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HP's grand vision
惠普的遠大宏景
Aping IBM
效仿IBM
HP needs to transform itself if it is to avoid becoming obsolete
若想避免被淘汰，惠普需要自我更新
WHEN the board of HP, the world's largest computer-maker, unveiled plans to restructure, it expected the company's shares to suffer; but not to crash by 20%.
當全球最大的計算機制造商—惠普—的董事會公開了其改組計劃之后，它預計公司的股份會下跌，但沒想到會下跌20%。
HP's bosses thought investors would love their plan to spin off the firm's low-margin personal-computer business, but be wary of their plan to buy Autonomy, a British software-maker, for a handsome $10.3 billion.
惠普的股東們以為這個讓惠普低毛利的個人電腦得以大賺一筆的計劃會受到投資人的喜愛；而103億美元高額收購Autonomy的計劃則會使投資人躊躇不前。
In fact, they hated both ideas. On August 19th, the day after the announcement, they wiped $12 billion off HP's market value.
事實上，投資人對這兩個計劃都沒興趣?；萜諏ν庑Q其計劃的第二天，8月19日，惠普的市值下降了120億美元。
One problem was that the announcement left unclear what HP wanted to do with its PC unit and why exactly it intends to pay so much for Autonomy. Another factor was that many of the firm's shareholders are short-termists, who were scared away by lowered revenue and profit forecasts.
一方面，這此宣告并沒有明確講明惠普對其個人電腦有何打算，也沒有說明它為什么要以如此高額來收購Autonomy；另一方面，惠普的很多股東都是短期投資人，他們被低收入以及低利率前景嚇到了。
But the big problem is that Léo Apotheker, HP's newish boss, is taking a huge gamble.
但最大的問題在于惠普的新老板Léo Apotheker這次玩大的：
He is trying to follow the example of IBM, by reducing HP's dependence on hardware and pushing up into software and services.
他打算效仿IBM，減少惠普對硬件的依賴，而轉(zhuǎn)向軟件和服務業(yè)務。
To grasp what HP has in mind, one has to understand the two main currents in the IT industry.
要弄清楚惠普腦袋里裝的是什么，就要先知曉目前IT行業(yè)的兩股主要潮流：
First, nearly any new technology quickly becomes a commodity that is easily copied and hence not very profitable.
第一，幾乎所有的新技術都會一夜之間成為簡單復制的商品，因此利潤也有限。
This is why IT firms are always trying to move up the stack into software and services, where margins are higher.
這就是為什么IT公司總是想辦法進軍躋身利潤更加豐厚的軟件業(yè)和服務業(yè)。
Second, the biggest IT firms typically control what is known as a platform: a digital foundation on which others build their products, such as Microsoft's Windows.
第二，典型的大型IT企業(yè)會操控一個平臺：一個他人會在上面創(chuàng)建電子產(chǎn)品的基礎，如同微軟的Windows。
This allows them to capture a disproportionate share of the industry's profits.
這使得它們得以獲得份額不一地利潤。
HP seems to have ignored both currents, at least in the past decade. Carly Fiorina, its boss from 1999 to 2005, merged with Compaq, another computer-maker, in a deal worth $25 billion.
至少過去十年來，惠普似乎對兩股潮流都視而不見?；萜?999年至2005年的總裁Carly Fiorina以250億美元并購了另一家電腦制造商Compad。
Mark Hurd, her successor, cut costs but was ousted in 2010 after a dust-up over sex and expenses before he could fix the firm's strategy.
Carly Fiorina的后繼人Mark Hurd降低了支出，但2010年，他還沒完成惠普的戰(zhàn)略計劃之時，他就因陷入財政和性愛雙重丑聞而被掃出局。
That job now falls to Mr Apotheker.
如今重任落在了Mr Apotheker肩上。
The firm's PC business is the world's biggest, but is not as profitable as HP's other units.
惠普的個人電腦業(yè)務規(guī)模居全球之首，但利潤還是比不上惠普的其它業(yè)務。
What is more, most buyers of HP's machines are consumers, whose demands shift faster and more whimsically than those of corporate customers.
此外，惠普的大多數(shù)客戶是消費者，相比那些企業(yè)客戶，他們的口味變化既快又古怪。
So HP intends to turn its PC business into a separate unit and then spin it off.
因此，惠普想要將其個人電腦業(yè)務獨立出來，并爭取擴大利潤。
Buying Autonomy also helps HP to move onto higher-margin terrain: the British firm's operating margins exceed 40%.
收購Autonomy也幫惠普進軍更大利潤的領域：這個英國公司的盈利空間超過40%。
But the main reason HP paid a 64% premium for its shares seems to be that it believes that Autonomy's technology could be turned into a platform to help companies make sense of their ever-growing pile of data.
但是惠普愿意購買64%的股份似乎是因為它相信Autonomy的技術可以轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐粋€平臺，這個平臺有助于企業(yè)處理其日益增長的數(shù)據(jù)。
This includes not only structured data, but also the unstructured kind, which now makes up more than 80% of the information that flows through a typical company.
不僅包括結構化數(shù)據(jù)，還包括那些如今構成一個典型企業(yè)80%信息量的非結構化數(shù)據(jù)。
Such a platform would allow firms to do some nifty things.
這樣一個平臺使得企業(yè)做事更有效率。
A retailer, for instance, might decide how much beer to stock based not just on previous sales records, but also on weather forecasts, party chatter on social media and schedules for sports matches.
比如，一個零售商不僅可以之前的銷售記錄為依據(jù)，還可以天氣預報、媒體上的黨派言論以及體育項目的記事日程來決定啤酒的囤貨量。
All this sounds sensible.
這一切聽起來似乎都很明智。
But establishing a new platform and ultimately becoming a firm that looks much like IBM is a tall order.
但建立一個新的平臺并最終成就一個類似IBM的企業(yè)并非易事。
Many other firms are also jostling to become the main interpreter of corporate data.
很多企業(yè)也在處理企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)領域相爭得你死我活。
To reach its goal of having software generate 8-9% of its revenues by 2015, up from less than 3% today, HP will probably have to make further acquisitions.
惠普的計劃是在2015年之前使得軟件盈利占其收入的8-9%，而今天軟件為惠普帶來的收入只占了3%，要完成這一目標，惠普可能要再并購其他企業(yè)。
And its services business is mainly about keeping IT systems running, not about helping firms reinvent themselves.
而惠普的服務業(yè)主要著眼于保持IT系統(tǒng)正常運轉(zhuǎn)，而不是重構企業(yè)本身。
Given the difficulties, it is not surprising that many shareholders have bolted.
考慮到這些困難，那么大多數(shù)股東打退堂鼓也就不足為奇了。
But HP and its new boss should not be faulted for trying.
但不應該譴責惠普及其新老總的嘗試。
They have little alternative, if they wish to avoid becoming a collection of commodity businesses.
如果他們想要避免淪落為一個商品企業(yè)，那么他們就別無他選。
Technology is a brutal business, says Mr Apotheker. If you don't innovate and reinvent yourself, you will become obsolete.
技術行業(yè)是很殘忍的， Apotheker說道，如果你不自我創(chuàng)新，那遲早會被淘汰。
