MTI英語口譯專業(yè)，

翻譯碩士二外考得一篇完型（10）

During the first many decades of this nation’s existence, the United States was a wide-open, dynamic country with a rapidly expanding economy. It was also a country that tolerated a large amount of cruelty and pain — poor people living in misery, workers suffering from exploitation.

Over the years, Americans decided they wanted a little more safety and security. This is what happens as nations grow wealthier; they use money to buy civilization.

Occasionally, our ancestors found themselves in a sweet spot. They could pass legislation that brought security but without a cost to vitality. But adults know that this situation is rare. In the real world, there’s usually a trade-off. The unregulated market wants to direct capital to the productive and the young. Welfare policies usually direct resources to the vulnerable and the elderly. Most social welfare legislation, even successful legislation, siphons money from the former to the latter.

Early in this health care reform process, many of us thought we were in that magical sweet spot. We could extend coverage to the uninsured but also improve the system overall to lower costs. That is, we thought it would be possible to reduce the suffering of the vulnerable while simultaneously squeezing money out of the wasteful system and freeing it up for more productive uses.

That’s what the management gurus call a win-win.

It hasn’t worked out that way. The bills before Congress would almost certainly ease the anxiety of the uninsured, those who watch with terror as their child or spouse grows ill, who face bankruptcy and ruin.

And the bills would probably do it without damaging the care the rest of us receive. In every place where reforms have been tried — from Massachusetts to Switzerland — people come to cherish their new benefits. The new plans become politically untouchable.

But, alas, there would be trade-offs. Instead of reducing costs, the bills in Congress would probably raise them. They would mean that more of the nation’s wealth would be siphoned off from productive uses and shifted into a still wasteful health care system.

The authors of these bills have tried to foster efficiencies. The Senate bill would initiate several interesting experiments designed to make the system more effective — giving doctors incentives to collaborate, rewarding hospitals that provide quality care at lower cost. It’s possible that some of these experiments will bloom into potent systemic reforms.

But the general view among independent health care economists is that these changes will not fundamentally bend the cost curve. The system after reform will look as it does today, only bigger and more expensive.

As Jeffrey S. Flier, dean of the Harvard Medical School, wrote in The Wall Street Journal last week, “In discussions with dozens of health-care leaders and economists, I find near unanimity of opinion that, whatever its shape, the final legislation that will emerge from Congress will markedly accelerate national health-care spending rather than restrain it.”

Rather than pushing all of the new costs onto future generations, as past governments have done, the Democrats have admirably agreed to raise taxes. Over the next generation, the tax increases in the various bills could funnel trillions of dollars from the general economy into the medical system.

Moreover, the current estimates almost certainly understate the share of the nation’s wealth that will have to be shifted. In these bills, the present Congress pledges that future Congresses will impose painful measures to cut Medicare payments and impose efficiencies. Future Congresses rarely live up to these pledges. Somebody screams “Rationing!” and there is a bipartisan rush to kill even the most tepid cost-saving measure. After all, if the current Congress, with pride of authorship, couldn’t reduce costs, why should we expect that future Congresses will?

The bottom line is that we face a brutal choice.

Reform would make us a more decent society, but also a less vibrant one. It would ease the anxiety of millions at the cost of future growth. It would heal a wound in the social fabric while piling another expensive and untouchable promise on top of the many such promises we’ve already made. America would be a less youthful, ragged and unforgiving nation, and a more middle-aged, civilized and sedate one.

We all have to decide what we want at this moment in history, vitality or security. We can debate this or that provision, but where we come down will depend on that moral preference. Don’t get stupefied by technical details. This debate is about values.

一篇閱讀（25）

Obama Loses a Round

While the jury is still out on what President Obama’s China visit has achieved for the long term, the president has most decidedly lost the war of symbolism in his first close encounter with China.

In status-conscious China, symbolism and protocol play a role that is larger than life. U.S. diplomatic blunders could reinforce Beijing’s mindset that blatant information control works, and that a rising China can trump universal values of open, accountable government.

