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Securitisation
證券化
It's back
重新啟動
Once a cause of the financial world's problems, securitisation is now part of the solution
證券化曾經是導致金融危機的因素之一，如今卻能幫助解決金融難題
GIVEN their role in the 2008 meltdown, and their subsequent branding as toxic sludge, it is not surprising that securitised financial products have had a quiet few years.
鑒于2008年經濟危機時所扮演的角色，以及隨后被貼上的有毒污泥的標簽，證券化金融產品這幾年的表現并不出乎人的意料。
Yet the transformation of mortgages, credit-card debt and other recurring cashflows into new marketable securities is enjoying something of a resurgence.
然而抵押貸款、信用卡債務和其他一些循環的現金流向新的可交易證券的轉變目前正在振興。
Once apparently destined for the financial history books, the alphabet soup of ABSs, MBSs, CLOs and others had a bumper year in 2013. More growth is expected this year.
盡管曾經有過慘痛的經歷，但是資產擔保證券、抵押貸款證券和貸款抵押債券以及其他許多以字母簡稱命名的證券在2013年卻大獲豐收。據預測，今年還會繼續增長。
Not everybody is thrilled.
并不是所有人都對此滿心歡喜。
Some observers argue that the risks securitisation poses are too grave.
一些觀察家稱證券化帶來的風險會非常嚴重。
But its revival should be welcomed, for it is probably essential to continued economic recovery, particularly in Europe.
但是盡管如此,重新啟動證券化還是眾望所歸，因為這對于經濟的進一步復蘇很可能是必需的，尤其是對于歐洲國家而言。
Use carefully
謹慎實行
In its simplest form, securitisation is straightforward and beneficial.
單純來看，證券化比較直截了當并且有著諸多優勢。
For example, a carmaker expecting lots of monthly payments from customers who have taken out financing can get investors to fund its business more cheaply by selling them its claim to those payments.
例如，那些每個月從辦理了汽車貸款的消費者那里獲得貸款支付的汽車制造商可以通過變賣這些款項的債權而讓投資者以更低的代價進行投資。
A bank on the receiving end of mortgage repayments or credit-card receivables can do something similar: bundle the loans up and sell them, or use them as collateral to get funding, which it can then use to issue more loans.
按揭還款或者信用卡應收賬款的收款銀行可以效仿此番做法：將貸款集中起來賣掉，或者把他們當作抵押款使用以獲得投資資金，這樣一來，他們就能繼續放貸。
This boosts both credit and growth.
這樣不僅能夠提升信用還能夠促進經濟增長。
Used recklessly, though, securitisation can be dangerous.
然而一旦使用不慎，證券化也會帶來危險。
It fuelled the catastrophic boom in American subprime mortgages.
之前，它曾刺激了美國次級抵押貸款的繁榮增長，但其影響隨后被證明是災難性的。
Some banks, aware that home loans would be sliced, diced, repackaged and sold on, gave up even cursory checks on their borrowers' creditworthiness.
部分銀行意識到住房貸款將會被分解、重組和轉賣，因而對貸款者信譽哪怕是最粗略的核查都放棄了。
Investors piled in blindly, snapping up supposedly safe tranches of bundled-up debt that proved to be anything but.
投資者們紛紛盲目涌入投資，搶購那批所謂的安全捆綁資金，但事實上這些資金并不如想象中那么優良。
The boom turned to bust and bail-outs.
這股投資熱潮進而轉向諸多破產，市場急需解救措施。
Yet structured finance cannot bear sole responsibility for the crisis.
然而結構化的金融業并不是經濟危機的唯一禍根。
It was more the conduit for irrational financial exuberance than its cause.
與其說它是經濟危機的根源不如說是它助了金融業的非理性繁榮一臂之力。
Lax lending standards in boom times predate the emergence of securitisation by several centuries at least.
在金融業繁榮時期實施寬松的借貸政策使得證券化的興起提前了至少幾個世紀。
Most structured products performed well through the crisis, with the notable exception of those related to American residential mortgages.
大多數結構化產品在經濟危機期間仍然表現良好，除了那些與美國住房抵押貸款有關的一些例外。
Defaults in Europe remained low despite the recession.
歐洲國家的債務違約情況并沒有受經濟危機的影響而明顯加深。
And although there are still risks, securitisation should be safer in the future than in the past because of new, post-crisis regulations to reduce the danger of excesses.
盡管風險仍然存在，但比起過去證券化在將來應該會相對較安全，因為危機過后重新制定的金融管理政策有利于減小過度放貸的可能性。
The principle that the party creating a new security needs to retain some exposure to the underlying credit should help ensure that underwriting standards do not get too slack.
產生新的有價證券的一方必須保留能證明其潛在信用的相關文件這一條例應該能夠確保保險業管理政策不至于太過松弛。
That will hamper the desirable transferring of risk but, given recent history, it is probably prudent to put a little sand in the gears.
這將會限制風險的直接轉移，但是，鑒于之前的經驗，防患于未然可能會比較明智。
Some of the Kafkaesque structures spawned by securitisation—such as collateralised debt obligations that invested in other CDOs that themselves invested in MBSs—have been made prohibitively difficult to recreate.
由證券化引起的一些奇怪結構—例如將債務抵押債券投資到其他的債務抵押債券，而這些獲得投資的債務抵押債券本身則又投資到抵押支付債券—已經被限制形成。
That is also sensible: whereas simple securitisation should be welcomed back, the over-engineered versions that rendered the financial system needlessly opaque should not.
這一做法也是很理智的:盡管單純的證券化回歸應該受到歡迎，而那些太過凸顯投資者個人利益并會致使金融系統變得遲鈍的投資方式則不該受到期許。
Europe stands to benefit most from securitisation's return. Lenders across Europe are under pressure to improve the ratio of capital they hold to loans made.
從證券化的回歸之中受益最大的仍然是歐洲國家。整個歐洲的國家都面臨巨大的壓力，它們都急需提高資金持有量對貸款額的比例。
One way of doing this is to stop extending credit, which is, unfortunately, what many banks have done.
解決此問題的途徑之一是停止放貸，但遺憾的是，很多銀行已經開始這樣做了。
If they instead slimmed themselves through securitisation, by bundling and repackaging loans and selling them to outside investors such as insurance firms or asset managers, they could lend more money to credit-starved companies.
如果它們是通過集中和重組貸款并轉賣給外部投資者諸如保險公司或者資產管理公司這種證券化方式來向外貸款的話，那么它們就可以向資金極度短缺的公司以更大幅度放貸。
That would have the added benefit of spreading risk away from wobbly banks.
這樣做的額外好處是可以將風險從經營狀況不佳的銀行轉移到其他地方。
Securitisation certainly has a black mark against it, but it is far too useful to be banished for good.
證券化的回歸當然會面臨諸多困難，但是它的自身優勢使得其不可能被永久棄用。
Almost all financial innovations, from the humble mortgage to the joint-stock company, have had to re-establish their reputations after a bust at some point in their history.
幾乎所有的金融改革，從不起眼的抵押貸款到合股企業都曾經經歷破產然后重塑形象。
Society benefited from their eventual rehabilitation—as it most probably will from the revival of securitisation.
而等它們最終成功恢復名聲，社會將能從中收益—正如很可能從證券化的回歸中受益一樣。
