評(píng)論
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For 30 years, China has prospered thanks to a low-wage, high-investment growth model--one in which workers see only a fraction of the fruits of growth and corporate profits are plowed back into ever greater capacity. That model, though, is changing: the recent strike over unpaid social insurance payments that affected an Adidas and Nike supplier in southern China shows how workers are becoming more aggressive.
中國(guó)30年來(lái)的繁榮發(fā)展得益于一個(gè)低薪酬、高投資的增長(zhǎng)模式。在這樣一個(gè)模式下，工人只享有一小部分經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展成果，企業(yè)利潤(rùn)被用于不斷擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能的再投資。不過(guò)，這種模式正在發(fā)生變化：最近中國(guó)南方一家阿迪達(dá)斯(Adidas)和耐克(Nike)供貨商的工廠因社保支付問(wèn)題發(fā)生罷工，表明中國(guó)工人正變得更加敢作敢為。
If China successfully manages to move from an investment-focused economy to a consumption-based one, such a shift will have an impact on the rest of the world too. That's especially true for the U.S., which has long ginned up its own consumption by selling Treasury bonds and other assets to foreign investors.
如果中國(guó)能成功實(shí)現(xiàn)從側(cè)重投資到立足于消費(fèi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型，這樣一個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)變也將對(duì)世界其他地區(qū)產(chǎn)生影響。尤其是對(duì)美國(guó)而言。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，美國(guó)一直依靠向海外投資者出售國(guó)債和其他資產(chǎn)來(lái)支撐自己的消費(fèi)。
These are the issues Stephen Roach, a former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia who is now at Yale's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, examines in his book 'Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China.'
這就是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)亞洲區(qū)前主席、目前任職于耶魯大學(xué)杰克遜全球事務(wù)研究所(Jackson Institute for
Global Affairs)的史蒂芬・羅奇(Stephen Roach)在其名為《失衡：美國(guó)與中國(guó)的相互依附》(Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China)的書中所探討的問(wèn)題。
Mr. Roach argues that both the U.S. and China need to find new ways to manage their economies. America needs to start saving more, he says, while China needs to start serving its own consumers -- starting with a better social safety net. Edited excerpts:
羅奇認(rèn)為，美國(guó)和中國(guó)都需要找到管理本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的新辦法。他表示，美國(guó)需要開(kāi)始增加儲(chǔ)蓄，而中國(guó)需要開(kāi)始服務(wù)于本國(guó)消費(fèi)者，首先要從改善社會(huì)保障體系入手。以下是采訪的編輯摘錄：
Why did you write the book?
你為什么會(huì)寫這本書？
There's a lot of misinformation and outdated views about China in the U.S. I hope I know as much as almost anybody about the intersection between the two economies, and I thought the relationship needed to be addressed from both sides.
在美國(guó)，有很多關(guān)于中國(guó)的錯(cuò)誤信息和過(guò)時(shí)看法。關(guān)于美中經(jīng)濟(jì)的交叉點(diǎn)，我所知道的和大多數(shù)人一樣多。同時(shí)，我認(rèn)為美中經(jīng)濟(jì)之間的關(guān)系需要分別從兩國(guó)各自的方面探討。
What do you think is the biggest misunderstanding Americans have about China?
你認(rèn)為美國(guó)人對(duì)中國(guó)最大的誤解是什么？
The U.S. continues to look at China through the same lens through which it sees itself. It looks at excess investment or low consumption or rising debt and concludes that China is doomed. The U.S. misses the fact that China not only has a different system but it also is at a totally different stage in its development. It's certainly facing some daunting problems, but moving from a producer model to a consumer model built on urbanization still requires very high investment ratios. It still requires an active government promoting state-directed infrastructure and real estate construction. We can't rely on our own model to assess China's progress or lack thereof.
