評論
打印
Books and arts
文藝
A history of guerrilla warfare
游擊戰的歷史
How the weak vanquish the strong
以弱勝強之道
Fighting an insurgency requires patience, restraint and a good public-relations strategy
平定叛亂需要耐心，克制和良好的戰略公關
Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present.
《看不見的軍隊》:一部述說古今游擊戰的史詩。
By Max Boot. Liveright; 750 pages; $35.
作者:Max Boot. Liveright；750頁，定價35美元。
To be published in Britain in February by W.W. Norton; 25.
W.W. Norton將于2月份在英國出版；定價25英鎊。
Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk
可以在英國亞馬遜網上書城購買。
LIKE the poor, guerrilla armies have, it seems, always been with us.
游擊隊就像窮人一樣，似乎一直都伴隨在我們左右。
From the nomadic rebels who brought down the Roman empire to the internet-savvy, plane-exploding jihadists who triggered America's ill-conceived global war on terror, irregular forces are a constant factor in the history of warfare.
游牧叛亂武裝打垮了羅馬帝國；互聯網專家，爆炸飛機的圣戰分子使美國開啟了思謀不周的全球反恐戰爭，非正規部隊是戰爭歷史中的一個永恒元素。
And fighting them has become tougher than ever.
現在對付游擊武裝比以往更棘手。
Plenty of literature gives advice on how to beat such maddening foes.
很多文獻給都教你如何擊敗這些令人發狂的敵人。
Max Boot, a neoconservative American military historian, has done something different.
屬于新保守派的美國軍事歷史學家Max Boot做了一些不同的工作，
Invisible Armies is a narrative history of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, ranging from what he describes as its origins, in bringing down the Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia in the 22nd century BC, to the present day.
《看不見的軍隊》敘述了從古至今的游擊戰和恐怖行動。他認為這種戰爭起源于公元前22世紀，美索不達米亞的阿卡德帝國就是被游擊戰摧毀的。
The author moves quite quickly over the first 4,000 years or so and only really gets going in the 18th century, with its revolutionary wars of independence.
作者很快講完了前4000年的歷史，從18世紀的獨立革命戰爭切入，這大概是真正游擊戰的發端。
Among the many liberal insurgencies he considers are the American revolution; the struggle against Napoleon in the Iberian peninsula; Greece's war for independence against the Ottomans; the wars of unification in Italy and various uprisings against colonial powers, such as the slave revolt against the French that led to the foundation of the Republic of Haiti.
在很多自由起義中，他思考了美國革命，伊比利亞半島反對拿破侖的斗爭，希臘人反抗奧斯曼人獨立戰爭，意大利統一之戰以及各種反抗殖民勢力的起義，如反抗法國的奴隸起義引發了海地共和國的成立。
In the 20th century Mr Boot examines the impact of irregular forces in the two world wars; the contribution to insurgent theory of Mao Zedong's seminal work On Guerrilla Warfare, gleaned from his experiences in the Chinese civil war; the very different French and British responses to rebellions against their fading empires; the radical chic revolutionaries of the 1960s and the rise of radical Islamism.
Boot先生仔細觀察了非正規部隊對20世紀兩次世界大戰的影響；毛澤東那部給起義理論做出貢獻的有開創性的著作《論游擊戰》，這是他從中國內戰中收獲的經驗，不同于逐漸衰落的英法帝國處理叛亂事件；上世紀60年代激進派時髦的革命和極端伊斯蘭分子的叛亂。
If this sounds a bit like a list, it is because of the way the book is organised. Mr Boot picks a theme, for example, The End of Empire, and then hoovers up into that section all the conflicts that can be made to fit that description.
上面的內容有點像開列清單，因為這是本書的組織方式，Boot先生選擇一個主題，例如帝國的終結，然后把所有符合主題的斗爭收錄到這個部分。
Each one gets a few pages of lively narrative and a brief analysis of why one side prevailed over the other.
每個主題都占據幾頁篇幅，敘述的很生動，并且簡要地分析了一方為何能戰勝另一方。
The formula works rather well. Even when the author is rattling through fairly familiar territory, such as the failures of the French against the Vietminh, he usually finds something fresh or pithy to say.
這種方式的效果很好。即使述說大家熟悉的事情，作者也能講出點新鮮東西和獨到見解。
Take, for example, Vo Nguyen Giap, the brilliant Communist general who succeeded in expelling first the French and then the Americans from Vietnam.
例如杰出的共產黨將領武元甲成功地把法國人和美國人先后趕出越南。
Giap closely followed the teachings of Mao in planning a three-stage struggle,first localised guerrilla war, then war of movement and finally general uprising,which he waged with a three-tier force of village militias, full-time guerrillas and a regular army.
武元甲密切遵循毛澤東的教導，制定了一個包含三個階段的斗爭—先是局部的游擊戰，接著實施運動戰，最后發動大起義 —他投入了三種力量:民兵、專職游擊隊和正規軍。
But where Mao was always cautious to avoid confrontations with more powerful forces, Giap's tendency to roll the dice on premature offensives in 1951, 1968 and again in 1972 could have proved fatal each time had it not been for the psychological and political frailties of the other side.
