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Finance and economics
財經商業
Buttonwood
金融市場
Where there's money, there's risk
哪里有貨幣，哪里就有風險
Events in America show that no asset is copper-bottomed
在美國發生的事情顯示出沒有資產是毫無風險的。
A GOVERNMENT with debt denominated in its own currency need never default, or so the theory goes.
一個擁有以本幣為計量單位的債務的政府需要的是永不違約，大概這個理論是可以實現的。
It can simply print more money to pay off the debt.
它能簡單地印刷更多的貨幣來支付它的債務。
In practice, however, countries do default on local-currency debt: six have done so in the past 15 years, including Jamaica, Russia and Ecuador.
但是實際上，國家不履行本國貨幣債務：在過去十五年已經有六個國家這樣做了，包括牙買加，俄羅斯和厄瓜多爾。
Before this week's budget deal, markets had feared that America could join the list, if only in a technical sense.
在本周的預算計劃前，市場已經擔心美國會加入這個名單，但愿在技術層面上。
From the point of view of a creditor, however, the ability of a government to print money is of little comfort if the result is higher inflation or currency depreciation.
然而，從一個債權人的觀點來看，一個政府的印鈔能力是沒有用的，如果結果是對國內投資者更高的通貨膨脹率或者對國外投資者的貨幣貶值。
Investors who bought Treasury bonds in 1946, when yields were around current levels, did not suffer a formal default.
在1946年國庫券年收益率與現在的水平差不多的時候，購買它的投資者沒有遭受正式違約。
But over the following 35 years they lost money in real terms at a rate of 2% a year.
但是在后續的三十五年他們以每年2%的利率實際上虧錢。
The cumulative real loss was 91%.
累積的實際損失是91%。
By that standard, Greek creditors, who recently suffered a 50% loss via default, were lucky.
跟據這個標準，最近因為違約損失50%的希臘債權人是幸運的。
Given this baleful history, the idea that sovereign debt is risk-free is puzzling.
考慮到這個可怕的歷史，認為政府債務無風險的觀點是令人費解的。
When it comes to the purchasing power of an investor's money, what does it matter if the loss comes in the form of a formal default or erosion in real terms?
那么當提到投資者資金實際購買力時，如果損失以正式違約或者實際侵蝕的形式發生時，這有什么差別呢？
The answer to that conundrum may be that default happens suddenly, whereas inflation and depreciation are slower, giving investors more time to adjust by demanding higher interest rates to compensate for their losses.
對于這個難題的答案可能是違約突然發生，然而通貨膨脹和貨幣貶值是緩慢的，這給了投資者更多的時間去調整，通過要求更高的利率去賠償他們的損失。
This is particularly true in the case of short-term debt, such as Treasury bills; inflation is unlikely to do serious damage to a portfolio in the course of a few months.
這個在短期債務中更有現實意義，如國庫券；通貨膨脹極少有可能在幾個月的過程中對投資組合產生嚴重的損害。
Twenty years ago there was much talk of bond vigilantes who would respond to irresponsible fiscal policies by forcing up the interest rates on government debt.
二十年前,有許多關于通過拋售國庫券來要求更高年收益和約束美國政策制定者的國際投資者的事跡,他們通過迫使提高政府債務利率來應對不負責任的財政政策。
With the bond vigilantes on the prowl, any short-term real loss suffered by investors would be recouped in the form of higher real rates as the government's debt was refinanced.
隨著他們伺機而動，投資者遭受的任何短期實際損失會由于政府債務再籌資而以較高的實際利率的形式收回來。
But by buying bonds in the name of quantitative easing, central banks are influencing interest rates of all maturities these days.
通過以量化寬松的名義購買債券，中央銀行這些日子在影響所有的到期利率。
By holding down bond yields, the authorities are employing a policy some have dubbed financial repression, in which real returns on government debt are reduced.
