The economic battleground
經濟戰場
Gas and chocolate
天然氣和巧克力
Supporting Ukraine's economy will not be easy or cheap
支持烏克蘭的經濟怕是既不容易也不廉價
THE Ukrainian economy is a mess.
烏克蘭的經濟現在是一片混亂。
Its currency, the hryvnia, has lost almost 20% of its value in the past month.
過去的一個月,其貨幣格里夫納已經貶值將近20%。
Foreign-exchange reserves have tumbled to $15 billion, despite the imposition of capital controls.
盡管實行資本管制, 外匯儲備還是已跌至150億美元。
Bank deposits fell by more than 3% in the first half of February and, since the revolution, the government has imposed limits on further withdrawals.
二月上旬,銀行存款下跌超過3%,自革命以來, 政府進一步限制提款。

Tax revenues have collapsed and pension payments have been delayed.
稅收收入已經崩潰, 養老金也被推遲。
The country was in poor-enough economic shape before all this: it was one of the reasons why Viktor Yanukovych, the deposed president, chose $15 billion in Russian loans over a deal with the European Union—the decision that led to his downfall.
此前,烏克蘭的經濟就已經很是貧困:這也是被廢黜的總統亞努科維奇選擇了俄羅斯150億美元的貸款而不是與歐洲聯盟的原因之一,此決定導致了他的垮臺。
Having propped up the Ukrainian economy, Russia seems to have the power, as energy provider, trading partner and creditor, to cripple it.
作為烏克蘭的能源供應商, 貿易伙伴和債權人,俄羅斯支持過烏克蘭的經濟, 俄羅斯似乎也有能力削弱它。
The most obvious economic attack would be to cut off the Ukraine's gas.
最明顯的經濟攻擊將是切斷烏克蘭的天然氣。
That need not have huge effects either on western customers whose gas comes via Ukraine or on Russian gas earnings.
這需要不會對天然氣運輸途經烏克蘭的西方客戶或俄羅斯天然氣收入產生較大影響。
Other Russian pipelines could handle much of the gas.
其他俄羅斯管道可以處理大部分的天然氣。
But it would still be a costly tactic, and one to which the Ukrainians are not as vulnerable as they might seem.
但這仍將是一個昂貴的策略, 烏克蘭人也沒有他們看起來那么脆弱。
They have large gas-storage facilities conveniently situated in the west of the country. How much gas the stores contain is unclear, and its ownership is murky—but after a mild winter there is probably a buffer of several months.
該國西部地區,他們有大型油氣儲備設施。天然氣存儲到底有多少還不清楚, 其所有權也很模糊,冬季之后能支撐幾個月來緩沖。
Moreover, Ukraine should be able to import gas from Slovakia, reversing the flow of a main east-west pipeline.
此外, 烏克蘭還能從斯洛伐克進口天然氣,扭轉一條重要的東西方管道的流動。
It has twice done this on smaller pipelines during previous disputes with Russia.
之前與俄羅斯發生過糾紛,他們兩次就修建好了一些較小的管道。
Trade is also a weapon which imposes costs on the aggressor, but an easier one to wield with precision.
貿易也是一種武器, 把成本強加于侵略者,更容易而且精確行使。
A quarter of Ukraine's exports head east and Vladimir Putin is not shy about messing with them; Russian restrictions, like those placed on Ukrainian chocolate last year, could cost the country billions, with the losses targeted on particular sectors, even particular oligarchs.
烏克蘭四分之一的出口是往東方出口,弗拉基米爾普京并不羞于干擾;俄羅斯對其進行限制,去年曾擱置烏克蘭出口的巧克力造成了上十億的損失,損失針對特定的行業,甚至特定的寡頭。
This week Russia banned pork from Ukraine, saying political instability had undermined safety inspections.
本周俄羅斯禁止從烏克蘭進口豬肉,聲稱烏克蘭的政治不穩定已經破壞了安全檢查。
Though Mr Putin says he wants to strengthen trade, instability is unlikely to be in short supply over the coming months.
盡管普京先生表示, 他希望加強貿易,在未來的幾個月不太可能出現供應不足。
As a creditor, Russia has given itself room for mischievous manoeuvre.
作為債權人,俄羅斯已經給自己惡意操縱的空間。
The way its bail-out to Mr Yanukovych, $3 billion of which was delivered before the revolution, was structured gives Mr Putin leverage that could scupper any attempts to reach agreements with other creditors in advance of forthcoming payments.
其對亞努科維奇的紓困,革命之前, 就已給了30億美元,普京目的是破壞烏克蘭與其他債權人事先達成協議。
And some fine print stipulates that if Ukraine's debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60% it would automatically be in default.
一些細則規定, 如果烏克蘭的債務占國民生產總值的比率超過60%, 俄羅斯可以不履行協議。
Russia's legal poison pills could make dealing with Ukraine's debts harder at a time when they are sure to grow; without loans from the West the government will run out of money.