During Mr. Obama’s visit, the Chinese outmaneuvered the Americans in all public events, from the disastrous town hall meeting in Shanghai to the stunted press conference in Beijing. In characteristic manner, the Chinese tried to shut out the public, while the U.S. unwittingly cooperated.

The final image of President Obama in China that circulated around the world is telling: A lone man walking up the steep slope of the Great Wall. The picture is in stark contrast to those of other U.S. presidents who had their photographs taken at the Great Wall surrounded by flag-waving children or admiring citizens. Maybe Mr. Obama wanted a quiet moment for himself before returning home. But a president’s first visit to the wall is a ritual that needs to be properly framed. Mr. Obama could have waited until the next visit, when he could bring the first lady and the children. Instead, he went ahead by himself to pay tribute to China’s ancient culture. In return, the Chinese offered nothing, no popular receptions, not even the companionship of a senior Chinese leader.

The trouble for the U.S. started at the town hall meeting two days earlier — a more scripted event than those organized with students for earlier U.S. presidents. There was no real dialogue, as a programmed audience, most of them Communist League Youth members, asked coached questions.

The Chinese also rejected the U.S. request for live national coverage and defaulted on a promise to live-stream the meeting at Xinhua.net, the online version of China’s state-owned news agency. Mr. Obama scored a point when he managed to address the issue of Internet freedom after the U.S. ambassador, Jon Huntsman, fielded him the question from a Chinese netizen submitted online.

Meanwhile, Chinese officials garnered from the meeting generous quotes from Mr. Obama affirming China’s achievements and America’s expressions of good will, which were turned into glowing headlines for the Chinese media. In this round of the propaganda skirmish, the U.S. scored one point while China reaped a handful.

Mr. Obama was similarly shut out from addressing the public in Beijing. At the Beijing press conference, President Hu Jintao and President Obama read prepared statements and would not take questions from reporters. “This was an historic meeting between the two leaders, and journalists should have had the opportunity to ask questions, to probe beyond the statements,” protested Scott McDonald, the president of China’s Foreign Correspondents Club, but to no avail.

In a final dash to break through the information blockade, the Obama team offered an exclusive interview to Southern Weekend, China’s most feisty newspaper, based in Guangzhou. Once again, journalists’ questions were programmed and the paper censored. In protest, the paper prominently displayed vast white spaces on the first and second page of the edition that carried the interview. Propaganda officials are investigating this act of defiance.

Only the Obama team knows for sure how they allowed themselves to be outmaneuvered. Unwittingly, the U.S. helped to produce a package of faux public events.

Pundits argued that the visitors were not supposed to impose the “American way” on China and that America needs to respect Chinese practices. The argument is both patronizing and condescending. Increasingly, the Chinese public has been clamoring for greater official transparency and accountability, while the Chinese government has been making progress on these fronts. No one in his right mind would ask Mr. Obama to lecture Beijing on human rights. But the Chinese public deserves better accounting, no less than Americans citizens.

To their credit, U.S. officials did try to get their message out online. But it was the Chinese bloggers who were most active in challenging official information control. They at least fought the good fight with growing confidence, a fight the Americans seem unable to wage effectively.

作文只給了個(gè)題目： waste not， want not（勤儉節(jié)約，吃穿不缺）（60）

2010英語翻譯基礎(chǔ)

MDGS Millennium Development Goals 千禧年發(fā)展計(jì)劃

Ban Ki-moon 潘基文

國務(wù)卿 Secretary of State

雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)

次貸危機(jī)subprime lending crisis

西部大開發(fā)戰(zhàn)略strategy of western development

經(jīng)濟(jì) > 中國經(jīng)濟(jì)

China's bubbles

A lot of things in China carry a whiff of excess. The cost of garlic is among them: wholesale prices have almost quadrupled since March. A halving of the planting area last year, and belief in the bulb's powers to ward off swine flu, provide some justification for the surge. But anecdotes of unbridled trading activity in Jinxiang county, home to China's largest garlic plant, suggest that the most likely cause is the most obvious – the abundant liquidity swilling through the system. New loans in China may top Rmb10,000bn this year, double the run-rate of the preceding years; 2010 should bring another Rmb7-8,000bn.

