商業(yè)報(bào)道
Mining in Indonesia
印尼礦業(yè)
Smeltdown
熔爐決定生存
The government risks an export slump to boost the metals-processing industry
政府為了刺激金屬加工業(yè)發(fā)展不惜冒著削減出口量的危險(xiǎn)
INDONESIA'S government concedes that it will cause short-term damage; but on January 12th it went ahead and banned exports of mineral ores, at last implementing a law passed in 2009.
印尼政府承認(rèn)了金屬加工產(chǎn)業(yè)將蒙受短期虧損;但是在1月12號(hào),印尼政府堅(jiān)持09年的立法,繼續(xù)禁止出口礦石。
Officials say that forcing mining firms to export only processed minerals will attract investment in smelters and refineries.
官方稱,強(qiáng)令礦業(yè)公司只出口加工過(guò)的礦石將吸引投資,主要針對(duì)熔煉和精煉產(chǎn)業(yè)。
After a year or so this will start to add value to the country's exports, they say.
在一年左右的時(shí)間后,這舉措會(huì)增加印尼出口的價(jià)值。
But it is quite a gamble.
但這是一個(gè)相當(dāng)大的賭博。
Indonesiahas few smelters, and earns 5 billion a year by exporting unprocessed minerals such as copper concentrate, nickel ores and bauxite.
印尼有一些熔爐產(chǎn)業(yè),而且每年可以從出口天然礦產(chǎn)里,例如銅精礦石、鎳礦石、礬土,獲利50億美元。
The mining ministry had admitted that an outright ban on ore shipments would cut exports by 4 billion this year and 2.5 billion next.
礦業(yè)部承認(rèn),今年完全禁止礦石海運(yùn)出口會(huì)減少40億的出口額,明年預(yù)計(jì)減少25億。
With the country's current-account deficit last year hitting 3.5% of GDP, its worst since 1986, and its currency falling steeply, this is a bad time to be forgoing foreign earnings.
在印尼往來(lái)賬戶赤字占有GDP總額3.5%的情況下,這不是一個(gè)放棄國(guó)外盈利好時(shí)期。這是自1986年來(lái)最壞的情形,并且它的貨幣貶值很厲害。
This may explain why the president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, relaxed the moratorium at the last moment to let big copper producers keep exporting concentrate.
這就解釋了為什么蘇西洛總統(tǒng)最后最后時(shí)刻放寬了出口政策轉(zhuǎn)而讓大型制銅商們繼續(xù)出口精礦石。
FreeportIndonesia, an American-owned miner, had warned of a 60% cut in production at its Grasberg mine in Papua, the world's fifth-largest copper mine, if the ban had been imposed in its original form.
如果禁令實(shí)施保持不變,美國(guó)控股的印尼自由港礦業(yè)公司警告它將減少了它在巴布亞島Grasberg礦的60%產(chǎn)量。
Freeportsmelts about 40% of its output at Gresik in eastern Java, the country's sole copper smelter, but it exports the rest as concentrate.
這座礦同時(shí)也是世界第五大銅礦。自由港冶煉了在Java東部Gresik大約40%的礦石產(chǎn)出,是這個(gè)國(guó)家唯一的銅礦冶煉公司,但是它出口剩下沒(méi)煉的礦石,例如銅精礦。
Concentrating minds
以提煉礦石為中心
Another reason for waiving the restriction on copper is that, in contrast to some other metals, mining and concentrating it produces most of its final value:
放棄限制銅礦出口政策的另一個(gè)原因就是,與某些金屬對(duì)比,采銅和精煉就可以占有最大一部分的最終價(jià)值:
Nathan Associates, a consultancy in Washington, DC, says only 4-6% is added by smelting.
南森聯(lián)合公司是華盛頓的一家咨詢公司,宣稱只有4%-6%的價(jià)值是通過(guò)熔煉加上去的。
So the potential upside from insisting that only refined copper be exported is slight relative to the downside of losing 2.5 billion a year of concentrate exports.
因此,與喪失一年25億美元銅精礦出口額相比,潛在的升值空間就來(lái)自于堅(jiān)持出口精煉銅礦出口。
However, there are significant gains to be made by processing other metal ores.
