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Depositors of banks in Cyprus now fear they have less money than they thought while US corporations have plenty of cash to hand – $1.45tn and rising, according to Moody’s. But whose money is it, anyway?
塞浦路斯銀行的儲戶現(xiàn)在擔(dān)心他們手里的現(xiàn)金將縮水，而根據(jù)穆迪(Moody’s)的數(shù)據(jù)，美國企業(yè)手頭現(xiàn)金充裕，為1.45萬億美元，而且還在增加。可是，這筆錢屬于誰呢？
Michael Dell clearly thinks it is his. The Dell founder wants to repatriate up to $7.4bn of his company’s overseas cash hoard in order to help finance his bid to take it private with Silver Lake, the private equity firm. Activist investors such as Carl Icahn and David Einhorn think more should be given to shareholders, to prevent executives wasting it.
邁克爾??戴爾(Michael Dell，見上圖)顯然認(rèn)為這筆錢是屬于他的。這位戴爾(Dell)創(chuàng)始人希望將該公司的海外現(xiàn)金儲備匯回至多74億美元，幫助為他與私人股本公司銀湖(Silver Lake)聯(lián)合將戴爾私有化的計劃融資。卡爾??伊卡恩(Carl Icahn)和大衛(wèi)??艾因霍恩(David Einhorn)等維權(quán)股東則認(rèn)為，應(yīng)當(dāng)把更多現(xiàn)金返還給股東，以阻止高管浪費(fèi)這筆錢。
This in turn outrages Martin Lipton, the lawyer who invented the poison-pill defence. He believes they are “sacrificing the future for a quick buck” and compares pressure on US technology enterprises to share cash to the “bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond takeovers” of the past, which “l(fā)aid waste to the future of many great companies”.
這進(jìn)而激怒了當(dāng)初發(fā)明“毒丸”(poison-pill)防御計劃的律師馬丁??利普頓(Martin Lipton)。他認(rèn)為，他們正“為了迅速撈取橫財而犧牲未來”，他還把美國科技企業(yè)現(xiàn)在面臨的分配現(xiàn)金的壓力，與當(dāng)年的“自主融資收購(bootstrap takeover)、破產(chǎn)式收購(bust-up takeover)、垃圾債券型收購(junk-bond takeover)”相提并論，那些交易“糟蹋了很多偉大公司的未來”。
The truth is, it does not belong to any of them. Corporate cash is no more the property of shareholders than a rainy-day fund of executives, hoarded in case something comes up. It is the product of companies such as Apple, which held $137bn in cash at the end of 2012, having done well. It belongs to the enterprise, not to either party.
事實(shí)是，它不屬于上述任何一方。企業(yè)現(xiàn)金不是股東的財產(chǎn)，也不是企業(yè)高管的小金庫，存起來以備不時之需。它是蘋果(Apple)等公司優(yōu)秀業(yè)績的產(chǎn)物，2012年底，該公司持有1370億美元的現(xiàn)金。它屬于企業(yè)，而非任何一方。
A company, being inanimate, can’t decide what to do with its cash. That is the task of managers, overseen by a board of directors and monitored by shareholders when they go astray. The kind of arguments we are now seeing are not evidence of chaotic dysfunction, as Mr Lipton argues. They are a sign of the system working as designed.
公司沒有生命，無法決定如何處置現(xiàn)金。這是管理者的任務(wù)，并得到董事會的管控，在他們誤入歧途時還受到股東的監(jiān)督。我們現(xiàn)在看到的這些爭論，并不是像利普頓所辯稱的那樣，表明出現(xiàn)了混亂和失調(diào)，而是表明這個制度正按照設(shè)計宗旨發(fā)揮作用。
The point is that neither side can be trusted, any more than the public could be trusted if someone placed an enormous pile of cash in the middle of the street as people walked by. They are there to watch each other, and to raise the alarm if the other makes off with it.
