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The United States, Japan and trade
亞太貿易協定：美國與日本
Don't treat trade as a weapon
別將貿易協定作為武器
An Asian-Pacific trade deal looks within reach, but politicians should stop seeing it as a way to contain China
亞太貿易協定似乎觸手可及,但政客們應該停止將其視為牽制中國的一種方式
GOOD news out of Washington is rare. Last week congressional leaders agreed on a bipartisan bill which, if passed, would for the first time in years give the president “fast-track” authority when negotiating trade deals. The bill would be a boost for the prospects of a huge trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), binding America with 11 economies (including Japan but not China) around the Pacific rim. Now, as if on cue, come welcome signals about the TPP itself. As Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, prepared to head to Washington for a much-anticipated trip including an invitation to address a joint session of Congress (see article), he claimed that America and Japan were close to agreement over their bilateral terms—on which the whole TPP deal hinges.
從華盛頓傳來了罕見的好消息。上周美國兩黨達成共識，如法案通過，美國總統在貿易協定談判領域可獲得快車道授權。該法案將成為促進貿易協議的最大助力點，且能促進跨太平洋伙伴關系(TPP)的形成。TPP即指，美國聯合環太平洋的十一個國家（包括日本，但不包括中國）而形成的經濟戰略伙伴關系。現在，不出人所料，一切的好消息都是向著TPP順利談成而發展的。備受矚目下，日本首相安倍晉三 (Shinzo Abe)將前往華盛頓，包括受邀在國會議席上發表講話(見文章)，他聲稱美國和日本正在就TPP協定關鍵的雙邊協議條款進行商討，就快達成一致了。
Yet there are two big caveats. First, fast track, formally known as Trade Promotion Authority, may still fall foul of Congress. Second, Japan may not make any serious cuts to tariffs that protect its farmers. Those outcomes are more likely because the Obama administration and the Japanese government have made a similar mistake: both have been too quick to cast the TPP as a weapon in the containment of China.
但有兩大阻力值得引起重視。首先，快車道授權(正式上稱為貿易促進授權)，仍會受到國會的干涉。其次，日本為了保護農民，不可能果斷地削減關稅。就目前的阻力而言，奧巴馬及安倍晉三政府都犯了一個極為相似的錯誤：過快的將TPP作為牽制中國的武器。
Flanked by Japan and America, the TPP would link countries which make up 40% of global GDP. It could boost world output by $220 billion a year by 2025. It is supposed to reform difficult areas such as intellectual property, state-owned firms and environmental and labour standards. It would join economies—from Vietnam to Australia—that lie at different ends of the spectrum of development.
TPP以日本和美國為兩個最大的經濟體，其覆蓋的國家GDP總值能夠占全球GDP的40%。且TPP預計可于2025年，為世界經濟每年帶來2200億美元的額外收益。同時TPP還在一些困難領域上支持改革，比如知識產權、國有企業及環境問題，以及勞工標準。協議將覆蓋從越南到澳大利亞的眾多經濟體，盡管它們處在不同的發展領域。
But the TPP will not happen without fast track, which forces Congress into a yes/no vote on any pending trade deal and so avoids the risk that it will be amended into oblivion. And the passage of fast track faces a lot of scepticism from Democrats (see article). Some are implacably opposed. Others want America to have a bigger arsenal with which to fight against unfair traders. Driven by a conviction that China artificially holds its currency down and destroys American jobs, Charles Schumer, a powerful senator from New York, is determined that fast track should include a provision that would make sure a trade deal included sanctions on currency manipulation.
但TPP必須以快車道授權為先決條件，才有其存在的意義。這也迫使國會盡快對這個一直懸而未決的貿易協定進行投票,以避免該法案被遺忘。但快車道授權仍受到許多來自民主黨的質疑(見文章)。其中一些人對此法案表示堅決反對。而其他人則希望美國有一個更為強大的軍力來對抗不公平的交易。 來自紐約的強有力的參議員查爾斯?舒默(Charles Schumer)，堅信中國人為的控制人民幣匯率并破壞美國的就業機會, 因而他認為快軌授權應包括一項足以確保貿易協議能對匯率操縱進行制裁的條款。
Attaching a currency-manipulation clause to trade deals is a poor idea, both because the practice is hard to define and because the addition of such clauses makes reaching an agreement less likely. But since the Obama administration has pitched TPP as a counterbalance to an assertive China, Mr Schumer's demands are harder to ignore.
在貿易協議上增加人民幣匯率操縱的條款，這是一個卑鄙的想法,原因有兩個：其一操縱作法很難定義；其二，添加這樣的條款只會讓協議達成一致遙遙無期。但是因為奧巴馬政府是把TPP作為牽制強硬的中國的一種手段，所以舒默的提議更不容忽視。
Give trade a chance、
給達成貿易協定一個機會
The same mistaken logic looks set to cause problems in Japan. Mr Abe committed his country to joining the TPP on strategic grounds—as a counterweight to China—rather than because he is a born admirer of free trade. When he entered negotiations, some of his backers thought that, by playing the China card, Japan would be spared from making real concessions: that America would care more about a pact that excluded China than about prising open Japan's most protected markets, particularly rice. Even now, Japan seems to want to keep tariffs high. The best it may offer is to allow in a fixed quota of tariff-free rice from the TPP's other members, America included.
相同錯誤的邏輯似乎會給日本帶來問題。安倍承諾日本將加入TPP的戰略基礎是因為想牽制中國發展,而不是因為他是一個天生的自由貿易的崇拜者。當他加入談判,他的一些支持者認為,只有打中國牌,日本才能免于真正去承認：美國更關心摒棄掉中國市場的協定，而不是撬開日本一直以來最受保護的市場,尤其是大米市場。即使是現在,日本似乎仍想保持高關稅。而最好的解決方案是從包括美國在內的TPP其他成員國那里，準予日本需以一個固定的大米免關稅配額進入。
If the China-containment logic leads to a minimalist agreement, then the economic gains from TPP will be slim. TPP's real value is to set high new standards for world trade, and that demands the boldest possible agreement. And in the long run the world gains most if China joins. The rhetoric makes trade negotiations sound like a contest. In fact, it is a battle where the more you give away the more you win.
如果說牽制中國這一邏輯造就了極簡主義的協議，那么從TPP獲取的經濟收益將會減少。TPP的真正價值是為世界貿易設置更高的新標準,并要求盡可能大膽的提出協議。從長遠來看，如若能讓中國加入TPP協議，世界獲益也最大。現在的措辭使貿易談判聽起來像一場競爭。事實上,這是一場你放棄越多，贏得的也就越多的戰斗。翻譯：楊靄琳 校對：顏琪琳
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