毛澤東總是謹慎地避免和更強大的力量發生對抗，但是武元甲愿意為過早攻擊孤注一擲。1951年，1968年和接下來的1972年他都用了這種方法，要不是對方存在著心理上和政策上的弱點，這三次作戰就不會造成致命的影響。
In guerrilla warfare, what matters most is the ability to shape the story, not the facts on the ground.
在游擊戰中，最重要的是推動戰爭向前發展的能力，而非戰場上的實際情況。
This is how guerrillas are able to win wars even as they lose battles.
這就是游擊隊即使戰斗失利的情況下仍然能夠贏得戰爭。
Because insurgencies pit the weak against the strong, most still end up failing.
因為這些起義以弱勢抗強敵，大部分還是以失敗告終。
Between 1775 and 1945 only about a quarter achieved most or all of their aims.
Boot先生說，從1775年至1945年，只有四分之一的起義完成了自己的大部分或全部目標。
But since 1945 that number has risen to 40%, according to Mr Boot.
但是自1945年以來，成功率增長到了40%。
Part of the reason for the improving success rate is the rising importance of public opinion.
成功率的提高部分原因是公眾輿論的重要性日益突出。
Since 1945 the spread of democracy, education, mass media and the concept of international law have all conspired,
自1945年以來，民主、教育、大眾媒體和國際公法的概念得到推廣，
to sap the will of states engaged in protracted counter-insurgencies.
這都削弱了應對長期叛亂的國家意志。
In the battle over the narrative, insurgents have many more weapons at their disposal than before.
戰斗過程中，可供叛亂分子使用的武器比以前多得多。
Mr Boot does not conclude that counter-insurgency in the 21st century is a losing game.
Boot先生沒有推斷在21世紀鎮壓叛亂是徒勞之舉。
But to prevail requires an understanding of the game's rules.
然而獲勝之前要理解游戲的規則。
He is a powerful advocate for the so-called population-centric approach pioneered by the British during the 12-year post-war Malayan Emergency, which lasted until 1960, and rediscovered by American generals,such as David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal in Iraq and Afghanistan,only after things there had gone disastrously wrong.
他極力鼓吹所謂以民眾為中心的方法，這是戰后英國在應對馬來亞12年危機時倡導的理論，美軍將領如分別在伊拉克和阿富汗的局勢,嚴重惡化之后對此做出重新發現。
The first principle is to abandon conventional military tactics.
第一原則是放棄常規戰術。
Clear and hold beats search and destroy.
清除和控制勝過搜尋和破壞。
To defeat an insurgency you must provide enough security for ordinary people to live their lives.
要平息叛亂，必須給普通民眾的生活提供充足的安全保障。
The second is that legitimacy is vital for both sides: corrupt or excessively violent governments will always struggle,
第二合法性對雙方來說都是重要的:腐敗或過于暴力的政府一直會引發斗爭，
but so too will guerrillas who terrorise their own people.
但是游擊隊也會威脅本國人民。
The third is staying power.
第三是耐力。
Firepower is no substitute for patience and boots on the ground.
在戰場上火力不能取代忍耐力和士氣。
The people you need on your side must believe that you are in it for the long haul.
必須要讓你爭取的民眾相信你會長期和他們在一起。
The fourth is that most counter-insurgency campaigns abroad are lost at home.
第四大部分在海外開展的鎮壓叛亂的戰斗都輸在國內。
Liberal democracies have short attention spans, low tolerance for casualties and other calls on their cash.
自由主義的民主國家對于需要花錢的重大傷亡事故和其他征召不大關注，容忍度也不高。
Unless voters believe that an intervention is necessary for their own security they will quickly withdraw support for it.
除非選民認為有必要采取干涉措施才能保障自身的安全，否則他們會很快放棄對這種行動的支持。
All of which explains why things are not going well in Afghanistan.
以上情況都可以解釋為什么阿富汗的事情進展不順。
The population-centric approach—and the troop surge needed to realise it came late in the day and with a foolishly rigid deadline.
實行以民眾為中心的方法和增加部隊都來的太晚，而且愚蠢地附帶著嚴格的時限。
The Afghan government has some popular legitimacy, but not enough in the places where the insurgency is resilient.
阿富汗政府在一定程度上擁有廣泛的合法性，但是在叛亂行動回彈的地方該政府的合法性還是不足。
Nor has it been possible for American forces to deny the Taliban their sanctuary in Pakistan: insurgencies with outside support are much harder to beat.
美國人不可能容忍塔利班在巴基斯坦避難:得到外部支持的叛亂更加難以平息。
Voters in America and Europe are not prepared to spend any more blood or money on what most presume is a lost cause.
美國和歐洲的選民還不想在大部分人看來要注定失敗的行動上流更多的血，花更多的錢。
Few think that what happens in Afghanistan will affect their own safety.
幾乎沒有人意識到發生在阿富汗的事情會影響到自己的安全。
Counter-insurgency may be out of fashion again, but it remains necessary to know how to do it.
鎮壓叛亂可能又過時了。但是我們還需要如何應對叛亂。
Mr Boot offers a timely reminder to politicians and generals of the hard-earned lessons of history.
Boot先生及時地向軍政要人提醒了這個得來不易的歷史教訓。
