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The latest wave of anti-trust investigations in China – first Qualcomm and now Microsoft and the ongoing criminal investigations involving GSK – is having an unsettling effect on global supply chains across a variety of industry sectors.
先是高通(Qualcomm)，現在又是微軟(Microsoft)，還有正在接受刑事調查的葛蘭素史克(GSK)，中國的新一輪反壟斷調查正對跨多種行業的全球供應鏈造成令人不安的影響。
But instead of planning an exodus, Western businesses should avoid over reacting and focus on finding new, appropriate strategies that will allow them to stay and profit from doing business in the world’s fastest-growing consumer market.
但西方企業該做的不是計劃大規模撤離，而是避免過度反應，并專注于尋找新的、適當的戰略，讓自己留在這個全球增長最快的消費市場繼續做生意賺錢。
Of course, any business thinking about shifting operations to China in order to gain access to its developing marketplace should do so with its eyes fully open. Businesses that go there simply seeking to profit from their exposure to the market will be unlikely to find that things run smoothly.
當然，任何正考慮將業務遷往中國，以求進入其發展中市場的企業都應睜大雙眼。來華外企如果只想獲利于其對中國市場的敞口，往往會發現事情不順利。
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the agency responsible for administrative control of the Chinese economy, will be more inclined to spot corrupt or anti-competitive working practices in businesses that are only interested in profiting from China rather than those that are bringing something valuable to the country that will enable its economy to grow in the future.
負責對中國經濟實施行政控制的機構——國家發展和改革委員會(NDRC)，更傾向于在以下這類公司發現腐敗或反競爭行為：只關心從中國獲利，而不為這個國家帶來有價值的東西以推動其未來經濟增長。
Simply put, if China doesn’t feel it is learning from a business, or a business is just exploiting an advantage it has, it will gently or abruptly stop it (for example with import tariffs or corruption investigations, or more subtly with changes to joint venture ownerships, ease of doing business, or taxation).
簡言之，如果某家企業讓中國感到沒有可借鑒之處，或只是在利用自己的優勢地位，那么中國就會要么柔和要么突然地向它亮紅燈。比如上調進口關稅，進行反腐敗調查，或采取更微妙的手段，如調整合資企業所有權，加大做生意的難度，或采取稅務手段。
Businesses that are providing Chinese people with an opportunity to learn how to manufacture premium parts for the automotive or aerospace industries, for example, or gain knowledge of innovative technologies, will be more welcome and accommodated.
那些能為中方提供學習借鑒機會的企業，將更受中國歡迎和接納，比如讓中國人學會如何制造汽車或航空航天高端零部件，或掌握創新科技知識。
Once this degree of market control is understood, Western businesses will realise that any business opportunity in China comes with strings and a time window attached – it may last five or ten years, or possibly longer, but it will be finite without evolution. If businesses become too big, they tend to be brought firmly under state control, or managed so as not to get too powerful or influential.
一旦西方企業了解到這種市場控制的分寸，它們將認識到在華的任何商機都帶有附加條件和時間窗，它的時長可能是5年、10年，或更久，但如果業務沒有演變，這個時長肯定是有限的。如果企業發展得過于龐大，國家往往會把它們牢牢控制起來，或設法阻止它們變得過于強大或有影響力。
From an outsider’s viewpoint, it may seem that Western companies have become less welcome in China lately, but this has never been further from the truth. The Chinese Government is desperate for its industries to move up the value chain so they can pay higher salaries and give Chinese people the job prospects and increased buying power they demand. They need Western businesses to help them to achieve this and scaring companies away is definitely not what they want.
從外界角度來看，西方企業貌似最近在華正逐漸遇冷，但這種想法完全錯了。中國政府急于讓國內產業向價值鏈上方移動，從而為中國人民提供更高的薪水、更多的就業機會以及他們要求的更大的購買力。中國需要西方企業幫忙實現這一目標，嚇跑企業絕對不是他們的初衷。
Despite this, the NDRC’s latest swoop on Western businesses could seem arbitrary (even though it’s not) and it is certainly politically motivated. However, we should realise that Western approaches to inbound trading are not that dissimilar. In Europe and the US, governments would probably seek to slap a tariff on any goods entering the marketplace if they faced little or no domestic competition (duties can also be added on to protect local competition). Is the NDRC’s action really that different?