美國(guó)仍在以看待自己的方式看待中國(guó)。美國(guó)看到中國(guó)投資過(guò)度、消費(fèi)偏低以及債務(wù)增加，就認(rèn)定中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)必將崩潰。美國(guó)忽略了一個(gè)事實(shí)，那就是中國(guó)不僅有一套不同的體系，而且處在和美國(guó)完全不同的發(fā)展階段。中國(guó)顯然正面臨一些嚴(yán)峻的問(wèn)題，但從生產(chǎn)型向基于城鎮(zhèn)化建設(shè)的消費(fèi)型經(jīng)濟(jì)模式轉(zhuǎn)變?nèi)孕枰芨叩耐顿Y比例。中國(guó)依然需要積極推進(jìn)政府主導(dǎo)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和房地產(chǎn)建設(shè)。美國(guó)不能用自己的模式去評(píng)估中國(guó)的進(jìn)步和不足。
How would you rate China's chances of escaping from the so-called 'middle-income trap' that other emerging economies have faced?
你認(rèn)為中國(guó)避開(kāi)其他新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體遇到的所謂“中等收入陷阱”的機(jī)率有多大？
I think the chances are reasonably good. Most developing economies do get caught in the middle-income trap largely because they stick with the same model that led them from early-stage development to middle income and they think it can provide the impetus for moving to higher income -- and it usually doesn't. China's changing the model, which is important, and so I'm optimistic China is on a course to escape this dreaded trap.
我認(rèn)為這一機(jī)率相當(dāng)高。多數(shù)發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體確實(shí)陷入了中等收入陷阱，主要原因是沿用了幫助他們從早期階段發(fā)展到中等收入階段的模式，而且他們認(rèn)為該模式能提供進(jìn)入更高收入階段的動(dòng)力，而事實(shí)通常并非如此。中國(guó)正在改變發(fā)展模式，這很重要。我相信中國(guó)正走在一條能夠避開(kāi)這一可怕陷阱的道路上。
What are the advantages of China's relatively centralized system of economic planning, compared with the approach in the U.S.?
與美國(guó)的做法相比，中國(guó)相對(duì)集中的計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)體制有何優(yōu)勢(shì)？
One word: strategy. Strategies don't always work, but all economies need some form of strategy. The United States is faced with daunting transitions right now and it has no strategy -- and it's suffering because of that. We operate on a very short-term basis. That constrains us from being proactive and planning for the future on issues like saving, U.S. competitiveness, and how to address income inequality. Politicians are afraid of having a debate because they know that when we make an effort to come up with solutions to our long-term problems there's likely to be some pain along the way. We don't have courageous leaders who are willing to take those risks.
一句話，戰(zhàn)略。戰(zhàn)略并非總能奏效，但所有的經(jīng)濟(jì)體都需要某種形式的戰(zhàn)略。美國(guó)目前面臨著艱巨的轉(zhuǎn)型任務(wù)，但因缺乏相應(yīng)的戰(zhàn)略而遇挫。我們的運(yùn)作著眼于極短期。這會(huì)制約我們的主動(dòng)性，制約我們?cè)趦?chǔ)蓄、美國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力以及解決收入差異等問(wèn)題方面為未來(lái)做打算。政界人士擔(dān)心展開(kāi)論戰(zhàn)，因?yàn)樗麄冎喇?dāng)我們努力為長(zhǎng)期問(wèn)題找到解決方法時(shí)，隨之而來(lái)的很可能是要受些苦。我們?nèi)狈Ω试该半U(xiǎn)的勇敢領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。
You argue that the U.S. will need to find ways to save more without relying on savings imported from overseas. How can this be achieved?
您說(shuō)美國(guó)將需要設(shè)法在不依賴來(lái)自海外儲(chǔ)蓄的前提下增加儲(chǔ)蓄。如何實(shí)現(xiàn)這一點(diǎn)呢？
First and foremost, we need to reduce the long-term budget deficit. But families also need to get their saving rate back up. American families were duped by bubbles, especially property bubbles, into believing that they had discovered a new way to save and didn't have to save out of their income. That bubble burst and they're left with no savings.
