日韩色综合-日韩色中色-日韩色在线-日韩色哟哟-国产ts在线视频-国产suv精品一区二区69

手機(jī)APP下載

您現(xiàn)在的位置: 首頁 > 在線廣播 > PBS高端訪談 > PBS訪談社會(huì)系列 > 正文

PBS高端訪談:朝鮮從烏克蘭一家工廠獲得火箭引擎

編輯:max ?  可可英語APP下載 |  可可官方微信:ikekenet
  


掃描二維碼進(jìn)行跟讀打分訓(xùn)練

HARI SREENIVASAN: We return to the North Korea story.

Moments ago, the regime's news agency said its leader, Kim Jong-un, has been briefed on plans for a missile test that would splash down near the U.S. territory of Guam.

And, as we reported earlier, Defense Secretary Mattis vowed today to shoot down any missile fired.

But where the regime is getting the engines for its new missiles is the subject of provocative new report. Its author says a factory in Ukraine is the source.

We go to special correspondent Nick Schifrin for more.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Joining me now is Michael Elleman. He's a senior fellow for missile defense at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former consultant to the Pentagon. And Melissa Hanham is a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute.

And thank you both for being here.

Mike, let's start with you, because you wrote the paper.

You come out with a notion that North Korea has advanced from middle-range missiles to ICBMs fast than any country has. And your notion is they got technology, they stole the technology, specifically from Eastern Ukraine. What's the evidence?

MICHAEL ELLEMAN, International Institute for Strategic Studies: The engines they are using for the longer-range missiles has an appearance that's very similar to a well-known engine family that originates in Russia and Ukraine.

And I have talked with sources that are — that have been to some facilities in Ukraine in the recent time, and they have seen the modifications that would have to be made from this existing engine of Russian-Ukrainian heritage to the one we see in the North Korean missiles.

And that happened rather recently, and one even bragged about having made the transformation or the remodeling of the pumping system. And then you look at the performance characteristics of the engine in the North Korean missiles, you get almost a precise match of capability.

And when you combine all those, it leads me to believe that sources in either Ukraine or Russia allowed these engines to make their way to North Korea.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Now, Melissa, I want to turn to you.

This paper is not without its critics. And you and I have discussed whether the paper actually underestimates whether North Korea itself can have built this engine, rather than have stolen it.

朝鮮從烏克蘭一家工廠獲得火箭引擎

MELISSA HANHAM, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey: It's more likely that they are perhaps borrowing some design influence, but not actually importing engines at all.

I think it's really common to believe that North Korea is backwards, that, you know, one of the common memes we see is that its lights are off at night. Really, what's happened in North Korea is that they have marshaled their resources, limited though they are, towards their military program.

And the new engines that we are seeing now have marked differences from others, and, in many cases, I think it is safe to say that they are largely indigenous, though that there are commonalities between all engines.

NICK SCHIFRIN: And, Mike, what's wrong with that? Is North Korea not capable of building these kinds of engine, or perhaps there are Ukrainian-Russian workers inside of North Korea?

MICHAEL ELLEMAN: Well, we haven't seen an indigenously developed engine before this.

Most countries start with smaller engines and slowly build up to much larger ones. The one we're talking about here that's powering their long-range missiles generates the equivalent of 40 tons of thrust, which is an enormous amount of energy.

One would expect them to start off with smaller engines in an indigenous design. So, when I look at those things, it's just hard for me to believe that suddenly the first engine North Korea has ever made produces this much thrust and it's successful, by the way, in each one of these tests.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Mike, I have talked to members of the intelligence community today. They actually echo Melissa's argument that North Korea has more capacity than you give them credit for.

And the Ukrainian government, as you know, has come out against your report today. Alexander Turchinov, he's the secretary of National Security and Defense Council. He said: "Ukraine has never supplied rocket engines and any missile technology to North Korea. We believe that this anti-Ukrainian campaign" — that's a reference to you — "was triggered by Russian secret services to cover their participation in the North Korean nuclear and missile programs."

Is Ukraine wrong, or it possible the Ukrainian government doesn't know?

MICHAEL ELLEMAN: Well, I would argue that they don't know.

In my article, I specifically say that it's very unlikely that the government itself was involved. I would be very surprised if even executives from the Yuzhmash factory were involved.