In the week that Dominique Strauss-Kahn, head of the International Monetary Fund, said asset bubbles were a cost worth paying for reviving growth through loose monetary policy, China needs to distinguish between good ones and bad ones. A bubble in garlic is small, financed by private speculators, and relatively harmless when it bursts. Bubbles in productive assets – roads, bridges, telecom lines – are also tolerable; capital has been put in place that can be exploited by somebody.

But bubbles in property – financed by banks, on non-productive assets – are doubly destructive. Zhang Xin, chief executive of Soho China, one of the country's most successful privately owned developers, believes that rampant wasteful investment in commercial property has already undermined China's long-term prospects. As for housing, which China began privatising just 11 years ago, prices rose at an annualised rate of 9 per cent between September and October – significantly higher than the ongoing 2.25 per cent one-year deposit rate and the 5.31 per cent one-year lending rate. What's more, this was the eighth successive month of above-trend growth in the national house price index. So far, attempts to arrest price rises have been minor – restrictions on second home mortgages here, loan discounts in exchange for bigger down payments there. Two years ago another eight-month hot streak was enough for authorities to start cooling in earnest. They should start again now.

中國一直在“補(bǔ)貼”西方？

前些日子，我翻閱一份英國報(bào)紙，看到一幅大照片，畫面是相當(dāng)于倫敦“王府井”的牛津街的商場(chǎng)購物人流，照片說明稱英國消費(fèi)者重返商店顯示金融危機(jī)可能即將觸底云云，但仔細(xì)端詳，我卻發(fā)現(xiàn)人流中有許多華人模樣的臉龐，再認(rèn)真研究，更覺得這些人的穿著打扮像是中國大陸人。

后來，我先后與幾位英國華裔朋友談起此事，他們一口咬定：“沒錯(cuò)，這些人肯定是從中國大陸來的！”他們還補(bǔ)充說，他們?cè)谥袊呐笥咽烊酥校陀性S多人借出差或旅游之機(jī)，轉(zhuǎn)戰(zhàn)倫敦各大商場(chǎng)，為英國經(jīng)濟(jì)走出衰退“做貢獻(xiàn)”。

最近讀了中國財(cái)經(jīng)評(píng)論家時(shí)寒冰的博客，發(fā)現(xiàn)中國消費(fèi)者也在為美國經(jīng)濟(jì)重歸繁榮“做貢獻(xiàn)”。時(shí)寒冰最近去了一趟美國，他在博客中寫道，他在洛杉磯曾經(jīng)“遇到一群中國去的游客，購物之多可用瘋狂來形容。在一個(gè)賣箱包的商店，幾乎每個(gè)從中國去的人都買兩個(gè)以上的箱子，因?yàn)椋麄円b下所買的商品。他們一邊挑選商品一邊驚詫著：‘這里的東西怎么會(huì)比國內(nèi)便宜這么多？！'我可以聽出他們心中的不平衡。”

至于那些沒有機(jī)會(huì)公款出國或沒有實(shí)力自費(fèi)旅游的普通中國人，知道這一事實(shí)后可能心里就會(huì)更不平衡了：因?yàn)樗麄冎荒軣o奈地接受中國物價(jià)的現(xiàn)實(shí)。

乍一聽，你會(huì)覺得不可思議：盡管如今中國人收入不斷提升，但中國人均GDP畢竟遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于美英等西方富國，怎么能夠承受比倫敦、洛杉磯還高的物價(jià)呢？其實(shí)，如果不是我本人今年也在北京工作、生活了幾個(gè)月，因而對(duì)北京物價(jià)有了親身體會(huì)的話，我也不會(huì)相信這是個(gè)事實(shí)。

別的地方我不敢說，僅僅對(duì)比一下我長(zhǎng)期生活過的北京和倫敦。在衣、食、住、行四個(gè)方面，北京至少在“衣”、“住”兩大方面比倫敦貴，至于“行”，北京的公共交通費(fèi)用的確要比倫敦便宜，但在個(gè)人購車花銷上，北京卻比倫敦貴得多。

