評(píng)論
打印
America and the second world war
美國(guó)和二戰(zhàn)
That special relationship
那種特殊的關(guān)系
Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World War II, 1939-1941. By Lynne Olson.
書名：《那些憤怒的日子：羅斯福、林白及美國(guó)對(duì)是否參加二戰(zhàn)的爭(zhēng)論，1939至1941年》作者：Lynne Olson
WHEN “the chips are down”, David Cameron declared on a visit to Washington last year, Britain and America know that they can always count on each other. Standing beside Barack Obama on a sun-drenched White House lawn, Britain's prime minister invoked the memory of their respective grandfathers, serving in the same campaign to drive Hitler's forces from France. The message was clear. Seven decades on, when the British need to claim a special relationship with America, nothing approaches the second world war's talismanic power.
去年，卡梅倫在訪問華盛頓時(shí)說：在“危急時(shí)刻”，英美兩國(guó)明白，雙方總是可以互相信賴的。卡梅倫首相與奧巴馬一同站在白宮灑滿陽光的草坪上，卡梅倫喚起了雙方對(duì)各自先輩的回憶：他們并肩作戰(zhàn)，將希特勒的軍隊(duì)從法國(guó)驅(qū)趕出去。卡梅倫傳達(dá)了一條明確的信息：七十年后的今天，當(dāng)英國(guó)需要與美國(guó)保持一種特殊關(guān)系時(shí)，什么也比不了二戰(zhàn)的特殊魔力。
In truth, for two terrifying years after it declared war on Germany, Britain did not know that America would come to its aid. Winston Churchill's government wavered between a conviction that President Franklin Roosevelt did not want Hitler to control the whole of Europe and so would send help, and a suspicion that many in his government dreamed of scavenging the assets of a doomed British empire. Britain made an extraordinary effort to bring America into the war before it was too late. With Roosevelt's tacit approval, hundreds of British agents flooded neutral America, secretly spying on isolationist politicians, Axis diplomats and Nazi sympathisers and more openly wooing public opinion with lectures, radio broadcasts and stories planted in friendly newspapers. Marrying a historian's thoroughness with a biographer's eye for human nature, Lynne Olson's magnificent new account shows what a close-run thing their campaign was.
實(shí)際上，在英國(guó)向德國(guó)宣戰(zhàn)后可怕的兩年中，英國(guó)不知道美國(guó)會(huì)對(duì)其提供幫助。丘吉爾政府搖擺不定，時(shí)而堅(jiān)信羅斯福不會(huì)讓希特勒控制整個(gè)歐洲，因此會(huì)向英國(guó)提供援助；時(shí)而又懷疑羅斯福政府中的一些人，認(rèn)為他們夢(mèng)想著大英帝國(guó)會(huì)毀滅，然后蠶食其資產(chǎn)。英國(guó)竭盡全力及時(shí)地拉動(dòng)美國(guó)參戰(zhàn)。在羅斯福的默許下，數(shù)百名英國(guó)間諜涌入中立的美國(guó)，秘密監(jiān)視孤立派政治家、軸心國(guó)外交官和納粹的同情者，他們還發(fā)表演講、進(jìn)行電臺(tái)廣播，同時(shí)在親英的報(bào)紙上刊登故事，來更加公開地爭(zhēng)取民心。在這部精彩絕倫的新書中，作者Lynne Olson結(jié)合歷史學(xué)家的全面性和傳記作家對(duì)人性的探尋，向讀者展示了他們的行動(dòng)是如何地驚險(xiǎn)。
“Those Angry Days” describes a divided America that is little remembered now, amid praise for the greatest-generation years that followed. She depicts an anti-war country in which bars near army bases sported signs banning soldiers, and generals wore mufti to testify on Capitol Hill, lest their uniforms provoke isolationist members of Congress.
《那些憤怒的日子》一書描述了一個(gè)現(xiàn)在鮮為人知的分裂的美國(guó)，字里行間也體現(xiàn)了對(duì)之后數(shù)年內(nèi)最偉大一代的贊許。她描述了一個(gè)反戰(zhàn)的國(guó)家，在那里，軍事基地附近的酒吧掛著禁止士兵入內(nèi)的標(biāo)識(shí)，將軍則在美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)山身穿便服作證，以免他們的制服惹惱議會(huì)中不主張美國(guó)參戰(zhàn)的人。
In defence of that pacifism, she explains how Americans felt that their country had been dragged into the first world war by clever British propaganda and promises that Americans killed in Europe's mud were making the world “safe for democracy”. Twenty years later, many Americans believed that Europe's squabbling powers once again seemed unwilling or unable to defend democracy. Less defensibly, a series of grandees—whether army officers, senators, press barons, or students at Yale and Harvard—are shown questioning whether there was any great moral difference between Britain and Nazi Germany, a view that was often tinged with anti-Semitism.
美國(guó)人感到正是英國(guó)人狡猾的宣傳和保證才把美國(guó)卷入了第一次世界大戰(zhàn)，這些感受還是有原因的。作者為反戰(zhàn)主義辯護(hù)，解釋了美國(guó)人為什么這樣想。二十年后，許多美國(guó)人認(rèn)為歐洲爭(zhēng)吵不休的大國(guó)再次似乎不愿意或不能夠保衛(wèi)民主。作者還較客觀地指出：一系列的大人物—不管是軍官、議員、報(bào)業(yè)巨頭或是耶魯和哈佛大學(xué)的學(xué)生—都在質(zhì)疑英國(guó)和納粹德國(guó)之間是否存在任何道義上的不同，這種觀點(diǎn)常常帶有一絲反猶太主義色彩。
Many pages are devoted to an isolationist leader whose clay feet are well known: the transatlantic air pioneer, Charles Lindbergh (pictured), who came grievously close to sympathising with the Nazis. But the book's power lies in its finely shaded portraits of figures more usually remembered in poster-bright hues of heroism.
