需的276個席位。接下來它必須要與第三方的反對黨----極右翼的民族行動黨進行強強聯手的合作，因為共和人民黨與親庫爾德人民民主黨揚言不會與正發黨一同加入政府。不過，如果親庫爾德人民民主黨沒有清除掉那10%的障礙，正發黨將獲得其在議會的所有席位，這不僅為能復興一黨執政的政府掃清道路，可能也能為埃爾多安的執行主席之位掃除障礙。
The HDP owes its rising fortunes in part to its co-chair, Selahattin Demirtas. With his youthful looks and biting wit, the former human-rights lawyer from Diyarbakir makes Mr Erdogan seem a has-been. All over Turkey, bejewelled dowagers, hipsters and factory workers say they may vote HDP either because they “like Demirtas” or because “it's the only way to stop Erdogan.” This is a sea change. The HDP was long seen as the political arm of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the rebels fighting for Kurdish self-rule since 1984. Few doubt that the PKK and its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, still hold much sway. But a ceasefire that has held since March 2013 has legitimised the HDP. Winning more seats in parliament would propel the Kurds further into the mainstream and loosen the rebels' grip. Being shut out would have the opposite effect.
親庫爾德人民民主黨的好運一部分歸功于其聯合主席塞拉·德米塔斯，這位來自德亞巴克爾的前任人權律師，一表人才、犀利機智，反倒是埃爾多安顯得過氣起來。縱觀整個土耳其，無論是珠光寶氣的貴婦、時尚流行的潮人，還是辛勤勞作的工人都表示自己或許會將選票投給親庫爾德人民民主黨，理由要么是“敬仰德米塔斯”，要么是“這是唯一能夠阻止埃爾多安的方法”。這是一場席卷的變革。親庫爾德人民民主黨長期以來一直被視作庫爾德工人黨在政治上的左膀右臂，自1984年起便致力于庫爾德人自制的斗爭中。無人質疑庫爾德工人黨，其已被監禁的領導人阿布拉杜·奧賈蘭仍然擁有舉足輕重的地位。2013年3月的停戰協定使得親庫爾德人民民主黨合法化。在議會中贏得更多的席位將推進庫爾德人成為政治主流，解放反叛。如被拒之門外，效果會大大相反。
Although it was Mr Erdogan who initiated peace with the Kurds, he has hit the campaign trail, Koran in hand, ranting about Mr Demirtas's supposed “terrorist connections” and lack of faith. The HDP has to lure pro-AK Kurds into switching sides if it is to squeak past the threshold. “Kurds in the big western cities like Istanbul and Izmir hold the key,” concludes Behlul Ozkan, a political scientist. The HDP's victory is “by no means guaranteed”
盡管埃爾多安倡導與庫爾德人和平共處，他卻手持《可蘭經》，在競選游說中大放其詞稱德米塔斯可能“與恐怖分子有來往”，無信仰不忠誠。若親庫爾德人民民主黨想要僥幸逃過所謂的門檻，他們必須要引誘正發黨的庫爾德人轉變政治傾向。“庫爾德人在諸如伊斯坦布爾與伊茲密爾的西方大城市很關鍵，”政治科學家Behlul Ozkan如是說。親庫爾德人民民主黨是否能夠取勝誰也無法保證。譯者：陳思思 校對：王穎
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