我這里說的“貴”，并不是相對(duì)的“貴”（即某商品價(jià)格在居民平均收入中所占的比例），而是絕對(duì)的“貴”，也就是說，如果英鎊與人民幣目前的兌換率是1：12，那么，在北京，房?jī)r(jià)和租房租金（至少在三環(huán)以內(nèi)）、國際名車價(jià)格以及正規(guī)商場(chǎng)多數(shù)中檔以上服裝的價(jià)格，即使除以12，也比倫敦貴。

“食”的情況比較復(fù)雜，一般而言，北京超市的蔬菜水果、柴米油鹽，如果除以12，要比倫敦便宜，但在相對(duì)價(jià)格上，則比倫敦貴或不相上下；北京有很多服務(wù)于外來打工者的廉價(jià)小餐館，無論是絕對(duì)價(jià)格，還是相對(duì)價(jià)格，都比倫敦便宜，但稍微上點(diǎn)兒檔次的餐館，相對(duì)價(jià)格就比倫敦貴，而高檔餐館的價(jià)格，絕對(duì)價(jià)格都比倫敦貴。

更為匪夷所思的是，北京某些日常用品的價(jià)格，絕對(duì)價(jià)格也比倫敦貴。例如，倫敦超市洗發(fā)水的價(jià)格通常是一英鎊左右，但北京超市洗發(fā)水通常都要賣15元人民幣以上，名牌洗發(fā)水則在30元人民幣以上。

時(shí)寒冰在其博客中如此描述他最近的美國之行：“到美國后才發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國除人工服務(wù)之外，絕大部分商品的價(jià)格（絕對(duì)價(jià)格）是低于中國的，有些商品的價(jià)差之大，有點(diǎn)瞠目結(jié)舌。”他對(duì)比了中國（大概指他居住的上海）和美國洛杉磯的物價(jià)：在中國一套賣3萬元左右的Armani（阿瑪尼）西服，在洛杉磯用四分之一甚至五分之一的錢就可以買到；寶馬Z4的價(jià)格，洛杉磯的廣告上標(biāo)注的報(bào)價(jià)為29881美元，中國的價(jià)格，聽一位朋友介紹，大致在50萬元——80萬元人民幣之間……

寒冰說的這些國際名牌商品，大概由于進(jìn)口到中國要征收很高的關(guān)稅，再加上運(yùn)費(fèi)等等，所以，在中國賣得比西方貴并不令人吃驚（盡管貴四、五倍仍然有些不甚合理）；但那些純屬中國制造的商品，在中國賣得居然也比西方貴，就太令人費(fèi)解了。

例如，美國一位研究中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的華裔學(xué)者就曾吃驚地發(fā)現(xiàn)，他在美國超市沃爾瑪買到的中國大陸生產(chǎn)的質(zhì)量不錯(cuò)的登山鞋，價(jià)格只有2.99美元，后來，他給一位中國經(jīng)濟(jì)官員打電話，講了此事，對(duì)方不信，說在中國大陸chushou的登山鞋，“三百塊人民幣買的還是爛牌子，好一點(diǎn)的都要一千多塊。”

我今年上半年住在北京，下半年住在倫敦，這種對(duì)比更鮮明、更強(qiáng)烈、更真實(shí)：許多同樣類型的中國產(chǎn)品，在英國的售價(jià)確實(shí)低于中國。但為什么會(huì)出現(xiàn)這種怪事？

那位美國華裔學(xué)者也想知道其中的原因。他詢問了一位在中國大陸投資的臺(tái)灣商人，這位臺(tái)灣人的解釋是：“中國大陸到處是欺詐，貿(mào)易商之間拖欠貨款比比皆是，生產(chǎn)商只有提高出廠價(jià)格才能保障自己的利潤(rùn)；而出口就不同了，只要你和外商簽訂了合約，基本上你就不用擔(dān)心，美國進(jìn)口商給你信用狀，你可以去銀行抵押貸款，生產(chǎn)之后你發(fā)貨，錢就到手了，沒有麻煩，錢少賺點(diǎn)，但風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也小。”