通過壓制住債券的年收益率，管理者運用一項政策引入金融抑制，由此政府債務的實際回報減少了。
The idea is to make investors buy riskier assets, such as equities and corporate bonds.
這個構想是讓投資者購買有風險的資產，例如股票和公司債券。
In effect, the bond vigilantes have been neutered.
實際上，債券市場秩序維護者們保持了中立。
One way of protecting the real value of investors' bond holdings is to buy inflation-linked debt.
保護投資者持有的債券實際價值的方法之一是購買通脹掛鉤債券。
The repayment value and interest payments on such bonds are normally tied to a well-known inflation index.
關于這類債券的回報價值和利息支付一般地說是與一個著名的通貨膨脹指數相聯系的。
But even these bonds may not be completely risk-free; it is possible to imagine that future governments may find ways to redefine the inflation measure for their own benefit.
但是即使是這些債券也不是完全無風險的；很有可能可以這樣想象未來政府可能為了他們自己的利益找到方法去重新定義通貨膨脹措施。
And foreign buyers of inflation-linked bonds are still at risk from currency depreciation.
并且通脹掛鉤債券的外國購買者仍然面臨來自貨幣貶值的風險。
Inflation-linked bonds are extremely attractive to pension funds, since they are a neat match for the funds' liabilities.
由于通脹掛鉤債券與養老基金的責任非常匹配，它們對養老基金來說非常有吸引力。
So such bonds are snapped up quickly and tend to trade on low real yields; sometimes, those yields are even negative.
所以這些債券很快被搶購一空并且有不正當利用低實際收益率的趨勢；有些時候，這些獲益率甚至是消極的。
An asset is hardly risk-free if it guarantees a real loss.
一個資產很難無風險如果它保證實際損失。
The concept of a risk-free asset is quite useful in finance.
無風險資產的概念在金融上是非常有用的。
For a start, it provides the base from which other assets can be priced.
首先，它提供了其他資產的定價基準。
Corporate borrowers pay an interest premium over the risk-free rate; equities have offered a higher long-term return than government bonds to reflect their higher risk.
公司融資者在無風險率上支付利息費用；股票提供一個比政府債券更能反映他們的高風險的長期回報。
But what is the true risk-free rate?
但是什么是真正的無風險率呢？
Multinational companies can borrow at a lower rate of interest than some governments: compare Apple with Greece, for example.
跨國公司可以以比一些政府更低的利率借款：例如，比較蘋果公司和希臘。
And although America is the world's biggest economy, its government does not borrow at the cheapest rate on the planet:
盡管美國是世界上最大的經濟體，它的政府并不以這個星球上最便宜的利率借錢；
Japanese yields have been lower for many years and German long-term yields are now significantly below those of Treasuries.
日本的年收益率已經愈來愈低很多年了而且德國長期年收益率現在很明顯的比國庫券低。
Where America does have a substantial advantage is that it borrows in the world's reserve currency—the dollar—and that its debt market is by far the most liquid.
美國實質上占優勢的地方是它借的是世界儲備貨幣并且它的債券市場是目前流動性最好的。
The result is that Treasury bills, in particular, play a vital role in the system as cash equivalents and as collateral for short-term loans and derivative contracts.
這樣的結果是，尤其是，國庫券作為現金等價物和作為短期貸款和衍生品合同作的擔保物在這個系統里起了一個至關重要的作用。
Treasury bills are seen as risk-free in this context in that they are instantly and universally acceptable to all participants in the system.
國庫券因為它們對這個系統里所有參與者迅速和廣泛的接受而在這個環境里被看為是無風險的。
They are the oil that lubricates the global machinery of finance.
他們是潤滑全球金融機器的油。
That was the real risk of the latest stand-off: not that America would not pay its bills, which it could easily afford to, but that the system would grind to a halt.
這個才是最新平衡的真正風險：不是美國不付它自己很容易支付的賬，而是這個系統會慢慢停滯下來。
