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In June and December last year, China’s interbank interest rates jumped from their normal level of about 3 per cent to peak as high as 9 per cent a year. The shockwaves did not stop there. Banks scrambled for deposits and pushed up interest rates on their wealth management products. Funding costs in the vast shadow banking sector also moved up, while stocks and bonds suffered falls.
去年6月和12月，中國銀行間拆借利率從3%左右的正常水平，飆升至9%的高點。利率飆升的沖擊并未就此止步。銀行拼命爭奪存款，并推高了其理財產品的收益率。規模龐大的影子銀行體系中的融資成本也在走高，而股票和債券則出現下跌。
Observers at home and abroad expressed concern about bad debts and the fragility of the banking industry. Some even called it China’s “Minsky moment” – a term coined during the Russian debt crisis of 1998 to describe the turmoil that arises when overstretched investors must finally repay their debts. Some fear that tighter credit markets could cause asset prices to collapse and precipitate a meltdown of the banking industry. But as someone who worked at China’s central bank in the 1980s, I am encouraged by the government’s willingness to tackle the country’s 35-year addiction to cheap credit.
國內外的觀察家們對中國銀行體系的壞賬問題以及脆弱性表示擔憂。有人甚至將此稱為中國的“明斯基時刻”(Minsky moment)——該詞源于1998年的俄羅斯債務危機，用于形容過度負債的投資者最終必須償付債務時所導致的市場動蕩。一些人擔心，信貸市場收緊可能導致資產價格崩盤，并加速銀行系統的崩潰。我曾于上世紀八十年代在中國央行工作過，因此對中國政府愿意解決35年來依賴廉價信貸發展的問題深感振奮。
Central banks are usually thought of as lenders of last resort. But in the 1980s and 1990s, the People’s Bank of China was the first port of call for banks whose lending ambitions were larger than their deposit bases could sustain.
中央銀行通常被認為是最終貸款人。但在二十世紀八、九十年代，對于貸款意愿超過自身存款基礎所能支撐規模的銀行來說，中國央行(People’s Bank of China)卻成為它們的最初貸款人。
I participated in the banks’ bargaining, not just in the loan quota-setting sessions that took place at the beginning of each year but also in ad hoc negotiations that unfolded in smoky boardrooms. It was a common scene in the dark and narrow corridors of the People’s Bank: a mayor or a governor from some province would sit patiently, sometimes for hours, waiting for an opportunity to lobby my senior colleagues for a bigger loan ration for banks in his province or city. Even junior officers such as me found ourselves on the receiving end of their entreaties – and freebies.
我參與了銀行與央行當時的討價還價過程，不僅僅是在每年年初劃定貸款配額的環節，還包括在煙霧繚繞的會議室里展開的臨時協商。在中國央行陰暗狹窄的走廊里，如下場景非常常見：來自某個省份的市長或者省長耐心地坐在那里等待（有時候要等上好幾個小時），以求得到一個機會游說我的那些級別較高的同事，從而為其所在省份或城市爭取較高的貸款配額。即便是像我這樣的小兵也成了他們懇求的對象，并能因此收到免費的禮物。
Instead of lending out 60 or 70 per cent of their deposits, the banks would lend out more than 100 per cent. The extra money came from the central bank’s printing press.
這些銀行并非僅將60%或70%的存款用于放貸，其貸存比甚至超過了100%。多出的資金來源于央行的印鈔機。
Official data show that the banking sector’s loan-to-deposit ratios had been well above 100 per cent for a few decades until the mid-1990s. Since then, the central bank has forced down loan-to-deposit ratios. But the flow of easy money has not ended. In fact, it has swelled.