首先，我們需要減少長(zhǎng)期預(yù)算赤字。但家庭也需要提高儲(chǔ)蓄率。過(guò)去，美國(guó)家庭被泡沫所蒙蔽，特別是房地產(chǎn)泡沫，他們以為自己找到了一條存錢的新途徑，不必把收入存起來(lái)。泡沫破裂了，他們的積蓄也隨之付諸東流。
The saving rate now is close to 4%, versus a 30-year average of about 9.5% at the end of the last century. It's as low as it's ever been for any leading nation in modern history. We need to expand existing incentives like 401-Ks and IRAs, we need to provide savings incentives explicitly for low-income individuals. Then we need to address the current unsustainable monetary policy, in which zero interest rates have crushed returns for a generation of savers.
目前儲(chǔ)蓄率接近4%，而截至上個(gè)世紀(jì)末的30年平均儲(chǔ)蓄率約為9.5%。美國(guó)目前的儲(chǔ)蓄率是現(xiàn)代歷史中主要國(guó)家中最低的。我們需要擴(kuò)大現(xiàn)有的激勵(lì)計(jì)劃，比如401K和個(gè)人退休賬戶(IRA)，我們需要為低收入個(gè)人提供明確的儲(chǔ)蓄激勵(lì)措施。我們還需要應(yīng)對(duì)難以持續(xù)的現(xiàn)行貨幣政策。當(dāng)前貨幣政策推行的近零利率壓縮了一代儲(chǔ)戶的回報(bào)。
You've been pretty critical of the Fed's loose monetary policy. Why is that?
你經(jīng)常批評(píng)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的寬松貨幣政策。這是為何呢？
These policies were put in place in the depths of a horrific crisis. They were emergency measures. The emergency is long over, and yet the policies are still on emergency settings. When excess liquidity gets combined with what's still a weak economy with considerable slack in labor and product markets, the odds suggest that it shows up in asset markets, either at home or abroad. It's a recipe for instability in financial markets and for potential future bubbles. Which bubbles they are, no one knows.
這些政策是一場(chǎng)可怕的金融危機(jī)愈演愈烈時(shí)推出的。它們是應(yīng)急措施。現(xiàn)在應(yīng)急狀態(tài)早已過(guò)去，但這些應(yīng)急政策依然在使用。當(dāng)流動(dòng)性過(guò)剩，而經(jīng)濟(jì)依然疲弱，勞動(dòng)力和產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)狀況仍不振時(shí)，可能發(fā)生的情況是，寬松政策的效果將在國(guó)內(nèi)或者國(guó)外的資產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)得到體現(xiàn)。它是治療金融市場(chǎng)不穩(wěn)定的處方，但也可能在未來(lái)催生泡沫。泡沫會(huì)出現(xiàn)在哪里？沒(méi)有人知道。
You emphasize that China needs to provide more in the way of social benefits if it is to bring down its very high saving rate. Do you think America's welfare state is adequate -- or over-generous?
你強(qiáng)調(diào)說(shuō)，如果中國(guó)想要把非常高的儲(chǔ)存率降下來(lái)，它需要提供更多的社會(huì)福利。你認(rèn)為美國(guó)的國(guó)家福利是否足夠，還是過(guò)于慷慨了？
It's not perfect. We have massive unfunded liabilities in both our retirement system and in healthcare. But we at least have a well-defined system of contributions and benefits. China doesn't have that. The lack of a well-funded and secure safety net, both for healthcare and retirement, is a main reason why the saving rate is excessively high for Chinese households and continues to go higher. Uncertainty translates into fear, meaning any incremental growth in income that Chinese families earn won't show up in discretionary consumption. That will impede a consumer-led transformation.
它并不完善。美國(guó)的退休系統(tǒng)和醫(yī)療保健系統(tǒng)都存在資金不足的情況。但美國(guó)至少有一個(gè)定義明確的繳付款項(xiàng)和享受福利的系統(tǒng)。中國(guó)沒(méi)有這樣一個(gè)系統(tǒng)。缺乏一個(gè)資金充足和安全的社保網(wǎng)絡(luò)為醫(yī)療保健和退休提供保障，這是中國(guó)居民的儲(chǔ)蓄率居高不下而且仍在上升的主要原因。不確定性帶來(lái)恐懼，這意味著中國(guó)家庭任何新增的收入都不會(huì)用于可選擇性的消費(fèi)。這將阻礙中國(guó)向以消費(fèi)為主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型。
