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The Oxbridge archives are rich enough to allow for the construction of something like an ideal property index, however. The study's authors dredged for detailed data on sales and purchases (from transaction ledgers) and on rents and maintenance costs (from rent books) over the period from 1901 to 1983. To keep quality constant, they tracked the growth in rents on the same properties from one year to the next. They then linked these annualrates in a chain to create a quality-adjusted long-run series of income growth. This series has the added advantage of being based on cashflows, rather than the rent required by the lease, which is not always paid. (Rent holidays were a thing before this pandemic.) Alongside this, the authors put together a long-run series of gross yields by matching the transaction data with the income figures. They arrive at a net yield by subtracting maintenance costs.
然而，牛津劍橋的檔案資料非常豐富，足以用來構建一個類似理想房產指數的東西。該研究的作者挖掘了1901年至1983年期間的銷售和購買記錄(來自交易賬簿)以及租金和維護成本(來自租金賬簿)的詳細數據。為了保持質量不變，他們追蹤了同一套房產的租金每年的增長情況。然后，他們將這些年增長率連接在一條鏈上，創造出經過質量調整的長期收入增長系列。這個系列的額外優勢在于，它不是基于并不總是支付的租賃要求的租金，而是基于現金流。(在疫情爆發之前就已經有了“免租期”這一說。)與此同時，作者通過將交易數據與收入數據相匹配，得出了一系列長期的毛收益率。它們通過減去維護成本得到凈收益。
The authors used these ingredients to derive a consistent measure of long-run returns. The results are fascinating. The net annual real return on residential property was 2.3%. That is surprisingly low. By comparison "The Rate of Return on Everything", an oft-cited study published in the Quarterly Journal of Economicsin 2019, puts the net returns on British housing at 4.7% over the same period.
作者利用這些因素得出了長期收益的一致衡量標準，結果令人著迷。住宅地產的凈年實際回報率為2.3%，也就是說出奇地低。相比之下，2019年發表在《經濟季刊》上的一項經常被引用的研究《所有事物的回報率》認為同期英國住房的凈回報率為4.7%。
What explains the discrepancy? Perhaps the Oxbridge sample is not representative of the returns that could have been achieved. Put bluntly, the colleges might have had duff portfolios (or especially bad tenants). The evidence on whether college endowments are good investors is mixed. But the study is clear that portfolios were well diversified by region and type, and were managed with a strong eye to long-term returns. Another explanation is that the bottom-up Oxbridge-based study is closer to the truth, because it has a better handle on the more distant past. Top-down housing data in Britain before around 1970 adjusts for neither mix nor quality. What looks like price appreciation or rising real rents may simply be quality improvement.
如何解釋這種差異呢？或許牛津和劍橋的樣本不能代表本可以獲得的回報。說白了，這些大學的投資組合可能都很差勁(尤其是糟糕的租戶)。關于大學捐贈基金是否是優秀投資者的證據有好有壞。但這項研究清楚地表明，投資組合按地區和類型進行了很好地多樣化，并且在管理時高度關注長期回報。另一種解釋是，這項基于牛津和劍橋的自下而上的研究更接近事實，因為它更好地處理了更久遠的過去。1970年以前英國自上而下的住房數據既不考慮混合因素也不考慮質量。看似價格上漲或房租上漲，其實可能只是質量的提高。
Look ahead, and there are big challenges for property investors. The pandemic will change how people live and work, and thus where they live and work. Understanding the pastis scarcely any easier. In the current circumstances it is not only Britons who might be wallowing in nostalgia. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate how good the past was.
展望未來，房地產投資者將面臨巨大挑戰。新冠將改變人們的生活和工作方式，從而改變他們的生活和工作地點。了解過去也不容易。在目前的情況下，沉浸在懷舊之中的不僅僅是英國人。但是，夸大過去的美好是不對的。
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