評論
打印
Business
商業報道
Golden parachutes
金色降落傘
Rip-cord economics
打開經濟降落傘
Pay-offs for the boss need to be better designed
企業老板薪酬結構須改善
RICH rewards for departing bosses are not popular.
離職的老板還領著厚餉總讓人難以接受。
After Sir Fred Goodwin led Royal Bank of Scotland into a ditch and dumped the bill on British taxpayers, he left with a pension of over ￡700,000 a year.
弗雷德?古德溫爵士把蘇格蘭皇家銀行推進深坑，繼而用英國納稅人的真金白銀買單走人之后，居然每年還享有70萬英鎊的退休金。
The Sun, a tabloid, said he had screwed the nation.
英國小報太陽報直陳其把整個國家都搞砸了。
Yet golden parachutes have their uses.
不過金色降落傘條款也并非一無是處。
If well-designed, they align the boss's interests more closely with those of shareholders.
如果妥善擬備該等條款，老板的利益會更緊密地和股東利益協調一致。
Suppose, for example, a takeover is brewing.
例如，在擬收購的項目中，該等條款的作用就可見一斑。
Takeovers are usually lucrative for shareholders of the target firm:
對于目標公司的股東而言，收購通常會帶來豐厚回報：
in America between 1990 and 2008, they have received a median premium of 35%. But the boss's interests are quite different.
在美國1990年至2008年間的收購項目中，目標公司股東的收益溢價中值為35%。
If the firm is acquired, he is likely to be fired.
但老板的權益相去甚遠；如果公司最終被收購，其可能官位難保。
A golden parachute can persuade the boss not to obstruct a takeover.
妥善的金色降落傘條款可促使老板不為收購設置障礙。
But their notoriety dissuades firms from using them.
但鑒于該條款通常不受歡迎，公司不太會動用。
Dirk Jenter of Stanford University and Katharina Lewellen of Tuck Business School find that golden parachutes are rarer and stingier than they should be.
斯坦福大學的德克?珍特和塔克商學院的卡特琳娜?盧埃林研究認為：金色降落傘條款不應該像現在這般罕見且苛刻。
To test whether bosses block takeovers, they looked at what happens when they are nearing retirement, and therefore have no future career to sacrifice.
為核查企業老板是否會因其自身原因選擇阻礙收購，這兩位學者研究了臨近退休的老板會如何處理收購項目。
Using data on American public firms from 1992 to 2008, they found that companies with a boss aged 65 or over were 50% more likely to be taken over.
他們分析了1992年至2008年美國上市公司的數據，結果顯示：老板年齡在65歲以上的公司被收購的可能性高出50%。
Another paper, by Eliezer Fich and Ralph Walkling of Drexel University and Anh Tran of Cass Business School,
德雷塞爾大學的埃利澤?芬奇、拉爾夫?沃克林與卡斯商學院的陳安在一篇共同發表的論文中指出：
found that when golden parachutes are larger, proposed mergers are more likely to be completed,
如果金色降落傘的力度增強，擬合并項目達成的可能性更大，
but buyers pay less for the shares of the target firm.
但買方就目標公司股份所支付的對價則減少。
The data from Mr Jenter and Ms Lewellen show that when the boss of the target firm is old, buyers pay an average premium of 26%.
珍特與盧埃林的統計數據顯示：如果目標公司的老板年屆退休，買方支付的平均溢價為26%；
For younger bosses, the premium is 33%.
而對于老板年齡較輕的公司，則為33%。
This makes sense. If younger bosses are more reluctant to sell, it will cost more to overcome their objections.
這就說明了問題所在：年輕的老板相對不太愿意售出其公司，所以買方須支付更高溢價以平息其反對意見。
So boards must strike a balance.
所以，董事會必須尋求一種平衡。
If the boss's golden parachute is too miserly, he may block a deal that would benefit shareholders.
若金色降落傘條款對企業老板過于不利，其可能會干預對股東有利的交易；
If it is too generous, he may fail to negotiate hard with potential buyers.
反之，若金色降落傘條款對其過于優厚，其可能不愿盡心盡力與擬收購方談判。
As with real parachutes, poor design can have serious consequences.
跟真正的降落傘一樣，劣質的金色降落傘所帶來的后果可能不堪設想。