盡管如此，國家發改委對西方企業的新一輪舉動可能貌似武斷（盡管其實并非如此），而且肯定出于政治動機。但我們應該認識到，西方對外來貿易的處理與中國并沒那么大不同。在歐美等國，如果進入本國市場的商品很少或沒有遇到國內競爭，政府多半會對該商品強加關稅（或者為保護本土競爭力而開征關稅）。中國發改委的作法真的有很大不同嗎？
While pulling out of China would be an over-reaction, some Western companies that are already operating there or those thinking about entering the marketplace, may need to find new strategies to minimise the associated risks.
盡管撤出中國將是過度反應，但某些已經在中國運營的西方企業，或者那些想要進入中國市場的企業，或許需要找到新策略以最大限度地降低風險。
A business will not be successful unless it recognises the need to provide a service in educating the local market, and is happy in doing so, in addition to selling its product or technology. By going in to business with a local partner, a planned strategy is put in place. The local partner will usually receive significant capital or taxation incentives, on top of the benefit gained by working with and learning from an incoming company.
除非一個企業意識到，在銷售其產品或者技術的同時，它需要提供教育當地市場的服務，并且樂于這么做，否則其無法取得成功。與當地的伙伴企業合作開展經營，有助于落實一種有計劃的策略。當地伙伴在受益于與外企合作并向其學習的同時，通常還能得到可觀的資本或者稅收激勵。
That said, a decent window of opportunity in a large market as well as working with a partner who the government is supporting and intending to make successful, can deliver a compelling business case and unique competitive advantage.
話說回來，在一個龐大的市場得到一扇不錯的機遇之窗，加上與政府大力支持并樂見其成功的合作伙伴合作，有望構成一個令人信服的商業理由，具有獨特的競爭優勢。
They should start by making sure their own corruption and anti-bribery policies are robust and, where necessary, to make sure that local expertise is employed to guide them on the correct protocols. In this way, businesses will be doing what they can to manage their risks from the start. If they later find themselves the focus of an anti-trust probe, the worst they could be accused of would be ‘monopolistic pricing’, which from a rest-of-the-world perspective at least, would be less an indication of corruption and more of a company that was the victim of its own success.
企業首先應該確保自身的腐敗和反賄賂政策是完善的，在有必要的時候，還要確保運用本地專業知識，指引公司遵守正確的準則。通過這種方式，企業可以盡其所能，從一開始就管理好自己的風險。如果之后這些企業發現自己成為反壟斷調查的目標，最壞的情況也只是被指控“壟斷定價”。至少從世界其他地方的視角來看，這種指控在更大程度上意味著該企業是自身成功的受害者，而不是表明其卷入了腐敗案。
Another way to minimise risk would be to avoid over exposure to the marketplace in the first place. As tempting as it may seem given the size of the Chinese marketplace, rather than going full throttle to maximise sales there, it may be sensible to spread risk and seek entry to some other fast-developing Asian countries at the same time – and there are plenty to go for.
另一個將風險降至最低的方法是在一開始就避免對市場建立過大的敞口。考慮到中國市場的規模，全力投入似乎頗具誘惑性。然而，與其全力提高在中國的銷售額，明智的選擇或許是分散風險，尋求進入其他快速發展的亞洲國家，而且可供選擇的國家有很多。
It may also be possible to hedge against the risk of facing an anti-trust investigation by making sure your business interests in the country are firmly tied up in a joint venture, which is in fact a statutory requirement. This will ensure that Chinese people can learn from the services and knowledge you are bringing with you and can develop this commercially in the future.
對沖反壟斷調查的風險還有另一個可能方案，就是確保企業在中國的商業利益捆綁在一個合資企業中，事實上這也是法定要求。這會確保中國人能從你帶來的服務和知識中學習，并在今后將其應用于商業化發展。
Finally, when it comes to reputational risk, businesses should take a balanced view. It would be easy to let such risks make their decision-making too risk averse, particularly when they see the headlines that anti-trust probes in China generate. It is important to remember that the rest of the world understands that China is a strictly-controlled marketplace and will remain that way.
最后，對于聲譽風險，企業應持一種平衡的觀點。很容易讓這種風險導致企業在決策時過于懼怕風險，特別是當企業看到中國反壟斷調查的新聞頭條時。記住以下這點很重要：世界其他地方的人理解中國是一個嚴格受控的市場，而且這種狀況將持續下去。
Roy Williams is managing director at Vendigital, a firm of procurement and supply chain specialists, operating globally and across industry sectors. As part of its international footprint, the company has a base in Hong Kong.
羅伊•威廉姆斯是咨詢公司Vendigital的總經理。該公司由采購和供應鏈領域的專業人士組成，在全球范圍內運營，提供多種行業類別的服務。作為全球部署的一部分，公司在香港設有辦公室。
