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When output is the result of a team effort, it is hard to put the necessary tasks out to the market.
當產(chǎn)出是團隊努力的結(jié)果時，把必要的任務(wù)交與市場很難。
That is because it is tricky to measure the contribution of each member to the finished work and to then allocate their rewards accordingly.
這是因為，衡量每一位成員對已經(jīng)完成的工作的貢獻、然后再相應(yīng)地分配他們的酬勞很棘手。
So the firm is needed to act as both co-ordinator and monitor of a team.
因此，公司是為同時充當合作者和團隊監(jiān)督者所需。
If a team of workers requires a firm as monitor, might that also be true for teams of suppliers?
如果說員工團隊需要公司作為監(jiān)督者，那么，這對供給方團隊也是正確的嗎？
In some cases, firms are indeed vertically integrated, meaning that suppliers of inputs and producers of final goods are under the same ownership.
在某些案例中，公司實際上是被垂直地整合起來的，這意味著投入的供給方和最終產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)者處于同一所有權(quán)之下。
But in other cases, suppliers and their customers are separate entities.
但是，在其他案例中，供給方和他們的客戶是單獨的實體。
When is one set-up right and not the other?
一種組織架構(gòu)何時是正確的，另一種何時是不正確的呢？
A paper published in 1986 by Sanford Grossman and Mr Hart sharpened the thinking on this.
桑福特·格羅斯曼(Sanford Grossman)和哈特在1968年發(fā)表的一篇論文讓這方面的思考變得又深入了一步。
They distinguished between two types of rights over a firm's assets (its plant, machinery, brands, client lists and so on) : specific rights, which can be contracted out, and residual rights, which come with ownership.
他們把兩種類型的公司資產(chǎn)權(quán)（廠房、機器、品牌、客戶名單等等）區(qū)分了開來：特殊權(quán)利，這是可以通過合同被外包出去的；剩余權(quán)利，這是隨所有權(quán)而來的。
Where it becomes costly for a company to specify all that it wants from a supplier, it might make sense to acquire it in order to claim the residual rights (and the profits) from ownership.
對于公司來說，當列出它想要從供給方得到的一切變得代價高昂時，收購供給方以宣稱來自所有權(quán)的剩余權(quán)利（和利潤）或許是有意義的。
But, as Messrs Grossman and Hart noted, something is also lost through the merger.
但是，正如格羅斯曼和哈特所指出的那樣，某些東西通過收購也喪失了。
The supplier's incentive to innovate and to control costs vanishes, because he no longer owns the residual rights.
供給方的創(chuàng)新和控制成本的動力消失殆盡，因為他不再擁有剩余權(quán)利。
To illustrate this kind of relationship, they used the example of an insurance firm that pays a commission to an agent for selling policies.
為闡明這種關(guān)系，他們使用了一家為出售保單支付給代理人一筆傭金的保險公司的例子。
To encourage the agent to find high-quality clients, which are more likely to renew a policy, the firm defers some portion of the agent's pay and ties it to the rate of policy renewals.
為鼓勵代理人發(fā)現(xiàn)更有可能續(xù)保的高質(zhì)量客戶，公司推遲支付代理人的一部分工資，并且還將其與保單續(xù)保率捆綁在一起。
The agent is thus induced to work hard to find good clients.
這樣，代理人就受到了努力發(fā)掘好客戶的誘惑。
But there is a drawback.
但是，這有一個缺陷。
The insurance firm now has an incentive of its own to shirk.
如今，保險公司自身有一種逃避責任的動力。
While the agent is busting a gut to find the right sort of customers, the firm can take advantage by, say, cutting its spending on advertising its policies, raising their price or lowering their quality.
當代理人拼命工作以發(fā)現(xiàn)正確類型的客戶時，保險公司可以通過消減宣傳保單的費用，提高價格或者降低質(zhì)量等方式占便宜。
There is no set-up in which the incentives of firm and agent can be perfectly aligned.
不存在公司和代理人的動力可以在其中得到完美調(diào)和的組織架構(gòu)。
譯文來源考研英語時事閱讀