關(guān)鍵問題是，任何一方都不能被信任，就像當(dāng)有人在熙熙攘攘的街頭放置大筆現(xiàn)金時、公眾不可信賴一樣。他們會互相看著對方，一旦對方把錢搶走，就會報警。
This safeguard is working better than at any time in the past few decades, as the examples of Apple and Dell illustrate. Neither a chief executive involved in self-interested financial engineering nor a hedge fund manager seeking a short-term return is immune to challenge.
這種保護(hù)機(jī)制的效果比過去幾十年任何時候都要好，正如蘋果和戴爾的例子所表明的那樣。參與自私的金融工程(financial engineering)的首席執(zhí)行官和尋求短期收益的對沖基金經(jīng)理都不能避免挑戰(zhàn)。
The balance of power has slowly shifted, from the postwar era of entrenched management to a period in the 2000s when corporations readily handed out cash to shareholders under pressure from activists. The amount distributed by Standard and Poor’s 500 companies using share buybacks increased 18-fold between 1987 and 2007.
實(shí)力平衡已慢慢發(fā)生變化，從二戰(zhàn)后管理層“說了算”的時代，變?yōu)楸臼兰o(jì)初企業(yè)在維權(quán)者壓力之下愿意將現(xiàn)金分配給股東的局面。自1987年至2007年，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)(Standard and Poor’s 500)成分股企業(yè)利用股票回購返還給股東的金額增加了18倍。
It arguably went too far. William Bratton and Michael Wachter, two US law professors, have argued that the shareholder pressure to raise short-term return on equity was one reason why banks over-leveraged their balance sheets in the run-up to the 2008 crisis – and then collapsed. They cite this disaster as a good reason for companies to beware shareholder empowerment.
可以說，這有些極端了。兩位美國法學(xué)教授威廉??布拉頓(William Bratton)和邁克爾??沃特爾(Michael Wachter)辯稱，股東要求提高短期股本回報率的壓力，是銀行在2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以前過度擴(kuò)張資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表、最后崩潰的一個原因。他們將這場災(zāi)難列為企業(yè)要警惕“股東賦權(quán)”的良好理由。
There is, however, a big difference between a bank with an equity base of 5 per cent of its assets and Apple, which is awash with cash. Even David Einhorn, the hedge fund investor who wants Apple to issue new preference shares with a 4 per cent yield, say it should keep $20bn under the mattress.
然而，一家股本基數(shù)占資產(chǎn)5%的銀行與現(xiàn)金充裕的蘋果之間存在巨大差異。就連對沖基金投資者艾因霍恩也表示，蘋果應(yīng)保持200億美元現(xiàn)金儲備。他希望該公司發(fā)行收益率為4%的新的優(yōu)先股。
High margins and a global market have brought the elite technology groups more cash than they have any use for. Moody’s estimates that the technology sector in the US holds $556bn in cash – 38 per cent of total corporate cash reserves. Apple will have $170bn by the year-end unless, as Tim Cook, its chief executive, promises, it gives some to shareholders.
高利潤率以及全球市場給頂尖科技公司帶來了大量現(xiàn)金，超出他們的利用能力。穆迪估計，美國科技行業(yè)持有5560億美元現(xiàn)金，占企業(yè)現(xiàn)金總儲備的38%。除非蘋果按照首席執(zhí)行官蒂姆??庫克(Tim Cook)所承諾的，把部分現(xiàn)金返還給股東，否則到今年底，蘋果的現(xiàn)金儲備將達(dá)到1700億美元。
It is hardly a corporate governance outrage for Mr Einhorn to suggest a way for Apple to do so. Warren Buffett, the eminent investor, advised Mr Cook to “ignore Einhorn” and focus on business, but Mr Buffett is no stranger to extracting money from companies by using high-yield preference shares, as Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and General Electric know.
