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By 2006, 40 percent of all the loans made that year, all the home loans made that year,were liar's loans,40 percent.
截至2006年，當年發放的所有貸款，當年的所有房屋貸款中四成是欺騙性貸款。高達四成啊，親。
And this is despite a warning from the industry's own antifraud experts that said that these loans were an open invitation to fraudsters, and that they had a fraud incidence of 90 percent,nine zero.
行業自身的反欺詐專家曾經警告，這些貸款簡直是引狼入室，詐騙率高達九成，百分之九十。盡管有這些警告，問題還是發生了。
In response to that, the industry first started calling these loans liar's loans, which lacks a certain subtlety, and second, massively increased them, and no government regulator ever required or encouraged any lender to make a liar's loan or anyone to purchase a liar's loan,and that explicitly includes Fannie and Freddie.
作為回應，金融行業首先開始稱呼這些貸款為欺騙性借貸，聽上去不太悅耳。其次，大幅增加這種貸款。沒有任何政府監管機構要求或者鼓勵任何借方放出欺騙性貸款要求或鼓勵任何人去購買欺騙性借貸，這當然也包括房利美和房地美。
This came from the lenders because of the fraud recipe.
由于欺詐的成因和模式，借方難辭其咎。
What happened to appraisal fraud?
估價欺詐行為又是怎樣呢？
It expanded remarkably as well.
同樣膨脹得非常了得。
By 2007, when a survey of appraisers was done,90 percent of appraisers reported that they had been subject to coercion from the lenders trying to get them to inflate an appraisal.
2007年，有份針對估價師的調查，9成受訪的估價師表示，他們受到借方的脅迫，要求他們對估值進行灌水（夸大價值）。
In other words, both forms of fraud became absolutely endemic and normal,and this is what drove the bubble.
換言之，兩種形式的欺詐行為成為常態，瘋狂肆虐，泡沫于是成型。
What happened in the governmental sector?
政府部門的情況呢？
Well, the government, as I told you,when we were the savings and loan regulators,we could only deal with our industry,and if people gave up their federal deposit insurance,we couldn't do anything to them.
政府啊，不提也罷，說多了都是淚，我們監管儲貸的時候，我們只能處理我們負責的行業，如果借方放棄他們的聯邦存款保險，我們就將束手無策。
Congress, it may strike you as impossible, but actually did something intelligent in 1994,and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act that gave the Fed, and only the Federal Reserve,the explicit, statutory authority to ban liar's loans by every lender,whether or not they had federal deposit insurance.
國會，說起來你們可能不信，在1994年實際上倒是干了點實事，通過了《房屋所有權和股權保護法》，法案賦權美聯儲，僅限美聯儲明確的法律權力去取締來自任何借方的欺騙性貸款業務，無論這些借方有無聯邦存款保險。
So what did Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan,as chairs of the Fed, do when they got these warnings that these were massively fraudulent loans and that they were being sold to the secondary market?
在接到這些預警信號：這些大面積的欺詐性貸款這些要轉售給次級市場的欺騙性貸款作為美聯儲主席到底做了些什么？
Remember, there's no fraud exorcist.
請記住，沒有神人能將這些欺詐行為消失。
Once it starts out a fraudulent loan, it can only be sold to the secondary market through more frauds, lying about the reps and warrantees,and then those people are going to produce mortgage-backed securities and exotic derivatives which are also going to be supposedly backed by those fraudulent loans.
欺騙性貸款一旦出現，只能通過更多的欺詐行為，如編造合約聲明和保證條款把這一借款轉售給次級市場。然后借方再推出抵押貸款證券和衍生產品，而為這些產品進行擔保的正是欺騙性借款。
So the fraud is going to progress through the entire system,hyperinflate the bubble, produce a disaster.
欺詐行為將貫穿整個系統的始終，使泡沫急劇膨脹，進而造成災難。
And remember, we had experience with this.
想想看，這事我們之前經歷過。
We had seen significant losses,and we had experience of competent regulators in stopping it.
我們遭受了巨大的損失，職能監管機構也有阻止危機出現的先例。
Greenspan and Bernanke refused to use the authority under the statute to stop liar's loans.
但是格林斯潘和伯南克拒絕使用法律賦予他們的權力來取締欺騙性借貸。