俄羅斯的法律毒丸可以讓讓烏克蘭因此債務交易更加困難; 但沒有從西方政府貸款,錢還是會用光。
If Ukraine had sensible economic policies such loans would be easily made, since the country's current debt burden, at 47% of GDP, is not excessive.
如果烏克蘭有明智的經濟政策, 這種貸款會很容易, 因為這個國家目前的債務負擔占GDP的47%, 并不過多。
But Ukraine has almost never had sensible policies; it has profligate ones, and the investors who used to support that profligacy when Ukraine offered high interest rates and a stable currency are now nowhere to be seen.
但烏克蘭幾乎從來沒有明智的政策, 揮霍無度,曾經支持 揮霍的投資者們所支持烏克蘭的高利率和穩定的貨幣政策現在也不可行了。
Time for the IMF, which has ample experience with this kind of balance-of-payments crisis.
國際貨幣基金組織行動的時候了,它有足夠的經驗處理這種國際收支平衡危機。
The standard remedy includes tough reforms—in Ukraine's case, a large depreciation, slashed energy subsidies and big budget cuts—in return for funds to tide the country over until it can once again borrow from private markets.
規范的補救措施包括艱難的改革,對于烏克蘭的這種情況, 需要一次貨幣大貶值, 削減能源補貼和大幅削減財政預算來換取資金,直到這個國家渡過難關, 直到能再一次實行私人市場。
Ukraine probably needs $3 billion to $4 billion in budgetary finance to last until after the May election.
烏克蘭可能需要30億美元到40億美元財政預算將持續到5月大選之后。
A larger loan of $15 billion would allow it to meet its external financial obligations for the next year.
150億美元更大的貸款, 將可能會讓其完成外部金融義務。
America is keen for the IMF to negotiate a big package of loans and reforms as soon as possible, arguing that Ukraine's transitional government not only needs the support, but also can make progress where others have failed.
美國希望國際貨幣基金組織協商盡快提供大的貸款和改革方案, 認為烏克蘭的過渡政府不僅需要支持, 也可以在別人失敗的地方取得進展。
Alexander Turchinov, the interim president, has already said he would accept all the IMF's terms, including draconian spending cuts.
Alexander Turchinov臨時總統已經表示, 他將接受所有國際貨幣基金組織的條件, 包括嚴厲的削減開支。
But many of the IMF's technocrats, and its member countries, dislike the idea of America using the fund as a geopolitical tool—worries given a bitter edge by the fact that America's Congress recently refused to approve an expansion of the fund's coffers.
但國際貨幣基金組織的許多技術專家, 和它的成員國,不喜歡美國的想法,把基金作為地緣政治工具-擔心最近美國國會拒絕批準擴大基金的資金是給定了一個痛苦的邊緣。
They would prefer that the IMF chip in $1 billion, with few strings attached, under its Rapid Financing Instrument.
貨幣基金采取快速的融資,給其10億美元 并附加一些條件。
Other short-term help is available.
他們更希望國際其他短期幫助也可以。
On March 5th the EU offered 1.6 billion in short-term macroeconomic assistance, as well as a lot of development aid in the longer term.
3月5日歐盟提供16億作為短期宏觀經濟援助, 以及大量的長期發展援助。
Add in the $1 billion loan guarantee announced by John Kerry this week and Ukraine can probably stumble along until May, at which point a newly elected government could negotiate a long-term package.
約翰克里在本周宣布了10億美元貸款擔保,到5月烏克蘭可能會踉蹌前行 , 那時新當選的政府可以協商一個長期計劃。
The politics of the rescue may get harder when it becomes clear where some of the money will end up.
我們很清楚,隨著錢的用完,救援舉措也會變得困難。
Using Western taxpayer's money to pay off Mr Putin or the hedge funds that bought high-yielding Ukrainian debt is an ugly prospect.
用西方納稅人的錢來償還普京或者高收益債券的對沖基金是一個丑陋的前景。
So Ukraine may try to renegotiate terms with its bondholders, which would be where Mr Putin's leverage could come into play.
所以烏克蘭可能嘗試與債券持有人重新談判合同條款, 普京也會利用杠桿作用做文章。
But it would also be where a reform plan with solid Western support would yield dividends.
這也將是一個西方支持的改革計劃,會產生紅利。
If Ukraine's economy is being transformed and the IMF is satisfied, Russian bloody-mindedness need not slow the country's return to the market, even if it forces a form of default.
如果烏克蘭的經濟轉變了, 國際貨幣基金組織對其滿意, 需要俄羅斯不找茬阻礙烏克蘭重返市場, 即便是它迫使違約。
But if Ukraine's reform commitment wobbles, Russia has room to cause yet more trouble.
但如果烏克蘭改革承諾一旦晃動, 俄羅斯會有機會制造更多的麻煩。