對(duì)這個(gè)解釋，這位美國華裔學(xué)者相信確有其理，但仍感并非全部原因，于是，他又查閱了一些中國大陸的商業(yè)流通資料，并通過其它渠道進(jìn)行了調(diào)查研究，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)更讓他吃驚的事實(shí)：從中國大陸運(yùn)貨到美國的運(yùn)費(fèi)，竟然比從廣州運(yùn)貨到北京還便宜！原因何在？還是MOD：由于中國大陸鐵路貨運(yùn)超負(fù)荷，流通商要想申請(qǐng)一個(gè)車皮的指標(biāo)，運(yùn)費(fèi)之外的額外費(fèi)用竟然高達(dá)五千到五萬人民幣之間；高速公路運(yùn)輸也不便宜，中國大陸媒體引述一位常年從廣州送貨到北京的司機(jī)的話說，廣州到北京的高速公路，一路的過路費(fèi)就有1400元人民幣，除此以外，還要有大約有7000元人民幣的額外費(fèi)用，這個(gè)費(fèi)用不是汽油費(fèi)，也不是汽車修理費(fèi)，而是無緣由的罰款和敲詐。

這些因MOD所造成的成本，自然也都被攤到產(chǎn)品價(jià)格中去了，最后由消費(fèi)者埋單。看來，MOD之害，不僅體現(xiàn)在政治方面，也體現(xiàn)在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面。

中國MOD這些年已經(jīng)意識(shí)到中國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展模式的弊病，所以常講要提振內(nèi)需，但效果不大，中國至今依然是一個(gè)主要依靠投資和出口拉動(dòng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。中國的內(nèi)需為什么提不上來？原因很多，包括缺乏醫(yī)療、養(yǎng)老等社會(huì)保障，但相對(duì)西方來說中國物價(jià)過高，至少也是原因之一。

而西方這么多年來通貨膨脹一直保持著較低的水平，至少在那些有真知灼見的西方學(xué)者看來，是得益于來自中國的廉價(jià)商品。中國一直在為西方打工，而且是廉價(jià)打工。

上個(gè)星期，我在倫敦參加了一次新書發(fā)行講座。這本新書的作者是兩位在多年在中國經(jīng)商的英國人，書名是：《China Counting》，序言中有一句話讓我深以為然：“西方輿論傾向于認(rèn)為，中國一直在for free乘坐西方的消費(fèi)列車，但真實(shí)情況是，中國一直在補(bǔ)貼西方。”

然而，即使西方的政客們意識(shí)到這一真相，但面對(duì)某些利益集團(tuán)的壓力，他們或者出于選票得失的短期政治考慮，或者出于保護(hù)本國制造業(yè)的短視經(jīng)濟(jì)理由，也會(huì)筑起“反傾銷”關(guān)稅的大墻，擋住來自中國的“補(bǔ)貼”。歐美最新一波針對(duì)中國進(jìn)口商品的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義浪潮即為明證。

嗨，好一個(gè)里外不討好、兩頭不受待見的“中國補(bǔ)貼”。

個(gè)人感覺漢譯英還是很長(zhǎng)，不過兩篇都是非文學(xué)翻譯，而且偏向于口譯文章的風(fēng)格

MTI英語口譯專業(yè)，2010漢語寫作與百科知識(shí)

15個(gè)選擇（都記不起來了）

5個(gè)名詞解釋：

京師同文館

建安風(fēng)骨

食貨志

呂氏春秋

以人為本

三個(gè)作文兩個(gè)應(yīng)用一個(gè)文學(xué)寫作

會(huì)議通知

公司簡(jiǎn)介

大作文題目：環(huán)境保護(hù)

這門考得最悲劇！只有93，據(jù)說有專門的復(fù)習(xí)參考書！要考的同學(xué)一定要好好

更多MTI真題，盡在可可英語。