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Citigroup
花旗集團
Paying up and moving on
付訖，前行
The perennial basket-case of American banking at last shows signs of life
數年崩潰下美國銀行業終于顯現生機
THERE were many reasons why Citigroup's earnings for the second quarter, released on July 14th, might have elicited familiar groans. Revenues from its North American retail operations plunged by 26%, thanks in part to an abrupt drop in the refinancing of mortgages due to rising interest rates. Worse, the bank agreed to a $7 billion settlement with prosecutors over its dealings in mortgage-backed securities before the financial crisis, twice what analysts had initially expected and 20 times what Citi had first offered. Yet in the wake of all this bad news, Citi's shares rose.
7月14日，花旗集團發布其第二季度盈利，這可能又會引發一片熟悉的呻吟聲，之所以會如此，原因眾多。花旗的北美零售業務收入銳減26%，部分原因是由于利率上升，抵押貸款再融資急劇下降。更糟的是，該銀行同意就其在金融危機之前的抵押貸款支持證券交易支付70億美元，與檢方達成和解。這個金額是分析師此前初步預計值的兩倍，更是花旗最初愿意支付金額的20倍。但是，緊隨所有的這些壞消息之后，花旗的股價上漲。
In part, that is because Citi's troubles are, for the most part, reassuringly typical of American banks. Wells Fargo, America's biggest bank by valuation, had previously announced its first decline in earnings per share since the financial crisis thanks largely to the refinancing drought. By the same token, Citi's income from trading bonds, currencies and derivatives fell no more dramatically than that of its rivals.
某種程度上，這是因為花旗的麻煩在很大程度上使眾多典型的美國銀行放下了心。受金融危機影響，美國市值最高的富國銀行此前首次宣布每股收益下降，很大程度上要歸結于再融資的干涸。同樣的道理，花旗買賣債券、貨幣和衍生品的收入下降，其競爭對手也沒討到什么好。
Even the settlement may have cheered investors. Although the accompanying statement of facts fingered the bank for giving misleading information about the quality of the mortgages that underpinned securities it sold, there was little to fuel private lawsuits seeking compensation. The most incriminating element was an e-mail from an unnamed trader saying, “I would not be surprised if half of these loans went down.” No employees have been charged with any sort of fraud related to the sales. Moreover, a provision of the settlement protects Citi from prosecution on similar grounds for its sales from 2005 to 2007 of another sort of toxic financial instrument, collateralised debt obligations.
和解協議可能會使投資者們感到振奮。盡管隨附的聲明已指出銀行故意歪曲抵押貸款質量，提供誤導性資料而出售支持證券，但幾乎沒有激起要求賠償的私人訴訟。大部分控訴材料來自于一位不愿透露姓名的交易員，他發電子郵件稱“這些貸款即使有一半貶值，我也不會感到驚訝。”沒有員工被指控犯有任何形式的與銷售相關的欺詐行為。此外，和解協議中的一項條款將花旗從類似起訴中解救出來，花旗被控自2005年到2007年間銷售債務抵押債券（另一類有毒金融資產）。
Attention is now shifting to Citi's future. Michael Corbat, its boss since 2012, has concentrated on cutting costs and selling unprofitable businesses. But there are also hints of growth: lending rose by 4%, thanks to strong demand from European and American companies. Profits from advising on mergers and underwriting stocks and bonds were up too—possibly a sign of bigger banking opportunities ahead.
現在，眾人都將注意力轉至花旗的未來上。2012年以來，花旗CEO邁克爾?考伯特一直專注于削減成本以及出售無利可圖的業務。然而集團業務也有增長的跡象：得益于歐、美公司的強勁需求，銀行貸款上升了4%。而為兼并和承銷股票及債券提供咨詢服務產生的利潤亦同比增長—這可能標志著銀行業更大的機會即將到來。
Citi's market capitalisation remains far lower than its accounting value, suggesting concerns remain about hidden problems. But the disparity has begun to shrink, as has the premium it pays to borrow. As one fund manager puts it, the debate over Citi's prospects has shifted from whether it might die to how it might survive.
花旗集團的市值仍遠遠低于其賬面價值，意味著仍需關注其潛在問題。但因為它為保證金支付的借款，兩數值之間的差距已經開始縮小。正如一位基金經理所說的那樣，花旗的前景之爭已然從它是否會就此消亡轉至它該如何存活下去。
