評論
打印
Business
商業
Dual-class share structures
雙重股份結構
The cost of control
控制的成本
The trouble with non-voting shares
沒有表決權的股票帶來的麻煩
SHAREHOLDERS in News Corporation have only themselves to blame.
新聞集團的股東只能怪他們自己。
When they entrusted Rupert Murdoch with their money, they knew he would not let them tell him what to do with it.
當初他們信任魯伯特·默多克，把自己的錢交給他時并沒指望默多克會按照他們的意愿投資。
The Murdoch family owns about 12% of the company but controls almost 40% of the votes, through a special class of shares which have superior voting rights.
默多克家族擁有公司12％的股份，不過通過一個特設的控股階層—該階層有優先投票權—掌控著40％的選票。
Such dual-class share structures are quite common, especially at media firms.
如此這般的雙重階級”股份結構很普遍，尤其是在多媒體行業。
They can shield managers from stockmarket short-termism and hostile takeovers. But they cause problems, too.
這樣經理人能避開短期證券交易和不懷好意的接管，但問題也是有的。
Two studies of American firms by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, covering the years from 1994 to 2002, found that dual-class firms perform worse than comparable firms where all shares confer equal voting rights.
1994年到2002年，從Paul Gompers，Joy Ishii 和 Andrew Metrick主持的兩個關于美國公司的研究發現雙重結構的公司比那些實行平等投票的企業，表現要糟糕。
Dual-class firms are fonder of debt than equity, to prevent the dilution of controlling stakes.
雙重階級公司比起普通股更熱衷債權，以防止所控股被削弱。
Yet surprisingly, their shares do not trade at a big discount on stockmarkets.
但讓人驚訝的是，他們的股票并未在證券市場受到賤價售賣的待遇。
A study by Chad Zutter and Scott Smart found that dual-class initial public offerings achieved only slightly lower price-earnings and price-sales ratios than comparable single-class IPOs.
由Chad Zutter和Scott Smart所做的一項調查發現，雙階級公司首次公開發售的股份，比起單階級公司，本益比和營收比只稍微低了一點點。
Nor does this strange ownership model show any sign of going out of fashion.
這種陌生的所有權形式也沒顯露出任何過時的信號。
There were 12 dual-class IPOs in America last year, not far from the norm for the nine-year period in the 1990s studied by Mr Zutter and Mr Smart.
根據Zutter 先生和 Smart先生的調查，去年在美國首次公開發行股票的公司里有12家是雙級公司，與90年代的九年階段標準差不多。
Dual-class structures are not just a way for press barons to keep their hands on the hatchet with which they threaten governments.
雙階級結構不僅是報業巨頭依之拿捏政府的厲斧。
Internet firms love them, too, since they allow founders brimming with self-belief to raise cash without surrendering control.
因特網公司也愛他們，因為這種形式能使公司的創始人放手集資而不必顧及周遭的控制。
Google's IPO in 2004 involved two classes of share.
谷歌2004年首次公開發行股票是有兩級股票，
LinkedIn followed suit this year.
今年LinkedIn也隨之仿效。
The IPO filings of Zynga and Groupon would also grant managers control over voting rights.
而Zynga和Groupon首次公開發行股票的文件也給予了經理人大于控制投票權的權力。
Investors who seek long-term gains may be happy to cede control if they think the boss is a genius.
如果覺得那個企業的老板是個天才，那些追求長期盈利的投資者也許樂意放棄控制權。
It worked for the holders of B shares in Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway.
手握Berkshire HathawayB型股票的投資者就是，該公司老板是Warren Buffett。
It once worked for investors in Mr Murdoch, too.
曾經默多克先生的投資者也是，
But tech punters have not been so lucky.
不過那些看好技術的就沒這么好運了。
The number of dual-class firms listed in America fell from 482 in 2000 to 362 in 2002 as the dotcom bubble burst.
網絡泡沫的破滅使美國的雙級公司數量從2000年的482家減到了2002年的362家。
If the current internet boom follows a similar path, News Corporation shareholders will not be the only ones feeling second-class.
如果現今興旺的因特網產業也是如此，那么新聞集團的股東將不會是唯一感到被看成二流的人。
