評論
打印
The authors argue that the fees prevent genuine claimants from enforcing their employment rights.
該書的作者認(rèn)為費(fèi)用阻止了真正的索賠人行使他們的就業(yè)權(quán)利。
In many cases the expected payoff is lower than the fee for starting the tribunal—which is not necessarily refunded even if the claim is upheld.
在很多案例中期望的報(bào)酬比一次開庭的費(fèi)用低—即使訴求被贊成，開庭費(fèi)用也不會退還。
The authors calculate that abandoning even a claim guaranteed to succeed is the rational response for 35-50% of would-be claimants.
該書的作者推測，對于35-50%的潛在索賠人而言，放棄即使是一次勢在必得的索賠是理性反應(yīng)。
Worse, there is little evidence that the fees have deterred only frivolous or mendacious claims.
更糟的是，幾乎沒有證據(jù)證明費(fèi)用只制止了無用的或是虛偽的訴求。
If that were the case one would expect the success rate of claimants to have risen.
如果是這樣的話，人們將期望索賠人成功率上升。
Instead, since 2012-13 the proportion of complaints that are struck out or dismissed has roughly doubled.
相反，自2012-2013年，被踢出局或駁回的投訴比重約已加倍了。
It may be that people with small but legitimate grievances have been deterred, whereas those who feel confident enough to game the system have gone ahead.
可能是那些有小量但合法不滿的人們被制止了，而那些足夠自信去玩弄體制的人已經(jīng)走在前面了。
Even if convinced by such arguments, the Supreme Court may not recommend the abolition of fees entirely.
即使被這種看法說服，最高法院可能也不會建議費(fèi)用完全被廢除。
A report last year from the Justice Committee of the House of Commons acknowledged that a contribution by users to the costs of operating courts was not objectionable in principle.
去年下議院司法委員會的一項(xiàng)報(bào)告承認(rèn)使用者對運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)法庭的費(fèi)用的貢獻(xiàn)原則上并不是令人反感的。
A recent government review made a similar argument.
最近一次政府評論也做了相似的看法。
Yet Ms Adams and Mr Prassl argue that the steepness of the fees makes them a “disproportionate restriction on litigants' right of access to the employment tribunals”.
但是Ms Adams 和Mr Prassl argue認(rèn)為，費(fèi)用的陡度使他們成了“對訴訟當(dāng)事人通往就業(yè)法庭不成比例的限制”。
That is bad not just for litigants but for Britain's labour market generally.
這不僅對訴訟當(dāng)事人不好，對英國的總體的勞動(dòng)市場也不利。
譯文來源考研英語時(shí)事閱讀
