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China's economic growth is slowing, property prices in some smaller cities are declining and some companies are starting to default. But Changyong Rhee, director of the International Monetary Fund's Asia and Pacific Department, believes the odds of China suffering a full-blown financial crisis remain low.
Bloomberg News中國經濟增長正在放緩，一些小城市的房價下跌，一些公司開始出現違約的情況。但即便如此，國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)亞太區負責人李昌鏞(Changyong Rhee)認為中國遭遇全面金融危機的可能性仍很小。
In an interview, Mr. Rhee outlined a number of reason not to sound the alarm bells:
李昌鏞在接受專訪時，給出了不用過于擔憂的如下理由：
1. China's owes most of its debt to itself. True, China's debt -- some tallies put the sum of private and government debt at double China's gross domestic product -- is scary. How companies and local governments will manage to service that debt as growth cools and interest rates rise is a puzzler. The IMF's latest Regional Economic Outlook, released Monday, predicts China's economic growth will slow to 7.5% this year from 7.7% last year, then further to 7.3% in 2015.
1. 中國的債務大部分屬于內部債務。誠然，中國的債務水平令人擔憂，有數據顯示，將中國民間和政府債務加總后，規模是中國國內生產總值(GDP)的兩倍。隨著經濟增長放緩和利率上升，企業和地方政府將如何償付這些債務成了一個難題。周一，IMF發布的最新地區經濟展望(Regional Economic Outlook)預測中國今年經濟增長率將從去年的7.7%放緩至7.5%，2015年增長率進一步放慢至7.3%。
Mr. Rhee says China is bound to see a rising number of credit defaults. But unlike Thailand or South Korea before the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, China hasn't borrowed heavily abroad in foreign currencies. China's total foreign debt amounts to only about 9% of its GDP, according to the country's foreign-exchange regulator. South Korea's was roughly one-third of GDP back in 1997.
李昌鏞稱，中國肯定會出現更多的信用違約。但與泰國或韓國在1997年金融危機爆發前的情況不同，中國的外債規模并不很大。據中國外匯監管部門的數據，中國全部外債僅占GDP的9%左右。而韓國在1997年時，外債占該國GDP的約三分之一。
That means that if China's currency falls further (it has dropped roughly 3% so far this year), it won't necessarily cause a dramatic increase in borrowers' debts in local-currency terms that then causes bankruptcies to snowball.
這意味著，如果人民幣進一步貶值（今年迄今為止，人民幣兌美元下跌約3%），不一定會導致以人民幣計價的債務急劇增加。如果出現債務激增的情況，企業破產就會滾雪球式地蔓延。
2. China's government debt is low. Like many governments in advanced economies, Beijing runs a budget deficit. But that deficit is relatively small -- about 2.1% of GDP. And total government debt, both those owed by the national government and China's much more heavily indebted provinces, still add up to only about 53% of GDP, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Compare that with the U.S., where government debt is roughly as big as GDP, or Japan, where government debt has ballooned to roughly 240% of GDP.
2. 中國政府債務水平低。與許多發達經濟體一樣，中國政府的預算呈赤字。但赤字水平相對較低，僅達到中國GDP的2.1%左右。據美銀美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch)，包括中央政府和負債更高的地方政府在內，中國政府債務總額占GDP的53%左右。與此形成對比的是：美國的政府債務與GDP基本相當，而日本的政府債務大約是GDP的240%。
That means China can afford to spend more to offset the economic slowdown if it becomes too painful to borrowers. It can even afford to bail out banks or borrowers it deems too big to fail. In the worst case scenario, China's central bank can follow the lead of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan and create money by buying up assets -- a policy known as quantitative easing. 'If something bad happens, they will muddle through,' said Mr. Rhee.
這意味著，一旦借款方處境窘困，中國有能力增大支出力度，抵消經濟增長放緩的影響。中國甚至有能力救助銀行或政府認為大到不能倒的借款者。如果最糟糕的情況發生，中國還可效仿美國聯邦儲備委員會(Federal Reserve,簡稱：美聯儲)和日本央行(Bank of Japan)，通過購買資產來增加貨幣供應，即實施量化寬松政策。李昌鏞說，如果不幸的事情發生，中國能夠應付，轉危為安。
3. China's slowdown, like its economy, is central planned. While it's easy to overestimate the degree of control Communist Party leaders have over economic decision making on the ground, they nonetheless are able to exert their influence in a way that policy makers in the United States and other democratic nations can only envy.
3. 中國經濟增速放緩，與經濟發展類似，都是由中央政府計劃的。盡管中共領導人對具體經濟決策過程的控制程度很容易被高估，但其對政策的影響力卻讓美國和其它民主國家的決策者羨慕不已。
The U.S. Congress rebuffed former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's first plan for halting the financial crisis in late-2008. China's economic mandarins have much wider latitude to implement policy without the say-so of China's National People's Congress. Most of the country's banks are state-controlled and state-run companies still dominate the economy.
美國國會在2008年末拒絕了前美國財政部長鮑爾森(Henry Paulson)遏制金融危機的第一個方案。而中國經濟當局擁有更廣泛的自主權來實施政策，無需獲得全國人大的批準。中國大多數銀行為國有銀行，國企依舊主導該國經濟。
China can instruct banks how to lend and to whom, and can even tell big companies how and where to invest. That's a solution China's leaders seem eager to avoid, but it remains an option. On the contrary, central bankers in the U.S. and Europe have found that even record-low interest rates could not compel banks to lend or companies to borrow, a situation that made their economic crises worse.
中國可以指導銀行如何放貸、向誰放貸，甚至可以告知大型公司如何投資、向哪投資。這似乎是中國領導人竭力避免的一種解決方案，不過這種做法仍未擯棄。與此形成對比的是，美國和歐洲的央行官員發現，即使利率處于紀錄低位，似乎也不能促使銀行發放貸款或促使企業借貸，這種情況導致歐美國家經濟危機加劇。
Does that mean China can sit back and do nothing? Absolutely not, said Mr. Rhee. China needs to stay the course of overhauling its economy to reduce its reliance on exports and investment in property and heavy industry.
這意味著中國政府可以作壁上觀什么都不做嗎？李昌鏞說，絕對不是。中國需要將經濟改革堅持到底，以降低對出口以及房地產行業和重工業投資的依賴。
China also needs to keep withdrawing cash from its economy to gradually push up interest rates and deflate its credit bubble, Mr. Rhee said. Developing insurance for bank deposits, he said, will help reduce the widespread misperception in China that the government stands ready to bail out any borrower. That myth has helped encourage excessive lending, both by banks and the unregulated non-bank financial sector -- so-called shadow banks.
李昌鏞說，中國還需要繼續回籠現金，從而逐步推高利率并擠破信貸泡沫。李昌鏞表示，發展銀行存款保險制度有助于減輕外界普遍存在的一種誤解，即中國政府隨時準備好救助任何一家銀行。這一神話鼓勵了銀行和未接受監管的非銀行金融機構（即銀子銀行）的過度放貸。
'The process will be bumpy,' Mr. Rhee warned. Defaults are inevitable. But rather than unleash a wave of new credit as China did in 2008 to offset a global slowdown, China should rely on small remedies - 'micro-surgery' as Mr. Rhee put it - to stem financial contagion.
李昌鏞警告說，過程是曲折的。違約現象將不可避免。不過與其像2008年那樣?了應對全球經濟滑坡而釋放一波新增信貸，中國不如依靠小規模救助計劃，正如李昌鏞所說的微創手術，來防范金融風險蔓延。
