Ms Warren’s impulse to constrain nuclear policy is right. However, her proposal could well have perverse effects that make the world less stable. Many of America’s allies, such as South Korea and the Baltic states, face large and intimidating rivals at a time when they worry about the global balance of power. They think uncertainty about America’s first use helps deter conventional attacks that might threaten their very existence, such as a Russian assault on Estoni. Were America to rule out first use, some of its Asian allies might pursue nuclear weapons of their own. Any such proliferation risks being destabilising and dangerous, multiplying the risks of nuclear war.
沃倫限制核政策的沖動(dòng)是正確的。然而，她的提議很可能產(chǎn)生適得其反的效果，使世界更加不穩(wěn)定。美國(guó)的許多盟友，如韓國(guó)和波羅的海國(guó)家，在擔(dān)心全球力量平衡之際，面臨著強(qiáng)大而令人生畏的對(duì)手。他們認(rèn)為，美國(guó)首次使用核武器的不確定性有助于阻止可能威脅他們生存的常規(guī)攻擊，比如俄羅斯對(duì)愛(ài)沙尼亞的攻擊。如果美國(guó)排除首先使用核武器的可能性，一些亞洲盟友可能會(huì)發(fā)展自己的核武器。任何此類擴(kuò)散都有破壞穩(wěn)定和危險(xiǎn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，增加了核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
The aim should be to maximise the deterrence from nuclear weapons while minimising the risk that they themselves become the cause of an escalation. The place to start is the question posed by Major Hering 46 years ago. No individual ought to be entrusted with the unchecked power to initiate annihilation, even if he or she has been elected to the White House. One way to check the president’s launch authority would be to allow first use, but only with collective agreement, from congressional leaders, say, or the cabinet.
其目標(biāo)應(yīng)該是最大限度地發(fā)揮對(duì)核武器的威懾作用，同時(shí)將核武器本身成為升級(jí)原因的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降至最低。首先是46年前赫林少校提出的問(wèn)題。任何個(gè)人都不應(yīng)該被賦予發(fā)動(dòng)毀滅的不受限制的權(quán)力，即使他或她已經(jīng)當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)。檢查總統(tǒng)發(fā)射權(quán)限的一種方法是允許先使用，但必須得到國(guó)會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人或內(nèi)閣的集體同意。
There are other ways for a first-use policy to be safer. America should make clear that the survival of nations must be at stake. Alas, the Trump administration has moved in the opposite direction, warning that “significant nonnuclear strategic attack”, including cyberstrikes, might meet with a nuclear response. America can also make its systems safer. About a third of American and Russian nuclear forces are designed to be launched within a few minutes, without the possibility of recall, merely on warning of enemy attack. Yet in recent decades, missile launches have been ambiguous enough to trigger the most serious alarms. If both sides agreed to take their weapons off this hair-trigger, their leaders could make decisions with cooler heads.
第一次使用的政策還有其他更安全的方法。美國(guó)應(yīng)該明確表示，各國(guó)的生存一定是受到了威脅。遺憾的是，特朗普政府采取了相反的行動(dòng)，警告稱“重大的非核戰(zhàn)略攻擊”，包括網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊，可能會(huì)遭遇核回應(yīng)。美國(guó)也可以讓它的系統(tǒng)更安全。美俄兩國(guó)約三分之一的核力量計(jì)劃在幾分鐘內(nèi)發(fā)射，而且不可能撤回，只是在接到敵人進(jìn)攻的警告后才發(fā)射。然而，近幾十年來(lái)，導(dǎo)彈發(fā)射一直模棱兩可，足以觸發(fā)最嚴(yán)重的警報(bào)。如果雙方都同意解除這種一觸即發(fā)的武器，他們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人就能以更冷靜的頭腦做出決定。
Most of all, America can put more effort into arms control. The collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty on August 2nd and a deadly radioactive accident in Russia involving a nuclear-powered missile on August 8th were the latest reminders that nuclear risks are growing just as the world’s ability to manage them seems to be diminishing.
最重要的是，美國(guó)可以在軍備控制方面投入更多努力。8月2日《中程核力量條約》的瓦解，以及8月8日俄羅斯發(fā)生的一場(chǎng)涉及核動(dòng)力導(dǎo)彈的致命放射性事故，都是最新的信號(hào)，表明核風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在不斷增加，而世界應(yīng)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的能力似乎正在減弱。
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