評論
打印
Unit 12 The Indispensable Opposition
不可缺少的反對派
Walter Lippmann
沃爾特·李普曼
Were they pressed hard enough, most men would probably confess that political freedom—that is to say, the right to speak freely and to act in opposition—is a noble ideal rather than a practical necessity. As the case for freedom is generally put today, the argument lends itself to this feeling. It is made to appear that, whereas each man claims his freedom as a matter of right, the freedom he accords to other men is a matter of toleration. Thus, the defense of freedom of opinion tends to rest not on its substantial, beneficial, and indispensable consequences, but on a somewhat eccentric, a rather vaguely benevolent, attachment to an abstraction.
倘若充分加以探究，大多數人可能都會承認，政治自由——自由說話和采取對立行動的權利——是崇高的理想，而非實際需要，因為現今人們一般是這樣看待自由的，上述論點適合于這種想法。挑明了來看，盡管人人聲稱自由是權利問題，個人給予他人的那份自由卻是寬容問題。因此，人們往往不是從言論自由那巨大、有益和不可或缺的結果來為它辯護，而是把它看成多少有些古怪、依稀讓人覺得慷慨仁慈、和一種抽象概念聯系在一起的東西。
It is all very well to say with Voltaire,"I wholly disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it," but as a matter of fact most men will not defend to the death the rights of other men: If they disapprove sufficiently of what other men say, they will somehow suppress those men if they can.
借用伏爾泰的話是十分恰當的：“我完全不贊成你所說的話，但是我愿至死捍衛你說話的權荊。”不過，事實上大多數人不會至死捍衛他人的權利：要是他們很不贊成他人的言論，只要可能他們就會設法去壓制那些人。
So, if this is the best that can be said for liberty of opinion, that a man must tolerate his opponents because everyone has a "right" to say what he pleases, then we shall find that liberty of opinion is a luxury, safe only in pleasant times when men can be tolerant because they are not deeply and vitally concerned.
因此，如果主張輿論自由的最好的說法是：個人必須容忍他的反對者，因為人人都有“權別”暢所欲言，那么我們將會發現輿論自由是一種奢侈，只有在切身重要利益不受影響從而能夠做到寬容的愉快情境下才能確保這份奢侈。
Yet actually, as a matter of historic fact, there is a much stronger foundation for the great constitutional right of freedom of speech, and as a matter of practical human experience there is a much more compelling reason for cultivating the habits of free men. We take, it seems to me, a naively self-righteous view when we argue as if the right of our opponents to speak were something that we protect because we are magnanimous, noble, and unselfish.
不過實際上，從歷史事實來看，言論自由的偉大憲法權利有著堅固得多的基礎，從人類實際經驗來看，也有更加令人信服得多的理由去培養自由的人的習慣。在我看來，我們爭論時采取了一種幼稚的自以為是的觀點，好像我們保護對手的言論權利是由于我們的大度、高尚而且無私。