I think this is more likely to be rogue actors. There are a number of elicit arms traders throughout the former Soviet Union, including Russia, including Ukraine. Let's not forget that the location of the Yuzhmash factories is only a couple hundred kilometers from where there is an active battle going between Ukraine and the separatists in Eastern Ukraine.

And this often gives rise to a lot of illicit markets. So, I'm not surprised the Ukrainian government is upset about the reporting, but I'm just trying to report on the facts as I know them. And I can assure you I'm not working for the Russian government.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Melissa, wrap this up for us quickly.

Is there any fear, from your perspective, that the longer we assume the North Koreans are backwards or not capable, the quicker we run out of time?

MELISSA HANHAM: The Chamjin missile factory is famous for production of missile parts. And their procurement activities over the last few years have definitely shown that they have imported the machine tools that they need in order to produce these types of engines and other parts of missiles that are needed.

I don't know where you would get a Nodong engine if they were not produced locally in North Korea, for example. Many of the photographs of Kim Jong-un visiting the facilities are underground. And I think that's why there isn't a lot of talk about them, but they do exist.

And I think, as you mentioned earlier, the longer we wait in order to engage North Korea in negotiation, the more likely their technical capabilities and the sheer numbers of these missiles and trucks will go up.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Melissa Hanham, Mike Elleman, thank you very much.

MICHAEL ELLEMAN: Thank you.

MELISSA HANHAM: Thank you.

重點(diǎn)單詞   查看全部解釋    
correspondent [.kɔri'spɔndənt]

想一想再看

n. 通訊記者,通信者
adj. 與 ...

聯(lián)想記憶
precise [pri'sais]

想一想再看

adj. 精確的,準(zhǔn)確的,嚴(yán)格的,恰好的

聯(lián)想記憶
sheer [ʃiə]

想一想再看

adj. 純粹的,全然的,陡峭的
adv. 完

 
territory ['teritəri]

想一想再看

n. 領(lǐng)土,版圖,領(lǐng)域,范圍

聯(lián)想記憶
provocative [prə'vɔkətiv]

想一想再看

adj. 氣人的,挑撥的,刺激的
n. 刺激物

聯(lián)想記憶
transformation [.trænsfə'meiʃən]

想一想再看

n. 轉(zhuǎn)型,轉(zhuǎn)化,改造

聯(lián)想記憶
assure [ə'ʃuə]

想一想再看

vt. 使確信,使放心,確保

聯(lián)想記憶
senior ['si:njə]

想一想再看

adj. 年長的,高級(jí)的,資深的,地位較高的

聯(lián)想記憶
unlikely [ʌn'laikli]

想一想再看

adj. 不太可能的

 
advanced [əd'vɑ:nst]

想一想再看

adj. 高級(jí)的,先進(jìn)的

 
?

最新文章

可可英語官方微信(微信號(hào):ikekenet)

每天向大家推送短小精悍的英語學(xué)習(xí)資料.

添加方式1.掃描上方可可官方微信二維碼。
添加方式2.搜索微信號(hào)ikekenet添加即可。
主站蜘蛛池模板: 王源个人资料简介身高| 电影百度百科| 教育电视台| 音乐僵尸演员表| 辩论赛作文| 在线观看亚| 大学生搜| 风月宝鉴电影剧情解析| 教育在线教育平台直播| stylistic device| 舌吻做爰视频舌吻| 动漫头像男| 尹邵熙饰演的全部电影| 金太勋| 红色一号电影| 爱人的眼睛是第八大洋什么意思?| 青春之歌电影演员表名单| 美国伦理小樱桃1| right here waiting中文版| 日韩免费观看视频| 女生被男生操视频| 双生姐妹| 情侣签名一男一女简短| 丰满妇女做a级毛片免费观看| 驯服型男刑警队长| 心跳源计划演员表| 男生女生向前冲第六季2014| 滑胎最凶的食物孕早期| 《高校教师》日本电影| 六级词汇电子版| 碧血蓝天| 女同版痴汉电车| 什么是实现碳达峰碳中和目标的基础路径| 胖女人做爰全过程免费的视频| 抖音电脑版| 凌晨晚餐| 日韩在线日韩| 蜘蛛夫人:超感觉醒 电影| 挠丝袜| 楼下的女邻居| 阴道电影|