作者還用了許多筆墨來描述一位孤立派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，他就是跨大西洋飛行員查爾斯-林白，他的致命弱點(diǎn)廣為人知：他十分接近于同情納粹。但是本書的妙處就在于作者擅于用委婉的手法對(duì)一些人物進(jìn)行描述，這些人物在當(dāng)今人們的眼中英雄色彩更濃一些。
George Marshall, who would later become a great war commander, is shown resisting help for embattled Britain until late in 1941. Marshall never quite rebelled openly, but he shielded aides as they leaked and schemed against government policy. Several senior officers were“essentially pro-German”. For his part Roosevelt is shown as perilously indecisive, poring over opinion polls and “waiting to be pushed into war”, as he told his treasury secretary. Even after the attack on Pearl Harbour, which was greeted with champagne by British officials in America, the president hesitated, detecting a “l(fā)ingering distinction” in public opinion between war with Japan and a second front with Germany. In the end, Hitler made the decision for him by declaring war on America.
本書寫道：后來成為戰(zhàn)時(shí)指揮官的馬歇爾一直拒絕向四面楚歌的英國(guó)提供幫助，這種情況一直持續(xù)到1941年年末。盡管馬歇爾基本上從來沒有公開反對(duì)向英國(guó)提供援助，但是當(dāng)來自美國(guó)的援助一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)流向英國(guó)時(shí)，他對(duì)之進(jìn)行了阻止；馬歇爾還暗中反對(duì)政府的政策。幾名美國(guó)高級(jí)軍官“實(shí)際上是親德的”。在本書中，羅斯福優(yōu)柔寡斷至極、埋頭研究民意調(diào)查、“等著被推入戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”—羅斯福就是這么告訴他的財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)的。珍珠港襲擊發(fā)生后，在美的英國(guó)軍官用香檳酒慶祝，甚至在那以后，羅斯福總統(tǒng)仍然猶豫不決，認(rèn)為“向日本開戰(zhàn)”和“在第二戰(zhàn)線與德國(guó)開戰(zhàn)”這兩種民意“一直存在區(qū)別”。最后，希特勒率先向美國(guó)開戰(zhàn)，從而為羅斯福做了決定。
The British are not let off scot-free. In addition to planting propaganda, British agents broke American laws with a will. The British tapped phones, opened letters and even forged a map given to Roosevelt, supposedly showing Nazi plans to take over Latin America. Snobbery played into Britain's hands. The book could be sub- titled “Wasps at War”, as east-coast anglophiles and Wall Street millionaires pushed their country towards engagement, against isolationist forces drawn from the prairies and small towns of middle America.
英國(guó)人的所作所為我們可不能不追究。除了四處播撒言論，英國(guó)間諜還大肆破壞美國(guó)的法律。英方竊聽電話、私拆信件、甚至虛造了一幅地圖給了羅斯福，讓他以為納粹可能有占領(lǐng)拉丁美洲的計(jì)劃。英國(guó)人正是利用某些美國(guó)人的勢(shì)利眼而達(dá)到了自己的目的。該書的副標(biāo)題可作“戰(zhàn)時(shí)的VIP們”，因?yàn)槟菚r(shí)美國(guó)東海岸的親英派和華爾街百萬富翁將美國(guó)推向了參戰(zhàn)之路，盡管那些來自北美大牧場(chǎng)和美國(guó)中部小鎮(zhèn)的孤立派反對(duì)這么做。
Among the heroes are Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate in 1940, who after his defeat backed Roosevelt and vitally campaigned for Americans to be conscripted and trained for war and for Britain to be sent aid. That enraged many in Willkie's party, but may have helped avert a Nazi victory.
溫德爾?威爾基是眾多英雄之一，他在1940年是共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人，在總統(tǒng)競(jìng)選失敗后他支持羅斯福，并積極動(dòng)員美國(guó)人為戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)應(yīng)征入伍并接受訓(xùn)練、推動(dòng)為英國(guó)送去援助。這激怒了很多共和黨人，但這很可能扭轉(zhuǎn)了戰(zhàn)局，防止了納粹的勝利。
In the end, the public was ahead of many in the elite. Even before Pearl Harbour, polls showed Americans preferring entry into the war to a German victory over Britain. Japan had hoped its bombs would demoralise Americans. Instead, America was united by the attack. Two years of savage debate had already aired every argument for and against war, Ms Olson notes. Democracy was America's strength, as an anxious Britain had hoped it would be. It was a point despotic enemies could never have understood.
最后，民眾反而走在了很多上層人士的前面。甚至在珍珠港事件發(fā)生以前，民意測(cè)驗(yàn)就顯示美國(guó)人更傾向于美國(guó)參戰(zhàn)，而不是德國(guó)戰(zhàn)勝英國(guó)。日本原本希望在珍珠港投下的炸彈能使美國(guó)人人心渙散；然而，那場(chǎng)襲擊讓美國(guó)人團(tuán)結(jié)一心。作者Olson指出，在兩年的激烈辯論中，人們可以聽到各種支持和反對(duì)美國(guó)參戰(zhàn)的言論。民主是美國(guó)的力量所在，而這正是焦慮的英國(guó)所希望能做到的。而這一點(diǎn)是任何專制的敵人永遠(yuǎn)也不會(huì)明白的。
