評論
打印
He ran media operations inside the royal court, which involved directing the country’s local media,
他負責運作王室內部舉辦的媒體活動，包括引導該國的地方媒體，
arranging interviews for foreign journalists with the crown prince,
安排王儲會見外國記者，
and using his Twitter following of 1.35 million to marshal the kingdom’s online defenders against enemies including Qatar, Iran and Canada, as well as dissident Saudi voices like Mr. Khashoggi’s.
并利用他那135萬推特粉絲組織王國的網絡防線，對抗卡塔爾，伊朗和加拿大等敵人以及哈蘇吉等持不同政見的沙特人。
For a while, he tweeted using the hashtag #The_Black_List, calling on his followers to suggest perceived enemies of the kingdom.
有一段時間，他還用#黑名單這一標簽發布推文，呼吁粉絲推薦他們眼中的王國的敵人給他。
"Saudi Arabia and its brothers do what they say. That’s a promise," he tweeted last year.
“沙特阿拉伯和他的兄弟們言出必行。這是我們的承諾，”去年他在推文中寫到，
"Add every name you think should be added to #The_Black_List using the hashtag.
“請將你認為應該加入到#黑名單中的每一個名字都用這一話題列出來。
We will filter them and track them starting now."
我們將從現在開始對他們進行過濾和跟蹤?！?/div>
A Suspected Mole Inside Twitter
有間諜嫌疑的推特內部人員
Twitter executives first became aware of a possible plot to infiltrate user accounts at the end of 2015,
推特高管們最早是在2015年年底意識到沙特可能設計了一個滲透用戶賬戶的陰謀的，
when Western intelligence officials told them
當時，西方情報官員告訴他們
that the Saudis were grooming an employee, Ali Alzabarah, to spy on the accounts of dissidents and others,
沙特正在給他們的一位名叫“阿里·阿爾扎巴拉”的員工洗腦，讓他監視異見人士之類的人的賬戶。
according to five people briefed on the matter.
據五位知情人士透露。
They requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
五位均要求匿名，因為他們無權公開發言。
Mr. Alzabarah had joined Twitter in 2013
阿爾扎巴拉于2013年加入了推特，
and had risen through the ranks to an engineering position
一步一步升到了工程師級別，
that gave him access to the personal information and account activity of Twitter’s users,
自此便有了訪問推特用戶的個人信息和賬戶活動信息，
including phone numbers and I. P. addresses, unique identifiers for devices connected to the internet.
包括他們的電話號碼，IP地址，多個設備同步所需的唯一標識等，的權限。
The intelligence officials told the Twitter executives that Mr. Alzabarah had grown closer to Saudi intelligence operatives,
情報官員們告訴推特的高管們，阿爾扎巴拉和沙特情報人員走得越來越近了，
who eventually persuaded him to peer into several user accounts,
就是他們最終說服他偷窺多位用戶的賬戶信息的，
according to three of the people briefed on the matter.
據三位知情人士透露。
Caught off guard by the government outreach, the Twitter executives placed Mr. Alzabarah on administrative leave,
此后，被沙特政府的越權行為打了個措手不及的推特給阿爾扎巴拉安排了行政休假，
questioned him and conducted a forensic analysis to determine what information he may have accessed.
對他進行了質詢同時還做了取證分析，確定他可能已經訪問過的信息。
They could not find evidence that he had handed over Twitter data to the Saudi government,
他們沒能找到表明他已經將推特數據交給了沙特政府的證據，
but they nonetheless fired him in December 2015.
但他們還是在2015年12月解雇了他。
Mr. Alzabarah returned to Saudi Arabia shortly after, taking few possessions with him.
之后不久阿爾扎巴拉便返回了沙特，幾乎未攜帶任何財產。
He now works with the Saudi government, a person briefed on the matter said.
現在他已經在為沙特政府效力了，據知情人士透露。
A spokesman for Twitter declined to comment.
某推特發言人拒絕針對此事發表評論。
Mr. Alzabarah did not respond to requests for comment, nor did Saudi officials.
阿爾扎巴拉自己也沒有回應對他提出的評論請求，沙特官員也是。
On Dec. 11, 2015, Twitter sent out safety notices to the owners of a few dozen accounts Mr. Alzabarah had accessed.
2015年12月11日，推特向阿爾扎巴拉訪問過的幾十個賬戶的所有者發放了安全通知。
Among them were security and privacy researchers, surveillance specialists, policy academics and journalists.
這些人中有安全和隱私研究人員，監控專家，政策學者和記者。
A number of them worked for the Tor project,
其中有一部分人也是Tor項目的工作人員，
an organization that trains activists and reporters on how to protect their privacy.
該項目旨在為活動家和記者提供隱私保護方面的培訓。
譯文由可可原創，僅供學習交流使用，未經許可請勿轉載。