然而,有一些可觀的收入就可能來(lái)自于其他金屬礦石加工。
About 94% of aluminium's final value comes from the refining and smelting stages, for example.
大約94%的鋁礦最終價(jià)值來(lái)自提煉和熔煉程序,例如,熔煉增加了鎳礦石的價(jià)值。
Smelting adds a lot of value to nickel ore, too.
但是,只要大量新的熔爐實(shí)際建成,印尼就會(huì)實(shí)現(xiàn)這些收入。
But Indonesia will achieve these gains only if plenty of new smelters are actually built.
這些投入很昂貴,需要大量配套基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施,
Such plants are expensive, and require a lot of supporting infrastructure, such as power plants, ports and roads:Indonesiais terrible at building these.
如電力,港口,道路:印尼很不擅長(zhǎng)建造這些設(shè)施。
Moreover, world mineral prices are depressed and smelting margins are low.
世界礦產(chǎn)價(jià)格持續(xù)低迷,熔煉利潤(rùn)持續(xù)走低。
Nevertheless, the government says that many new smelters are in the works.
不過(guò),政府部門稱,很多熔爐都已投入使用。
China Hongqiao, that country's biggest privately owned aluminium producer, is building a 1 billion smelter in Borneo.
中國(guó)虹橋公司,作為印尼最大的私有鋁礦生產(chǎn)者,正在Borneo建造一個(gè)價(jià)值十億美元的熔爐。
The Indonesian government says another big Chinese firm, Shandong Nanshan Aluminium, is investing 5 billion in a smelter, power plant and port on Bintan island.
印尼政府說(shuō)另一個(gè)大型中國(guó)公司,山東南山鋁業(yè),正投資50億美元在Bintan島建造熔爐,電力系統(tǒng),港口。
As for nickel, when President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia last October he witnessed the signing of several agreements by Chinese firms to build smelters to produce the metal, used in making stainless steel.
至于鎳礦,去年十月份習(xí)近平主席拜訪印尼時(shí),見證了中國(guó)公司建熔爐生產(chǎn)金屬制作不銹鋼的協(xié)議簽訂。
This was a reminder of how dependentChinais on Indonesian nickel supplies, and a hint that it may be more interested in securing those supplies than in whether its companies make profits from the new smelting plants.
這是一個(gè)對(duì)中國(guó)的提醒,對(duì)印尼鎳礦提供有多么依賴,也是一個(gè)暗示,中國(guó)可能會(huì)對(duì)保護(hù)這些供給礦源產(chǎn)生更大的興趣,而不是在乎是否這些公司真正從這些新熔爐制造中盈利。
So although export bans are generally not a good idea, and using protectionism to foster “infant industries” is a policy that has produced more failures than successes, it is not impossible thatIndonesiawill achieve its hopes of moving its natural-resources industries up the value chain.
因此,盡管出口禁令總體上不算個(gè)好點(diǎn)子,而且使用貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義來(lái)培育“新生產(chǎn)業(yè)”的政策往往帶來(lái)更多失敗而不是成功,但印尼也有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)它的期望,那就是將依賴自然資源的工業(yè)綁上盈利產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈。
But at what cost in the meantime?
但是這樣做的同時(shí)需要付出什么代價(jià)呢?
A little bit of resource nationalism may win Mr Yudhoyono's allies a few votes in the parliamentary elections scheduled for April and the presidential one in July.
一年資源國(guó)家主義可能會(huì)為尤多約諾總統(tǒng)在四月份的議會(huì)選舉和7月份的總統(tǒng)大選里贏得一些選票。
But it may lose a lot more if many smaller miners, who cannot afford to invest in smelters, close down and cut large numbers of jobs.
但是也有可能失去更多的小型礦主,他們無(wú)力投資熔爐,導(dǎo)致倒閉和大量裁員。
If the short-term loss of export income exacerbates worries aboutIndonesia's current account, the consequences could be worse still.
如果短期出口盈利損失使印尼貨幣貶值加劇,結(jié)局仍可能是更糟。