艾因霍恩向蘋果提出一種將現(xiàn)金返還給股東的方法，很難算得上公司治理方面的一種離譜行為。知名投資人沃倫??巴菲特(Warren Buffett)建議庫克“不要理會艾因霍恩”，應(yīng)關(guān)注企業(yè)，但巴菲特對于利用高收益率優(yōu)先股從公司抽走現(xiàn)金的做法并不陌生，正如高盛(Goldman Sachs)、美國銀行(Bank of America)和通用電氣(GE)所知道的那樣。
It would be strange for investors always to wait meekly for a handout, like Maundy Money from the Queen, when a company has lots of it. Lynn Stout, a law professor, notes that “as a matter of law, shareholders??.??.??.??are entitled to receive nothing from the firm unless and until the board of directors decides they should receive it”. They might as well ask.
如果一家公司擁有大量現(xiàn)金，投資者卻總是要乖乖地等待著公司的派發(fā)，就像英國女王發(fā)放救濟(jì)金(Maundy Money)一樣，那才是奇怪的。法學(xué)教授林恩??斯托特(Lynn Stout)指出，“從法律的角度來看，除非及直到董事會決定股東應(yīng)得到現(xiàn)金，否則股東……無權(quán)從公司得到任何返還”。他們還不如公開要求。
Indeed, balance sheet structure is an issue on which fund managers have useful opinions. They are less to be trusted on corporate strategy, which is not their speciality. As Mr Einhorn said about Apple, “we aren’t here to offer strategic thoughts on how they operate their business – they are the experts”.
的確，在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表結(jié)構(gòu)這個問題上，基金經(jīng)理可以提出有用的意見。公司戰(zhàn)略并非他們的專長，在這個問題上不是那么可以信任他們。正如艾因霍恩談到蘋果時所言：“我們來到這里不是為了就他們?nèi)绾谓?jīng)營業(yè)務(wù)提供戰(zhàn)略思路——他們是行家。”
It may give Mr Lipton apoplexy, but there is no harm in investors challenging executives and a board of directors if they are hoarding cash from caution or laziness. This does not mean that investors are always right – the money could turn out to be useful in future – but it is a fair debate to hold publicly.
這可能會讓利普頓發(fā)瘋，但如果高管和董事會出于謹(jǐn)慎或懶惰囤積現(xiàn)金，投資者向他們發(fā)起挑戰(zhàn)沒有任何害處。這并不意味著投資者永遠(yuǎn)正確——現(xiàn)金可能在未來證明是有用的——但這是一場可以公開進(jìn)行的公平辯論。
The bigger question, to which Mr Lipton alludes, is not whether the managers or the shareholders should decide. It is whether short-term investors that pressure companies for dividends or share buybacks are behaving against the interests of the long-term shareholders. That is the trap into which banks fell before the 2008 financial crisis.
更大的問題（利普頓也曾提到）不是應(yīng)該由管理者還是股東做出決定，而是短線投資者向企業(yè)施壓、要求派發(fā)股息或進(jìn)行股票回購的行為，是否有損長期股東的利益。那正是2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)之前銀行所墜入的那個陷阱。
Executives have to be alert to this, and to repudiate cash handouts that sound nice but would make it harder to build a profitable and sustainable enterprise. They need not follow the caricature version of “shareholder value” that sees the job of managers as to maximise the current share price at all costs.
企業(yè)高管必須關(guān)注這個問題，而且必須反駁那些聽上去不錯、但不利于打造盈利且可持續(xù)的企業(yè)的現(xiàn)金返還。他們不需要遵循漫畫版的“股東價值”，認(rèn)為管理者的工作就是不惜一切代價將當(dāng)前股價提升至最高。
But US technology companies, several of which could bail out small eurozone countries without breaking a sweat, are not victims of corporate raiders. They are simply being asked to make use of their wealth.
可話說回來，美國科技公司并非敵意收購的靶子（有幾家企業(yè)無需費(fèi)力就能為歐元區(qū)小國紓困）。人們只不過是要求它們好好利用手中的財富。