官方數據顯示，在上世紀九十年代中期以前的幾十年里，中國銀行體系的貸存比持續保持在遠高于100%的水平。自那以后，中國央行被迫壓低銀行的貸存比。但低成本資金流并未就此斷流。實際上，其規模甚至有所擴大。
In part, that is because the reduction of the loan-to-deposit ratio was more than offset by the recapitalisation of the banking system with the creation of four
部分原因在于，銀行體系的資本重組大大抵消了貸存比降低的影響。在資本重組的過程中誕生了四家所謂的“壞賬銀行”。這使得銀行能夠繼續發放新的貸款。新增貸款一旦被借款方存入銀行賬戶，就又會增加儲蓄并為進一步放貸鋪平道路。
so-called “bad banks”. This enabled lenders to extend new loans, which, once placed in borrowers’ bank accounts, lifted deposits and made way for yet more lending.
16家大型銀行公開發行上市以及后續的配股融資，為銀行進一步提供了資金來源。結果是，1999年至2000年度銀行整體信貸增長約8%，但從那以后到現在的年均復合增長率達到17%左右。
A further source of capital was provided by the public listings of the 16 largest banks, together with subsequent share placements. As a result, total credit growth accelerated from roughly 8 per cent in 1999-2000 to a compound annual rate of about 17 per cent since then.
如今銀行擴張信貸面臨三大主要限制：高達20%的存款準備金率（遠高于任何其他主要經濟體）；75%的貸存比上限；以及每家銀行的信貸配額限制。這共同反映出監管當局當前的謹慎態度。
Today there are three major restrictions on the banks’ credit expansion: the very high reserve requirement ratio of 20 per cent
但這道防線現在已有了漏洞。銀行通過發售“理財產品”輕易地繞過了這些限制。理財產品的部分功能與儲蓄存款相同。銀行對央行的游說力度絲毫不見減少。2012年，我發現自己在為一家地區性銀行辯護。坐在我對面的是我在央行的前同事們，這讓我感到很不舒服。
(far higher than in any other major economy); the 75 per cent cap on the loan-to-deposit ratio; and credit quotas for each bank. It all adds up to a picture of regulatory prudence.
近期的利率飆升遠談不上前所未有。在二十世紀八、九十年代，過度放貸的銀行經常會發現自己沒有資金應對儲戶的取現需求。但當時并未在社會上引起恐慌，因為媒體從不報道此類事件，那時也沒有銀行間市場。
The bucket is leaking, however. The banks have easily circumvented these restrictions by selling “wealth management products” that serve some of the same purposes as deposits. And their lobbying efforts continue unabated. In 2012 I found myself advocating on behalf of a regional lender. Sitting opposite me were my former colleagues from the central bank, and I felt very uncomfortable.
中國央行會以提供緊急貸款的形式介入干預。這種做法已經變得司空見慣，以至于一些銀行開始有意運用這一伎倆，將其變成從央行獲取更多貸款的常規操作。雖然央行會對銀行的不當行為略施懲罰，但這幾乎無法阻止它們再次違規。銀行家和地方官員會開玩笑地說：“正是這種不痛不癢的懲戒帶來的刺激感才導致他們違規的”。
The recent interest rate jumps were far from unprecedented. In the 1980s and 1990s, overstretched banks regularly found themselves without money to meet withdrawals. There was no panic at the time, as the media never reported these things and there was no interbank market.
上世紀八十年代初以來銀行貸款快速增長，再加上寬松的放貸標準，導致到了上世紀九十年代末期，不良貸款在銀行貸款資產中所占比重達到了30%-40%。如今中國央行正在采取嚴厲措施防止這種局面重演。銀行業的游戲規則有望隨著時間推移而改變。
The central bank stepped in to provide emergency loans. These had become commonplace, and some banks began deliberately using the tactic as a matter of routine, to extract more loans from the central bank. Although the banks would receive a slap on the wrist in punishment for their misbehaviour, this did little to deter repeat offenders. Bankers and local politicians would jokingly say: “The thrill justifies the sin.”
中國需要更高的利率水平，來給房地產市場泡沫降溫，縮減浪費性的投資，并盡可能地降低普通儲戶對銀行的補貼。中國政府仍然不愿讓信貸市場完全自由化。但即便政府尚未出手，市場力量已經開始推高利率水平。
